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FOREWORD
This Final Report was prepared by Ultrasystems, Incorporated, Newport
Beach, California, under National Aeronautics and Space Administration contract
NASI-12793. The work was performed between 9 October 1973 and 8 November 1974.
Sponsorship for this work was provided by the Flight Instrumentation Division,
Electronics Directorate, Langley Research Center. The Project Monitor was
Mr. J. Larry Spencer with technical assistance provided by other members of the
Aircraft Electronics Research Section.
The Ultrasystems' Study Leader was Ralph B. Conn. Other participants
in the study were Dr. A. A. Avilienis, Mr. H. 0. Levy, Dr. P. M. Merryman,
Mr. S. R. Pond, Dr. D. A. Rennels, Dr. J. A. Rohr, and Mr. K. L. Whitelaw.
Publication of this report does not constitute NASA approval of the
findings or conclusions indicated in the report. It is published for the
exchange of information and stimulation of ideas.
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1.0 SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
1.1 OBJECTIVE, ACCOMPLISHMENTS, AND CONCLUSIONS
1.1.1 Objective
The objective of this study was to provide concepts and engineering
data from which a highly-reliable, fault-tolerant, reconfigurable computer
system (RCS) for aircraft applications could be designed. For the purposes
of this study, an RCS is defined to be a redundant configuration of off-the-
shelf avionics computers which achieves fault-tolerance through use of a
variety of recovery techniques. A principal study goal was the development
and application of reliability and fault-tolerance assessment techniques.
Particular emphasis was placed on the needs of an all-digital, fly-by-wire
control system appropriate for a passenger-carrying airplane.
1.1.2 Accomplishments
The accomplishments of Contract NAS1-12793 are summarized in the
following five-item list.
1. A complementary analytic-simulative technique (CAST)
for calculation of predicted failure probabilities of
multicomputer systems was evolved.
2. Measures of fault-tolerance applicable to general fault-
tolerant computer systems were defined.
3. CAST was applied to 39 example computer system configura-
tions to provide insight into the important aspects of
these configurations, as well as demonstrate the efficacy
of the approach.
4. A set of customer-provided reliability-enhancement techni-
ques (RETs) was expanded and their individual effectiveness
was evaluated.
5. A set of control laws for a digital fly-by-wire flight
control system was translated into flow charts and computer
sizing and timing for these were estimated (see Appendix A).
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1.1.3 Conclusions
The conclusions reported below were obtained by use of CAST.
They are based on a ten-hour flight and failure rates thought to be applicable
to the off-the-shelf avionics computers studied. The reconfigurable computer
systems were assumed to be composed of as many as five machines.
As shown in Figure 1.1-1, the greatest improvement in system
survivability is obtained by increased redundancy. Each increment of redun-
dancy decreases the i0-hoiur TdiIlu.re probabilLty by apprI nILateIy LWU UorIer
of magnitude. The greatest failureprobability decrease occurs when changing
from triplex to quadruplex, e.g., a 200-fold improvement. Increasing redun-
dancy also increases cost in terms of power, weight, and volume not only due
to the added units but due also to the increased complexity of intercommunica-
tions modules, external electronics modules, and bus switches.
Increasing redundancy has diminishing returns if there are errors
in permanent-recovery algorithm design. This error penalty becomes more
severe with added redundancy. Using simpler recovery algorithms, i.e., those
involving less RCS adaptivity, is a possible way of ensuring error-free recovery.
However, the increase in failure probability for air-transport-type missions
due to decreased adaptivity '(e.g., not adapting the system down to one computer)
is less than that caused by decreased redundancy or recoverability.
Since redundancy has such a large effect on failure probability,
external hardware should have an equivalent redundancy to prevent external
failures from depressing the overall survivability.
The techniques reported here devote much attention to the modeling
of transient faults. The results show that.a knowledge of the transient
environment results in effective transient recovery features. Underestimating
transient duration results in many transients being recorded as permanent,
while overestimating transient duration leaves the system unduly vulnerable
to further faults.
Finally, subject to the qualifications and assumptions described in
the first paragraph of this subsection, configuration assessment has shown that
hardware-aided software configurations provide a lower probability of failure
than mostly-hardware or mostly-software configurations.
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1.2 INTRODUCTION
The configuration types to which CAST is applicable are symmetrical
configurations of five or fewer, synchronized computers. The term symmetrical
is used here to indicate that no one of the computers is used in a supervisory
or executive mode. Each of the computers executes the same program in synchro-
nism with the other machines. The synchronism may be "loose," or tight,"
depending on the mechanization of the configuration, i.e., the configuration
may be one in which the fault-tolerance functions are implemented largely in
software, they may be implemented in a software-hardware combination; or they
may be implemented mostly in hardware. For all of these, the mechanisms for:
the obtaining of input data from the sensors; the error-detection process;
and the supplying of outputs to the actuators are considered to be part of
the configuration. Consideration of software reliability was not considered
to be within the purview of this study.
The architecture of fault-tolerant computing systems is heavily
influenced by the key requirements of reliability, maintenance intervals,
time for fault recovery, structure of the computations to be performed, and
cost or maximum allocation of power, weight, and volume. The avionics applica-
tion of this study is characterized by the following salient attributes:
1. Extreme Reliability Requirements, including "fail-safe"
capability - lives are endangered upon failure.
2. Short Inter-Maintenance Interval - flights seldom exceed 10
hours.
3. Short Fault-Recovery Time - on the order of milliseconds
to prevent degradation of control functions.
4. Moderate Computational Requirements - real-time control,
well within the capacity of candidate machines.
5. Ample Power, Weight and Volume Allocations - a number of
redundant computers may be employed.
To meet the reliability requirements of the avionics application
it is necessary to attain a very high value of "coverage" in the computer
design. It has been shown, that coverage, defined as the conditional prob-
ability, given that a fault occurs, that the fault is properly detected
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and the subsequent "recovery" is successful, is the most sensitive parameter
affecting the reliability of a fault-tolerant digital system. With imper-
fect coverage, addition of redundant units gives little increase in reliability.
For the aircraft application, coverage must closely approach unity in order
to meet the stringent reliability requirements.
As a consequence of the high coverage requirement, a preferred
approach to fault-tolerant computer configurations is massive redundancy.
That is, performing the same computations with several computers and
comparing their outputs in order to provide nearly perfect fault detection
and isolation. When this approach is coupled with a sound recovery algorithm,
high coverage is assured. This approach has obvious cost advantages if
off-the-shelf computers, with minimal internal modifications and external
supporting hardware, can be utilized. Not only can development costs be
saved, but also support software and test procedures can be procured with
the computers.
1.3 SYSTEM ORGANIZATION CONCEPTS
During the RCS study general models and specific examples of
fault-tolerant computer configurations which are appropriate for implemen-
tation using "whole" computer massive redundance were formulated. These
models are sufficiently general to serve as the basis for discussion of
various redundancy options and reliability enhancement techniques. The
more promising options for each configuration were modeled analytically and
simulated to determine their effectiveness.
Three general categories of configurations utilizing "whole"
computer redundancy were formulated. The first, termed the mostly-software
approach, utilizes software for fault detection, voting, recovery and
synchronization. External hardware is held to a minimum. The second, the
hardware-aided software approach, shares fault detection and recovery between
software and external hardware which supplies fault detection and voting.
The third, the mostly-hardware approach, utilizes hardware to perform
fault detection and recovery with the goal of minimizing the amount of
special software required for fault-tolerance. These categories of con-
figurations were examined in detail during the study.
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1.3.1 "Mostly" - Software Configurations
The salient feature of "mostly" software (MSW) configurations is
that external hardware is held to a minimum. Comparison of outputs for
fault-detection and isolation is carried out by software. The interconnect-
ing and synchronization techniques, as well as techniques for fault detection.
and recovery are quite similar for configurations of three or more computers.
And thus a general model is presented which is inclusive of systems with
three four and five computers.
The simplest fault response is to ignore transients and for the
agreeing machines to ignore the subsequent outputs of the machines which
disagree. However, since transient correction is essential in meeting the
stringent reliability requirements of the avionics application, it was
necessary to examine more sophisticated recovery algorithms.
The recovery algorithms must respond to the following three
fault conditions.
1. Permanent Fault - In the case of a permanent fault a
transient recovery attempt will be unsuccessful and it
is necessary to recognize this condition, typically by
repeated disagreements, and terminate attempts at
transient recovery. The subsequent outputs of the machine
are ignored.
2. Transient Fault --Program Undamaged - There exist a
set of transient faults which can be corrected by one
of two simple procedures. One of these recovery techni-
ques, using segmented programs, is designated "rollahead".
The'second of these recovery techniques is called "roll-
back."
3. Transient Faults -- Program Damaged - Transient faults
which result in damage to instructions or constants stored
in memory, cannot be corrected by rollback, restart, or
rollahead techniques. Correction of these fault-effects
requires reloading memory, a process which results in a
much longer recovery time.
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To effect transient recovery* a mechanism must exist for trans-
ferring correct information to the memory of the damaged computer. A salient
feature of the mostly-software configuration is that there is no hardware
mechanism by which agreeing computers can take control of the disagreeing
machine to force rollahead, update memories, etc. Thus even faulty computers
must have a limited degree of autonomy and, in order to provide transient
recovery, it was assumed that transient-damaged computers must maintain a
small interrupt handling routine in order to correct this class of faults.
If memory protection (addressing interlocks) and NDRO technology
is employed, a majority of transient faults will be rollahead or rollback
correctable. However, unless ROM is employed for instructions and constants,
there remains a probability of transients which require memory copy techniques
for correction. Thus rollahead techniques should be backed up with the
capability of copying memory contents to provide adequate coverage. A
typical hybrid transient correction approach would be (1) attempt rollahead,
then if a disagreement recurs, (2) attempt memory copy, and if fault still
persists, (3) consider the computer to contain a permanent fault.
The I/0 structure of the mostly-software configurations must provide:
1. Communication with sensors and activators;
2. Masking of faulty computers;
3. Precisely timed events from commands from computers
which may be unsynchronized by a number of microseconds;
4. Redundancy and single-point-failure protection within
the I/0 structure.
Avionics systems typically contain sensors and actuators at
widely separated locations. The recent trend has been to employ highly
multiplexed I/0 on order to reduce weight and complexity associated with
cabling. Thus bus models were assumed in the analysis of I/0 structures.
It was assumed that two or more redundant busses are employed with a
number of redundant interfaces. Two types of bus structure were considered.
Transient recovery is defined as a recovery effected by the subsystem such
that the number of properly operating computers and their identities before
the fault occurrence and following the recovery are the same.
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The first utilizes a bus dedicated to each of the computers with synchroni-
zation and voting performed in the peripheral units. The second treats
the redundant bus structure as an integral unit in which voting, synchroni-
zation, and bus redundancy management is carried out by a special bus con-
troller. In this case, individual busses and peripheral devices are not
dedicated to any specific computer.
1.3.2 Hardware 
- Aided Software Configurations (HASW)
Hardware-aideu .conliurations are characterized by the use of
external hardware for fault-detection and synchronization. The goals of
this approach are to (1) increase speed of computation and simplify software
by performing the task of comparing state vectors and outputs in hardware,
and (2) to allow the use of off-the-shelf computers with minimal I/0 facilities.
The set of N computers is connected to a set of I/0 busses through a
special External Hardware Interface. This interface may be a single, massively-
redundant structure or a set of identical modules dedicated to either individual
computers or busses. The non-redundant building-block element of the external
hardware interface is designated the External Electronics Module (EEM). The
EEM accepts and buffers outputs from the computers, synchronizes the machines,
provides voting for outputs, provides for inter-computer communications, and
buffers returning inputs.
In order to effect transient recovery, a communication path must
be established such that the agreeing computers can enter data into the
memory of the faulty machine and command its restart. An adaptive voting
capability is utilized within the EEM to allow this intercommunication.
Transient recovery algorithms are similar to those used in the MSW configura-
tions.
System failure occurs in the HASW configurations when all but
two computers have failed and one of the remaining computers suffers either
an uncorrectable transient or a permanent failure. When two computers remain
functional, this condition is designated the Residual Duplex Configuration.
Techniques for recovery from failures in the residual duplex configuration
and continuing computation with a single simplex computer were developed
during the study.
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1.3.3 Mostly-Hardware Configurations
Mostly-hardware configurations are structured in such a way as
to minimize the amount of software required to support fault detection and
recovery. Table 1.3-I indicates the additional supporting software functions
employed in software, hardware-aided and mostly-hardware configurations.
Mostly- Hardware-Aided Mostly-
Software Software Hardware
Fault Detection by Comparison X
Synchronization X
Transient Recovery X X
Recording and Masking Perma- X X
nently Faulty Modules
TABLE 1.3-I SOFTWARE OVERHEAD OF FAULT-TOLERANT
CONFIGURATIONS
The special software features associated with hardware-aided con-
figurations are:
1. Rollback/Rollahead structured programs.
2. Identifying recurring faults and the decision to employ
rollahead, memory copy, or classify a computer as permanently
faulty.
3. Control of data transfers for rollahead and memory copy.
4. Disabling (fault response) faulty machines.
5. Diagnostic programs for recovery when only two computers
remain functional.
6. A "warm" restart capability. A restart point at which
computation can be resumed with a minimum of variables
required for initialization. (Employed to minimize
downtime for transfer of variables at the end of a
memory copy.)
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Mostly-hardware configurations perform the functions associated
with the previously discussed hardware-aided software configurations along
with implementing one or more of the above functions in hardware.
The principal difference'between the mostly hardware and hardware-
aided software configurations is that in the former the system state infor-
mation and recovery decision mechanism resides in a central "hard core".
1.4 EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE
Four design goals were established for the executive. These
goals specify general guidelines for the executive design as well as in-
dicating a particular application in which the executive could be used.
These goals are to design an executive which:
1. Can be readily adapted as an executive model for all
RCS configurations under consideration.
2. Is general enough to support any reasonably foreseeable
avionics application.
3. Makes clearly visible all the features required to
support a digital flight control application.
4. Makes available the necessary parameters for configuration
evaluations.
Since this study is directed toward multicomputer systems rather
than encompassing multiprocessors, a single executive can be designed for
use in each of the computers of the configuration. Thus, the first design
goal ensures that the executive which is designed can be used in all computers
of all configurations being considered, adapted as required by the configuration.
The computational environment imposed by air transport applications
is such that the majority of computations must be performed periodically, al-
though the computations performed will vary with the phase of the flight and
the mode(s) used. Thus the computational requirement imposed by the avionics
environments in which the computer systems being considered will operate
involves primarily periodic, cyclical tasks of varying complexity, rate, and
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duration. The processing of occasional aperiodic tasks is also required. The
executive has been designed to meet both of these requirements and thus be
generally applicable to all avionics applications.
The executive skeleton consists of four distinct modules, each
providing one of the four basic facilities required in an executive for an
avionics computer. The four modules are the scheduler, the input-output
driver, the interrupt processor, and the machine error handler.
The choice of a scheduling mechanism for an executive is the
single most important decision in the design. The selection of the scheduling
mechanism affects other modules in various degrees. For the avionics applica-
tion, there exists a complete spectrum of executive scheduling mechanisms
ranging from totally synchronous to constrained asynchronous.
The scheduling mechanisms considered can be differentiated by the
following three characteristics:
1. Fixed vs variable processing time intervals;
2. Fixed vs variable task execution order;
3. Polled vs interrupt-driven aperiodic event registration.
The synchronous executive, while limited in terms of flexibility and
growth, is conceptually very simple and its behavior is completely predictable.
The synchronous mechanism utilizes fixed time intervals, fixed execution order,
and polled aperiodic event registration. The constrained-asynchronous mechanism
is the most flexible scheduling mechanism usable for an avionics application.
The constrained-asynchronous executive schedules tasks on a demand basis. It
thus provides a more flexible structure which permits growth to be achieved
more easily. This mechanism utilizes variable processing intervals, variable
task execution order, and interrupt registration of aperiodic events (even
during periodic processing). There are a number of intermediate designs which
utilize various combinations of the above approaches.
Thus it can be seen that the scheduling mechanisms considered range
from the synchronous in which everything is fixed to the constrained asynchronous
where everything is variable. The synchronous mechanism is the easiest to
verify because everything is fixed. As more asynchronism is introduced, veri-
fication becomes more and more difficult because of more and more variability.
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The asynchronous mechanism, in which almost everything is variable, can never
be totally verified because the number of combinations of events is very large.
All that can be done is to test all branches in a reasonable number of ways.
The choice of an executive scheduling mechanism is made on the basis
of the environment, the machine capabilities, and the applications programs
requirements. Once the choice of an executive scheduling mechanism is made,
the other portions of the executive can be considered. In the HASW configura-
tins this information and cVonIrol mechanism is distributed and replicated
within the software of the individual computers. The tradeoff between the two
implementation types is largely a matter of cost.
Implementation cost in the mostly hardware case includes not only
augmentation of the EEM units, but also a mechanism for protecting against
and correcting transient errors in the augmented EEMs. A process of voting
on all internal states (NMR synchronization) is required as well as a well-
defined AEEM restart in case of information loss. To protect against tran-
sients it is advisable that the AEEM control states be maintained in non-
volatile storage. Thus the augmented EEM is considerably more complex than
the HASW EEM without augmentation.
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1.5 MEASURES OF FAULT-TOLERANCE
Reliability theory defines the reliability of a system as the prob-
ability of correct operation up to the "mission time", T, given that the system
was operating correctly at the mission starting time. The work on measures
of fault-tolerance applicable to an RCS is based on the fact that computer
systems are a special case among all physical systems because in their case
"correct operation" means the correct execution of a set of programs, rather
than the continued functioning of a set of components of the system.
The following four criteria form an operational definition of
"correct execution of a set of programs:"
1. The program and their data are not altered or halted
by faults;
2. The results of operations do not contain fault-caused
errors;
3. The execution time of each program does not exceed a
specified limit;
4. The storage capacity that is available for each program
remains above a specified minimum value.
There are three distinct quantitative measures that can be applied
to measure the fault-tolerance of a computer system. They are:
1. The Discrete Fault Tolerance d
2. The Reliability R(t)
3. The Survivability S(t)
The discrete fault tolerance (DFT) d is a deterministic measure
that specifies how many faults of a given class can be tolerated by a computer
system or by a module of the system. The remaining two measures - reliability
R(t) and survivability S(t) - are probabilistic measures that predict the
probability of the system continuing its correct operation over a specified
time interval.
DFT is defined as the ability of a Module Set M to operate correctly
for at least d faults within the Module Set. It is important to note that
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DFT is not a function of time, i.e., the probability of continued correct
operation is stated to be unity as long as not more than d faults from the
fault set occur within the module set M.
The reliability R(t) also refers to a set F of permanent faults that
can occur in the hardware module set M. It is defined as the probability that
the set M will not experience a disabling hardware failure during a specified
"mission time" interval O0tT.
It is known from experience that computer systems are also subject
to transient faults, which can terminate the correct execution of a set of
programs without causing a disabling hardware failure in the module set M i.
Our goal was to incorporate the survival probability with respect to the
occurrence of transient faults into one probabilistic measure of fault-
tolerance that also contains the reliability R(t). This measure is called
the survivability S(t) of the module set M .
Previous work has established that three fault-tolerance activities
must be successfully executed before the system returns to its functional
state after a fault event. It was found convenient to partition the probability
of successful system response to a fault into three components:
1. Detectability, denoted by u and defined as the probability
that fault is detected, given that it occurs;
2. Diagnostibility, denoted by v and defined as the probability
that the faulty module is correctly identified, given that
the fault has been detected;
3. Recoverability, denoted by w and defined as the probability
that the operational state is successfully re-established,
given that the fault has been located.
Thus the survivability S(t) is seen to be an overall measure of
fault-tolerance of a computer system, while detectability, diagnostibility,
and recoverability give detailed insight into the system behavior and can be
used for more precise specification of the fault-tolerance desired in a computer
system.
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1.6 ANALYTIC MODELING
The analytic modeling effort was directed toward the specific
inclusion of transient faults and the inclusion by use of parameters, of
the software structure and the system failure criteria.
The problem was approached by preparing state diagrams representing
the fault/recovery status of the system. Transient faults were assumed to
arrive at an average rate T which is constant over the life of the system.
Similarly, based on physical reasoning and mathematical tractability, an
exponential density function was chosen to represent transient duration.
The three-stage transient recovery sequence, consisting of detection,
recovery-start delay, and recovery, was formulated and the necessary parameters
defined. The concept of imperfect detection was formalized using a probability
density function of the detection time. An important concept, that of tran-
sient leakage, was formulated and defined. Transient leakage, xT, is the
probability that a transient fault is interpreted as a permanent.
The modeling of specific computer systems was begun by considering
an enhanced TMR configuration. An enhanced TMR systems possesses the capability
of recovering from a transient fault. Following the obtaining of the results
for the enhanced TMR system, the work was extended to N computers, first
considering the case involving a linear degradation of the system (i.e. 5
computers to 4 computers to 3, etc.), and then formulating the more general
case where an N-computer system can go directly to the system failure state.
A recursive expression for the survivability of an N-computer configuration
was developed and then, by mathematical induction, it was shown that the
survivability can be expressed as a linear combination of exponential functions.
An iterative expression was then developed for determining the coefficients
for the linear combination.
The final aspect of the analytic modeling was the formulation of
a model using the Markov chain analysis method. By assuming that state transi-
tions occur continuously, it was possible to develop a vector differential
equation representing the system and obtain an expression for the state
probabilities at time t. As was to be expected, the results agreed with
those obtained earlier. However, they provide the basis for a set of simply-
formulated computer programs which are useful in obtaining numerical results.
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1.7 SIMULATION
The function of the simulator developed during this contract is
to produce: 1) parameters for use in analytic models of RCS; 2) the
fault-tolerance effectiveness of each of a wide variety of RCS configurations;
and 3) the behavior of a configuration in various fault environments.
The general organization of the simulator was formulated so that
the end-product would be versatile and flexible. An efficient simulation
was dev eopeu by designing a "fault-driven simulator, rather than one
that simulates the continuous operation of the system. The simulator was
written in FORTRAN IV and currently runs on a CDC-6600 computer.
The approach taken to the formulation of the simulator is similar
to that utilized in the analytic modeling in that a state diagram is used
to describe the programs requirements. A simplified state diagram is shown
in Figure 1.7-1.
The simulator program is structured to simulate the detection of
faults within a computer system and the computer system's successful/unsuccess-
ful recovery actions taken in response to the detected faults. Each simulated
mission is assigned a mission time. A simulation run consists of the repeti-
tive continued simulation of a designated number of missions (each with the
same mission time). As stated earlier the simulation is fault-driven. Nothing
happens in the simulator until a fault occurs. This is very important in
terms of simulator efficiency. The computer time spent in one run is
roughly proportional to the number of faults and not to the simulated mission
time.
A good measure of the detail included in a system simulation is the
number of parameters that must be specified for each run. It can be seen from
Table 1.7-I that the RCS simulator is very detailed. The outputs produced by
the simulator are listed in Table 1.7-II. As can be seen from this table,
outputs are provided to the user that give detailed insight into the system
behavior.
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INTRODUCTION DUPLEX MEMORY SYSTEMOF A OPERATION COPY FAILURESPARE
ROLLBACK DIAGNOSIS SIMPLEX ROLLBACK
IN OPERATION IN
DUPLEX SIMPLEX
FIGURE 1.7-1 SIMULATOR STATE DIAGRAM
TABLE 1.7-I LIST OF RCS SIMULATOR INPUTS
NUMBER OF SIMULATED MISSIONS
MISSION DEPENDENT PARAMETER
Mission Time
MACHINE DEPENDENT PARAMETERS
Permanent Failure Rates
BITE Detection Probability of a CPU Fault
BITE Detection Probability of a Memory Fault
Self-Test Program Efficiency
Self-Test Program Duration
CONFIGURATION-DEPENDENT PARAMETERS
Number of Computers
Number of Spares
Dedicated/Non-Dedicated EEMs (External Electronic Modules)
Probability that an EEM Fault Hits the Bus
Number of Non-Dedicated EEMs
Dedicated/Non-Dedicated Busses
Number of External Devices
Coverage and Relative Failure Rate of each Device and
of the Busses
Applicable Recovery Algorithms
Recovery Algorithm Characteristics
Duration
Unacceptable Recurrence Interval
Maximum Number of Rollbacks
Program Integrity
Memory-Copy Efficacy
SCHEDULING PARAMETERS
Iteration Period
Time Between Comparisons
Major and Minor Cycle Durations
Asynchronous/Synchronous Mechanism
ENVIRONMENT DEPENDENT PARAMETERS
Transient Failure Rates
Transient Failure Duration
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TABLE 1.7-II RCS SIMULATOR OUTPUTS
NUMBER OF SYSTEM FAILURES
CAUSES OF SYSTEM FAILURES
Excessive-Length Recovery
Non-Isolated Faults
Simplex Mode Failures
EEM Failures
I/O and Bus Failures
NUMBER OF SWITCHES TO - Quadruplex
- Triplex
- Duplex
- Simplex
TRANSIENT COVERAGES IN MULTIPLEX, DUPLEX, SIMPLEX
DIAGNOSTIBILITY IN DUPLEX
PROPORTION OF CATASTROPHIC FAULTS
NUMBER OF MISSED ITERATIONS
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1.8 COMBINED ANALYTIC-SIMULATIVE TECHNIQUE
The analytic modeling approach described in Section 1.6 and the
simulation technique described in Section 1.7 each has its strengths and
limitations. However when these two system evaluation approaches are
combined, and supplemented by some engineering analysis, a very powerful
technique results.
This Complementary Analytic-Simulative Technique (CAST) evolved
as it became evident that neither analysis nor simulation alone could satisfy
all the RCS evaluation requirements. Analytic modeling provides flexibility
and rapid, economical data-generation. However the solutions for some configu-
rations are very cumbersome and in certain cases the mathematical model formu-
lated is intractable. Simulation permits computer system details to be in-
cluded easily, but data generation is slow and expensive. CAST permits the
user to obtain the best features of both analytic modeling and simulation.
The RCS engineering analysis is performed to provide six categories
of information to the analytic modeling and the simulation. These information
categories are:
1. Configuration Particulars
2. Fault Environment
3. System Failure Criteria
4. Software Structure
5. Recovery Features
6. Test Features
The results produced by the simulator are:
1. Permanent-fault coverage
2. Transient-fault coverage
3. Detectability
4. Diagnostibility
5. Recoverability
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1.9 RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the work summarized here and repotted in detail in
Sections 2 through 9, the following two actions are recommended.
1. Apply CAST to a specific configuration of interest.
The combined analytic-simulative technique should be
applied to a specific aircraft or spacecraft applica-
tion that requires a highly reliable computing capability.
Preferably this would be an application that has progressed
far enough in the preliminary design stage so that the
software structure has been formulated, application pro-
gram size and execution times have been estimated, sub-
system failure criteria have been postulated, and specific
sets of sensors and actuators have been selected. Applica-
tion of CAST to a specific system will illustrate its
utility.
2. Introduce additional complexity into the analytic model
in order to reduce the cost of the necessary simulation
runs. The complexities to be considered are:
a. Spare computers;
b. Dedicated busses;
c. Recovery-procedures complexity;
d. Explicit failure criteria;
e. Software structure; and
f. Burst-fault environment.
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2.0 SYSTEM ORGANIZATION CONCEPTS
The architecture of fault-tolerant computing systems is heavily
influenced by several key requirements of their application. Among these
are: 1) reliability, 2) maintenance intervals, 3) time for fault recovery,
4) structure of the computations to be performed, and 5) cost or maximum
allocation of power, weight, and volume. The avionics application of this
study is characterized by the following salient attributes:
1. Extreme Reliability Requirements, includinq "fail-safe"
capability - lives are endangered upon failure.
2. Short Inter-Maintenance Interval - flights seldom exceed
10 hours.
3. Short Fault Recovery Time - on the order of milliseconds
to prevent degradation of control functions.
4. Moderate Computational Requirements - real-time control,
well within the capacity of candidate machines.
5. Ample Power, Weight and Volume Allocations - a number of
redundant computers may be employed.
In order to meet the reliability requirements of the avionics appli-
cation it is necessary to attain a very high value of "coverage" in the computer
design. It has been shown, both by analytic means and by simulation, that the
most sensitive parameter affecting the reliability of a fault-tolerant digital
system is "coverage", defined as the conditional probability, given that a
fault occurs, that the fault is properly detected and the subsequent "recovery"
is successful. [BOUR 69]. In many cases it can be shown that increasing coverage
by 1% can improve the reliability of a fault-tolerant computer to a greater
extent than using an additional spare computer. Conversely, with imperfect
coverage, addition of redundant (spare units) gives little increase in reliability
For the aircraft application, coverage must closely approach unity in order to
meet the stringent reliability requirements.
As a consequence of the high coverage requirement, a preferred approach
to fault-tolerant computer configurations is massive redundancy. That is,
operating several computers to perform the same computations, and comparing
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their outputs in order to provide nearly perfect fault detection and isolation.
When this approach is coupled with a sound recovery algorithm, high coverage
is assured. This approach has obvious cost advantages if off-the-shelf compu-
ters, with minimal internal modifications and external supporting hardware, can
be utilized. Not only can development costs be saved, but also support software
and test procedures can be procured with the computers.
The purpose of this section is to provide general models and specific
examples of fault-tolerant computer configurations which are appropriate for
implementation using "whole" computer massive redundancy. The models are
intended to be sufficiently general to serve as a basis for discussion of
redundancy options and reliability enhancement techniques. The more promising
options for each configuration will be modeled analytically and through
simulation to determine their effectiveness.
Under the constraints of 1) little or no modifications to the off-
the-shelf computer elements, and 2) application of redundancy at the "whole"
computer level, there are three key interfaces to the digital computer for its
implementation into a redundant configuration. These are: 1) I/0 interfaces
including interrupts and AGE, 2) software, and 3) synchronization (which,
though not an explicit physical interface, bears heavily upon the design of
the configuration).
There are three general categories of configurations utilizing
"whole" computer redundancy. The mostly-software approach utilizes software
for fault detection, voting, recovery and synchronization. External hardware
is held to a minimum. The hardware/software approach shares fault.detection
and recovery between software and external hardware which supplies fault detec-
tion and voting. The mostly-hardware approach utilizes hardware to perform
fault detection and recovery with the goal of minimizing the amount of special
software required for fault-tolerance. The following sub-sections are directed
toward an examination of these categories of configurations.
2.1 "MOSTLY"-SOFTWARE REDUNDANT CONFIGURATION (MSW)
The salient feature of mostly-software configurations is
that external hardware is held to a minimum. Comparison of outputs for fault-
detection and isolation is carried out by software. The interconnecting and
synchronization techniques, as well as techniques for fault detection and
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recovery are quite similar for configurations of three or more computers. And
thus a general model is presented which is inclusive of systems with three,
four and five computers.
Mostly software configurations are characterized by 1) inter-computer
communications utilized for fault-detection, transient recovery, and synchroni-
zation, and 2) a redundant I/O structure which can convey "correct" information
to and from peripheral devices in the presence of computer or I/O faults. These
two characteristics tend to define the MSW redundant configurations which are
described below:
2.1.1 Internal Communications for Fault Detection and Transient Recovery
The internal cross-connections associated with software redundant con-
figurations are shown in Figure 2.1-1. Each computer generates data and control
outputs which are made available to the other N-l machines. It is assumed that
synchronization is carried out by software and that exactly-synchronized clocks
for data transfers cannot be guaranteed. (The candidate computers employ
asynchronous memory cycles, an attribute which does not allow synchronizing
clocks without internal hardware modifications). The following is a description
of the two sets of internal cross-connections.
1. Data Transfer Paths - It is necessary to transfer outputs,
and state variables generated within program segments,
between computers for checking and voting by software.
The data paths employed can be implemented in one of
several fashions, each of which can tolerate the lack of
clock synchronization:
a. Parallel (Held) - Each computer's output remains
until sampled by other computers.
b. Serial or Parallel (Transmitted) - Output is sent
to latching registers within the receiving computers
for synchronization.
c. DMA transfer facilities between computers under
control of the outputting modules. Software
synchronization is only necessary for initiation
(or completion) of a block transfer. Individual
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2
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COMPUTER (1) DATA PATHS
3 (2) CONTROL SIGNALS
COMPUTER
N
FIGURE 2.1-1 MSW INTERNAL CROSS-CONNECTIONS
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word transfers are transparent to the software.
(This approach is expensive in hardware but offers
the more rapid comparison/voting process).
2. Control Signals - It is necessary for each computer to
supply the other machines with control signals for
synchronization and fault recovery. Examples of control
signals are 1) output ready, 2) fault detected, etc.
An example of the comparison and synchronization process is given
in the following paragraphs.
2.1.1.1 Voting and Synchronization
The following description of voting and synchronization is centered
around the activities of properly functioning processors. It is assumed that
there is a set of N processors, each programmed to performean identical compu-
tation, loosely synchronized within a few instructions of each other. The
properly functioning computers comprise the subset W and have stored internally
the identity of the working machines W and that of the.machines assumed to have
failed F. (N=WUF). A vote Vi(W,F) is performed in each of the properly
functioning computers which provides: 1) a voted result Vr or an indication
of indeterminable output (such as when all inputs disagree), and 2) an indi-
cation of one or more disagreeing units d.. A number of voting algorithms
are possible, e.g. NMR, hybrid, adaptive, etc..
A typical scenario of the voting and synchronization process is in-
dicated in Figure 2.1-2. When any properly functioning computer reaches a
point in the program where comparison of results is required, it transfers
its values to the other computers and waits for one of two events:
1. The other working computers complete the transfer
indicated by their Output Ready (OR) levels or,
2. A time-out overflow occurs.
In either case a vote is taken on the transferred information in all the
properly functioning computers in the set W. If all the computers agree with
the voted result, computations continue else a corrective action is taken.
This approach corresponds to the fault exit in Figure 2.1-2.
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FIGURE 2.1-2 SYNCHRONIZATION AND VOTING SCENARIO
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The simplest fault response is to ignore transients and for the
agreeing machines to delete the machines which disagree from the set W and
to ignore their subsequent outputs. However, since transient correction is
essential in meeting the stringent reliability requirements of the avionics
application, it is necessary to examine more sophisticated recovery algorithms.
2.1.1.2 Transient Recovery Techniques
The condition which causes a computer in the set w to be in disagree-
ment with the other machines is either 1) an erroneous computation, or 2) the
disagreeing machine has gotten out of step with the others. It is useful to
classify the causes of this condition into the following three categories and
list the implications of each on the transient recovery process:
1. Permanent Fault - In the case of a permanent fault a
transient recovery attempt will be unsuccessful and it
is necessary to recognize this condition, typically by
repeated disagreements, and terminate attempts at
transient recovery. The machine is reclassified from
the set W to the set F and its subsequent outputs are
ignored.
2. Transient Fault -- Program Undamaged - There exist a set
of transient faults which can be corrected by either one of
two simple procedures, program rollahead and program rollback.
For both of these procedures, the program is segmented and
associated with each segment is a set of global variables
designated the State Vector. The state vector contains
necessary and sufficient input data to properly execute the
associated program segment. Furthermore the state vector is
not modified by its associated program segment (e.g. call by
value) such that the program segment can be re-started. During
correct computation of the Nth program segment, the state
variables for the next (N+lth) segment are generated (ROHR 73).
The first technique, designated "rollahead", takes advan-
tage of one or more "correct" machines. When a fault occurs
in a computer, the next state vector (including the location
counter) of the "torrect" machines is loaded into its memory
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at the end of the program segment in which the fault occurred.
Since the corrected state vector corresponds to the variables
which are necessary to start the next program segment, the
faulty machine can be corrected without repeating the segment
in which the fault occurred. The desired outputs are available
from the correct machines.
The second of these recovery techniques is called "rollback".
In this case, if the computers disagree upon output or compari-
son of information the current program segment is re-started.
If the state vector and program have not been damaged, the
program segment will be executed correctly after the restart.
While program rollahead takes place nearly instantaneously,
program rollback results in a delay required to re-compute a
transient-damaged program segment. However, since rollback
does not require a transfer of information from "correct"
computers, it can be utilized in duplex configurations where
the "correct" computer cannot be immediately identified. Thus
rollahead is the preferred approach to correction of this class
of transient faults when three or more computers are functional.
Rollback is required in the residual duplex condition where
only two machines remain functional or when only one computer
is working.
3. Transient Faults -- Program Damaged - Transient faults
which result in damage to instructions or constants
stored in memory, cannot be corrected by rollback, restart,
or rollahead techniques. Correction of these faults requires
reloading memory, a process which results in a much longer
recovery time.
Memory address protection and NDRO memory are two RETs employed to
prevent transients of type (3) above, as well as to reduce the total number of
memory transients. The next section explores the implementation of transient
recovery techniques in software redundant configurations.
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2.1.1.3 Transient Recovery - Implementation
In order to effect transient recovery a mechanism must exist for
transferring correct information to the memory of the damaged computer. A
salient feature of the software configuration is that there is no hardware
mechanism by which agreeing computers can take control of the disagreeing
machine to force rollahead, update memories, etc. Thus even faulty computers
must have a limited degree of autonomy and, in order to provide transient
recovery, it is assumed that transient-damaged computers must maintain a small
interrupt handling routine in order to correct this class of faults.
Two examples are given below of transient correction mechanisms
employed in the software-redundant configuration. Each requires three principal
actions:
1. The disagreeing computer must be notified that it is out of
step. It can ascertain this locally by performing a test at
the occurrence of each real-time interrupt (RTI), or can be
notified via interrupts from the other computers in w.
2. The "good" computers must effect transfer of correction
information.
3. The faulty computer must load this information and
re-synchronize with the other computers.
It is assumed that each computer has capability of loading compari-
son values into dedicated buffers in the other computers independent of the
program in those machines (e.g. DMA).
Program Rollahead
"Instantaneous" transient recovery can be achieved if segmented
programs are employed and rollahead is implemented. At the.end of each
segment of program, the state variables (those global variables utilized by
subsequent program segments) are exchanged and compared in the various computers.
If a computer in W suffers a transient fault during the program segment, which
does not damage instructions or constants, it can utilize the state vector from
the other machines and continue with the next program segment. The address of
the next segment must be included within the state vector to indicate the point
at which the faulty machine should commence execution.
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The principal problem of the rollahead implementation is notification
of the faulty machine so that it can utilize the corrected state vector and
start the next program segment in step with the other machines. Three cases
exist:
1. If the machine has only data damage but is still in step
with the other machines, the software vote N.(W,F) will
indicate its disagreement and the program can automatically
choose the state vector sent from another machine in W and
continue.
2. If the machine is out of step and attempts a comparison before
the other machines, this condition can be recognized and a
wait initiated for access to the state vector from the other
computers and a subsequent rollahead.
3. If the machine is out of step and does not perform a comparison
with the others of state vectors, then it must be alerted to
this fact in order to execute the rollahead. This can be done
utilizing "fault detected" signals as interrupts in the
following fashion.
Each computer generates a "fault detected" (FD) signal
which is received as an interrupt by the other computers.
This interrupt is permanently masked (by all computers in
w) from computers designated as failed (F).
Prior to performing a comparison, each computer masks out
the FD interrupts. If after completion of the transfer, one
computer fails to respond with an output ready (OR) signal,
the other computers send the FD signal, thus notifying the
computer which is out of step. The validity of these inter-
rupts can be verified by the interrupted computer by checking
for several OR signals.
Thus the idea of this approach is:
a. A computer not in or near the process of comparison
enables FD interrupts from the other machines.
2-10
b. If the other machines perform a comparison without
activity from one or more machines their FD interrupts
are raised.
c. Erroneous FD interrupts are identified and masked
by verification of output-ready signals.
A machine which is alerted as to being out of step can utilize the
state vector from the other computers to perform a rollahead.
Memory Copy
At the occurrence of the RTI, the computers in set W, check the
results sent for comparison during the last minor cycle. If one of the compu-
ters has gotten out of step due to a transient, it will then recognize that its
comparison data differs from that of the other good machines. Under this condi-
tion the faulty computer enters the UPDATE mode. (It is important that ROM or
memory-protect hardware be employed to preserve the integrity of this RTI-driven
program).
Upon recognizing a computer from the set W which is in disagreement,
the remaining (agreeing) computers transfer programs, constants, and
that variable data necessary to restart computations to the disagreeing computer.
Two characteristics of this transfer are listed below:
1. Since it is necessary to maintain normal computations,
the transfer of programs and fixed constants takes place
at a low duty cycle and thus recovery takes on the order
of seconds.
2. Computations must be stopped during the transfer of that
variable information required to restart the disagreeing
computer. The UPDATE program is flagged by receipt of this
variable data and it resumes normal computation at the next
RTI if the transient was corrected.
If the disagreeing computer continues to produce erroneous results,
after the transient recovery attempt the remaining computers in set w, reclassify
the machine as permanently faulty and ignore its outputs.
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2.1.1.4 Utilization of Transient Recovery Techniques
If memory protection (addressing interlocks) and NDRO technology is
employed, a majority of transient faults will be rollahead or rollback correc-
table. However, unless ROM is employed for instructions and constants, tran-
sients may cause memory-contents damage which require memory copy techniques for
correction. Thus rollahead techniques should be backed up with the capability
of copying memory contents to provide adequate coverage. A typical hybrid
transient correction approachr would be 1) ,attemp ru,,a,,au, L,,, i a usa,1e-
ment recurs, 2) attempt memory copy, and if fault still persists, 3) consider
the computer to contain a permanent fault, reclassify from W to F and ignore
further outputs from that machine in comparisons.
The previous discussion was related to internal cross-connections
associated with the software redundant configurations. It is these connections
which are utilized for comparison of variables for fault detection, voting to
establish the correct value of information in the various machines, and data
transfer for transient correction. The next sub-section deals with various
redundant structures for I/O.
2.1.2 Redundant I/0 Structures for Communications with Fault Masking
Beside the primary task of providing communication with peripheral
units, the I/O structure of the software redundant configurations must:
1. Provide masking of faulty computers.
2. Provide precisely timed events from commands from
computers which may be unsynchronized by a number
of microseconds.
3. Provide redundancy and single point failure protection
within the I/0 structure.
Avionics systems typically contain sensors and actuators at widely
separated locations. The recent trend has been to employ highly multiplexed
I/O in order to reduce weight and complexity associated with cabling. Thus
bus models will be employed in the following discussion of I/O structures. It
is assumed that two or more redundant busses are employed with a number of redun-
dant interfaces. Two types of bus structure will be discussed. The first
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utilizes a bus dedicated to each of the computers with synchronization and
voting performed in the peripheral units. The second will treat the redundant
bus structure as an integral unit in which Voting, synchronization, and bus
redundancy management is carried out by a special bus controller. In this case,
individual busses and peripheral devices are not dedicated to any specific
computer.
2.1.2.1 Dedicated Busses
Figure 2.1-3 shows the connections employed in an I/O configuration
with dedicated busses. Each bus may be bidirectional or employ a separate set
of return lines. Each bus is controlled by its associated computer and is only
synchronized within a few instruction times of the other busses. Two types of
I/O modules may be attached to the bus 1) dedicated and 2) non-dedicated.
2.1.2.1.1 Dedicated Sensors
A set of identical sensors may be dedicated one per each bus line
and operate independently. This results in differing values being returned
to the various computers. And thus it is necessary to exchange input values
from a set of redundant sensors (using the interal cross-connections
described in the previous sections) between the computers in W and to com-
pute a common value for use in subsequent computations so that the machines
will generate identical outputs and not appear faulty. This process of
computing a common value for the various sensors is a critical RET in the
utilization of sensor redundancy which must (1) exclude values from faulty
machines (EF), (2) exclude inputs from sensors previously determined as
faulty, and (3) use reasonableness checks, averaging, etc. to establish
a "best" sensor value for common utilization.
The use of dedicated sensors has the advantage of simplicity, but
also has several disadvantages:
1. The number of redundant sensors is constrained to
the number of computers, which prevents optimum
balance of redundancy for modules of differing re-
liability. This approach is not applicable for con-
figurations of more than three computers due to the
requirement of excess redundancy in sensors.
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2. If one computer fails, its associated sensors are
effectively disabled.
2.1.2.1.2 Non-Dedicated Sensors and Actuators
A non-dedicated sensor/actuator interface, provides communication
between all the computers and the redundant sensors and actuators. The bus
interface allows each of the computers to address any specific member of
a redundant set of sensors or actuators and the returning information is
coherent, i.e. the same number is returned to all computers. This differs
from the case of dedicated I/0 where each computer addresses a different
peripheral device within a redundant set and receives slightly different
information. Redundant sensor data is obtained by addressing several
redundant devices in sequence.
Bus interfaces to non-dedicated sensors or actuators are moderately
complex since they have the following requirements:
1. The interface receives identical commands and data from
busses associated with properly functioning computers, and,
most likely, incorrect outputs from failed computers.
2. The agreeing outputs are not precisely synchronized but
will occur within a worst-case time interval At.
3. For commands which change the state of peripheral subsystems,
a vote must be provided in the interface to mask out faulty
commands. (A typical implementation is to respond only
to two or more identical commands, occurring on different
busses within the acceptance interval At).
4. Independent data streams must be supplied to each computer
upon receipt of a set of identical input-request commands. In
order to meet the timing requirements of a number of candi-
date machines, information must be returned immediately upon
receipt of its request (i.e. each input transfer is
synchronized to the associated computer). Thus voting may
not be employed for information requests if the first
computer to make an I/0 request cannot wait for subsequent
requests and voting.
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5. The I/O interface should supply identical data to all machines
making an information request within the acceptance interval
At. This can be accomplished by synchronization with the
RTI. (All status vectors and sensor measurements are latched
and only allowed to change upon occurrence of the RTI; all
programmed I/0 is constrained to occur between these changes).
Non-dedicated modules have several advantages indicated below:
1. ndiiu Il actvuators within reduanu. sets require a
guarantee of correctness from the computer system before
executing a command. Thus the I/O module voting capability
is necessary.
2. A computer failure does not disable non-dedicated sensors
and actuators.
Several disadvantages exist and are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
1. Latching of information to guarantee identical sensor values
to the various machines is not inconsistent with the real-time
control application, but does represent a degree of added
complexity.
2. Cross checking of input information must still be performed,
or a faulty input from an I/O module will appear as a computer
fault due to disagreeing results.
3. As indicated above, a non-dedicated I/O interface is a
device of considerable complexity, but this complexity is
not significantly greater than that required by replicating
simplex bus interfaces as employed with dedicated devices.
2.1.2.2 Non-Dedicated Busses (Non-Dedicated Sensors)
A non-dedicated redundant bus structure can be treated as a self-
contained unit for conveying information between the computers and peripheral
devices. One or more busses carry identical information to and from the sensors
and actuators, and individual sensors are accessed within redundant sets. To
utilize redundancy, a set of identical sensors must be sampled sequentially and
a selection (or voting) process performed in software. Individual bus lines
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are not dedicated to any specific computer but, information may be obtained
from any of the computers by a process of switching or voting. A good first-
order approximation is to treat the non-dedicated bus structure as a series
term in the system reliability expressions (see Section 9).
Two options are possible for implementation of non-dedicated busses:
1. Switched Busses - Each of several busses can be connected
to any of the computers, in standby or massive redundant
configurations (see Figure 2.1-4). With standby redundancy,
only one bus is utilized, and the remaining busses serve as
spares. In the massive redundant case, the various busses
are connected to different computers, allowing voting and
error correction in the peripheral sensor and actuator
interfaces.
2. Voted Outputs - Each bus output is derived as a vote of the
various computer outputs. As with switched outputs above, the
redundant busses can be employed in standby or massive redundant
configurations.
Switched busses require limited amounts of hardware and can employ
software synchronization. Thus switched-bus structures are discussed in this
section which treats mostly-software computer configurations, being consistent
with the requirement of minimum external hardware. Busses driven by voted
outputs are more complex, requiring a degree of hardware synchronization.
Redundant busses which include output voting are described in Section 2.2 which
considers hardware-aided computer configurations.
2.1.2.3 Non-Dedicated-Switched Busses
A non-dedicated switched bus configuration is shown in Figure 2.1-4.
Case 1 - Standby Redundancy
One computer is designated MASTER and the others are designated
auxiliary machines. All I/0 is initiated and carried out by the master
machine. Synchronization of the computers and transfer of input information,
as well as comparison of information prior to output is performed using the
internal cross connections as described in 2.1.1.
The switching function, i.e. assignment of a bus to one of the
computers, is carried out in the following fashion. Each computer generates
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several signals to specify which switch (bus) is to be active, and which compu-
ter (master) is to be connected. Voting is provided in the switch to select
the proper command when several computers disagree. (The vote performed in
the switches should be adaptive and can be implemented in such a way that the
switch only responds to computers in w, as defined by software voting algorithms.
This is a problem associated with specific implementations).
1. Fault Detection Detection of faults in the computers is
accomplished by comparison of variables using the internal
cross-connections as described in Section 2.1. Each computer
generates the information to be output and a cross-comparison
is made to verify proper computation. If all machines in W
agree, the master machine proceeds with the I/O operation.
Faults in the bus may be detected using a) a wrap around check
at each RTI, or b) by utilizing error detecting codes appended
to words before transmission.
2. Fault Correction In the case of a disagreement of the
computer designated master, when state vectors are compared
before output, the remaining computers in w designate a new
master machine by commanding the active bus to switch to a
different computer. Transient correction techniques are
applied to the disagreeing machine (rollback, rollahead,
memory-copy as described in Section 2.1) and if the disagreement
is not corrected the machine is deleted from the working
set W.
If bus failure is detected by a wrap-around or parity check,
the computers in W activate a spare bus and continue
computation.
Case 2 - Multiple Identical Outputs
A minor variation on Case 1 is to utilize all redundant busses to
convey I/O information between the master machine and the peripheral sensors
and actuator interfaces. A vote can then be performed at the peripheral inter-
faces and at the computer input to correct input and output information in the
presence of bus failures.
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In both configurations (1 and 2) all I/0 is controlled by the master
machine offering the distinct advantage that the peripheral interfaces are not
required to synchronize multiple data streams. The standby redundant bus
structure further simplifies peripheral interfaces in that voting is not
required.
Case 3 - Multiple Computer Outputs
This configuration corresponds to the case of a set of active busses,
connected to at least three different computers. This approach allows correction
of computer and bus fault if voting is employed in the bus interface units.
Several computers must be designated master, and fault detection and recovery
algorithms become more complex.
2.1.3 Executive Program Considerations
The unique characteristics of the executive and applications pro-
grams running on MSW computer configurations will be considered in this and
the following section. Previous sections have considered the hardware
required for a "mostly" software redundant configuration as well as some of
the recovery strategies which are applicable. Here the executive augmenta-
tion which is required for the MSW computer configurations will be described
in enough detail to illustrate the feasibility of the approach.*
The executive augmentation which will be described is applicable to
any NMR or NMR-adaptive MSW computer configuration. With some further addi-
tional modifications, operation on a duplex configuration would be possible.
The three major augmentations to a standard or skeleton executive
are a voter module, intercomputer communication routines in the input/output
module, and memory reload on the error handler module. The voter is a com-
pletely new module which does not appear in a skeleton executive. The inter-
computer communication routines and memory reload capability are also new,
but they are additions to existing modules, namely, input/output and error
handler, rather than new modules themselves. Each module will now be discussed
individually.
The general requirements and applicable executive structures are described
in Section 3.
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2.1.3.1 Voter Module (Figure 2.1-5)
The voter module is the heart of the MSW computer configurations.
All comparisons of data and all decisions as to which computers are fault-
free are made in the voter module. When the voter module encounters a sus-
pected error in a computer which was previously considered to be fault-free,
the error handler is utilized to attempt to bring the computer back into the
working state.
The voter module can be used in two different ways, depending on
the hardware configuration in which it is used. If the bus structure is such
that bus voting is required, then the voter module does this. If the hardware
does the bus voting, then the voter is used only to compare program state
vectors at predetermined program segment points. For either type of voting,
the use of voter module is the same.
The voter assumes that the computers in the configuration are
numbered. An example of the numbering scheme for three computers is shown
in Figure 2.1-6. Each computer checks on the computer ahead of it to ensure
that it has received data from that computer. If a computer determines that
it needs to reload itself, it reloads from the computer behind it. The first
computer is assumed to follow the last computer to make the connection a
closed ring of computers.
The voter module is first activated when all data should have been
received. The voter first checks to see if all computers have sent data.
If not, a check is made to determine if data have been obtained from the next
computer in the ring. If not, a fault is tallied against the next computer.
If the fault count for the next computer has reached or exceeded a specified
limit, n, then that computer is forcefully reloaded on the assumption that
it has failed and cannot recover. If data have been received from the next
computer, its fault tally is cleared to zero.
The justification for including the reload capability is the
recovery of a machine whose program or constants have been damaged by a
transient error. If a working computer has detected repeated errors or
missing responses in another computer, the memory of the faulty machine can
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be reloaded by the working machine. If errors persist, the faulty machine
has a permanent, hardware fault. If memory reloading restores the faulty
machine to working status, then memory damage had occurred and was repaired
by the reload.
The next step in the voting procedure is to compare the data which
are available. If all data agree, the self-error tally is cleared to zero
and the voting procedure is terminated. If all available data do not agree,
then further action is required. If the computer determines that its own
data are in disagreement with the data from other computers, it tallies an
error against itself and calls its error handler, indicating that its own
data do not agree with that of the other computers in the configuration.
It then corrects its own data and continues. If the computer's own data
are not faulty, then it clears its self-error tally and continues.
For some MSW computer configurations, the voter module will be
required to perform additional tasks. If one of the computers in the con-
figuration is designated as a master computer, then the voter module in
each of the computers must check on the behavior of the master computer. If
the master computer's data are good, then no further action is required.
If, however, the master computer's data are bad, then the next working com-
puter in the ring is designated as a new master computer. If the new master
computer's data are bad, the process repeats until all computers have been
tried as master computers.
If and when a new master computer is obtained which has good
data, then the number of the new master computer is sent to all other
computers for voting and confirmation. If confirmation is received, that
computer which was selected as the new master is used. If no confirmation
is received, that computer which was selected as the new master is used.
If no consensus can be obtained, the current master computer is used. In
any case, the new master computer is set by whatever means is required by
the configuration. This may be only setting tables in all the computers of
the configuration or it may be actually setting hardware to designate the new
master computer.
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2.1.3.2 Input/Output Module
The augmentation required for the input/output module of the
executive in a MSW computer configuration consists of data interchange
routines and reloading routines. The data interchange routines consist
of transmitting routines which transmit data to another computer and re-
ceiving routines which receive data from another computer. Similarly, re-
loading routines are required which transmit a memory load from one computer
to another and which receive the memory load. It is desirable to have the
receiving routine be implemented as much by hardware as is possible.
The data interchange routines are used to exchange input and
output data for bus voting in configurations where bus voting is done by
software and for program state vector voting in all MSW computer configura-
tions. The data interchange routines in the sending computer initiate the
handshaking activity required to establish a connection between computers.
When the transmission has been completed, the sending computer proceeds to
send the data to the next computer in the ring. It may be possible on some
hardware to broadcast the data to all computers simultaneously so then only
one transmission will be required regardless of the number of machines in
the configuration.
The reload procedure is used to reload memory as the last resort
when all other recovery mechanisms fail. If a machine is well enough to
know it needs a reload, it will request it. Else, another computer will
forcefully do the reload. In either case the computer being reloaded should
do the minimum possible role in the reload. This may require software, but
read-only memory or handwired control is preferable. The same hardware which
is used for initial loading by AGE could very likely be used for the function.
The reload strategy which is used always loads the next higher
numbered computer in the ring from the next lower number. The routine which
transmits a reload is a relatively slow, low-priority routine. It transmits
words as the facilities are available until the computer being reloaded has
received all the program and inactive data words. When this has been
accomplished, computation is halted, the state vector is transmitted at the
highest possible speed and all machines begin computations at the same point.
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2.1.3.3 Error-Handler Module (Figure 2.1-7)
The augmentation required for the error handler module of the
executive in an MSW computer configuration consists of the processing which
handles voter disagreement errors when the subject coiputer disagrees with
the other computers. The first step which is taken is to record the error
for later analysis if required. Then a comprehensive self-test is attempted.
If the test fails, the computer returns to attempting normal operations,
though it will probably be considered to be a faulty machine by the other
computers in the configuration. If the self-test is successful and does
not indicate any hardware malfunction, program memory damage is indicated.
Thus a check is made of the number of self-errors. If a specified number,
m, of self-errors has occurred, a self-reload is initiated to return the
computer to normal operation.
2.1.4 Applications Programs Considerations
The major effect on applications programs of using a MSW computer
configuration is the rollahead/rollback requirement which implies a need for
program segmentation. It is assumed here that, as discussed in the preceding
section, any voting which is required for sensor data or actuator control is
done by the executive routines.
The segmentation requirement for rollahead/rollback will have varying
impacts on the applications programs. Many programs will require only minimum
modification to run in a rollahead/rollback environment. These programs are
ones which run for only a short time when activated and require no internal
segmentation. The programs may be run often, but they complete each time
and can establish a new rollahead/rollback point when they complete. Another
type of program which will require minimum modifications is one which requires
no state vector data between activations. This type of program always uses
the most current input data for its computations. Even if it is a relatively
long program, it must be restarted with fresh input data if an error occurs.
The type of program which is most effected by recovery in a
rollahead/rollback environment is the type which requires a relatively long
time to run and has many variables in its state vector. For this type of
program, careful segmentation is required to establish rollahead/rollback
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points with minimum size state vectors. Also, the amount of data in the
state vector at the end of each activation of the program should be minimized.
One other consideration affects applications programs. This is the
executive scheduling mechanism. If a synchronous-type executive is used,
the rollahead/rollback structure of the applications programs can correspond
temporally to their successive activations. If an asynchronous-type executive
is used, an order of magnitude of complexity is introduced due to the number
of programs which may be active. When an asynchronous-type executive is used
in a rollahead/rollback environment, both the executive and the applications
programs must be structured to minimize the size and frequency of state vector
updates.
2.1.5 Machine Features and RETs
The previous discussion of software redundant configurations dealt
with the general interconnections, synchronization, and recovery techniques
required when external hardware is held to a minimum. Several features are
characteristic of these configurations. Specifically, 1) an internal cross
connection network for exchange of information between computers, 2) software
techniques for synchronization, comparison checking and transient recovery in
the redundant computers, and 3) dedicated and non-dedicated I/0 structures.
The principal objective of this architectural description is to clarify the
features required for implementation of the software redundant configurations
and to identify applicable RETs and their influence on reliability modeling.
The next section is a qualitative discussion of those machine features necessary
to implement MSW configurations with off-the-shelf hardware requiring minimal
additional circuitry.
2.1.5.1 Machine Features
The salient requirement for an off-the-shelf machine for MSW implemen-
tations is the need for sufficient I/0 capabilities to support the internal cros!
connections and I/0 busses. This implies:
I. Signal/Interrupt Facilities for synchronization, and failure
notification and bus redundancy control where applicable.
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2. Digital (word) I/0 for support of I/0 busses. Serial or
byte-serial transfer of information is consistent with the
relatively low data rates associated with the avionics appli-
cation and the requirement of high bus reliability. A DMA
capability (under control of the processor for reliability)
though not essential will result in simplication of software
and an easing of processor timing (speed) requirements.
3. Internal Cross-Connections The machine should support the
capability to send information to the other computers and a
multiple-port facility to receive information from the other
machines. If the computers are not precisely (hardware)
synchronized, it is necessary for incoming information from
other computers to be buffered. The most effective way to
provide this buffering and to expedite the cross-transfer
of incoming I/0 information is to utilize DMA structures
for the transfer of information between machines.
4. Time-Out Counting In order to proceed when one machine
fails to generate data at a comparison (or rollback) point
it is necessary to utilize a time-out count. This counter
may be implemented either by special hardware or in software.
2.1.5.2 Reliability Enhancement Techniques
There are a considerable number of optional features and techniques
which may be included in the machines for reliability enhancement. Examples
are.NDRO memory, wrap around bus checks, coding techniques, program rollahead,
etc. The following is a discussion of the implication of these features on
modeling parameters. The following is a listing of a number of these optional
RETs and their effects from the standpoint of reliability modeling.
2.1.5.3 Machine Options
1. NDRO Memory - Significantly reduces the probability of transients
which damage the contents of memory. Greatly reduces the
probability of transients which damage programs and data in
memory thus making most memory transients correctable by program
rollahead.
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2. Memory Address Protection - Limits the extent of damage due
to a processor transient. Prevents processor transients from
damaging protected memory areas, typically programs and fixed
data, thus making most processor transients rollahead correctable.
2.1.5.4 Fault Detection
1. Comparison - Information is compared between the computers at
rollback points and before outputs. Thus faults effecting the
currently active area of program and memory are detected with
probability approaching unity. This fault detection only occurs
at discrete intervals of time (typically once every minor cycle)
allowing considerable memory damage to occur before detection
of a transient.
2. Built-In-Test Equipment - RETs associated with built-in tests
such as memory parity checking, address protection, illegal
operation traps, etc. have a probability of detecting faults
which is considerably less than unity, however, those covered
by the BITE are detected sooner thus reducing possible memory
damage. When comparison is employed, BITE does not improve
the probability of fault detection but does in some percentage
of faults allow for more rapid detection.
3. Duplex Fault Detection - When only two computers remain func-
tional, the probability of recovery from failure depends upon
the effectiveness of diagnostics utilized to isolate the faulty
machine and the effectiveness of BITE. Typically the coverage
of diagnostics indicated by manufacturers includes the use of
BITE, without which software diagnostics would be larger, slower,
and less effective.
4. Memory Comparison There can exist faults in memory areas seldom
utilized. The maximum duration of these lurking faults can be
bounded if memory is compared at a low rate between machines
on a periodic basis. Lurking faults tend to increase the chance
of double failures and thus should not be allowed to remain
within the system.
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2.1.5.5 Transient Recovery
1. Program Rollback - Given that a transient is detected there
exists a probability of successful rollback corresponding
to the probability that only local variables are damaged
in memory. This probability is significantly increased by
the use of NDRO memory and address protection. Associated
with program rollback is a recovery time during which the
program segment is repeated during which computation is halted
and the system remains vulnerable to additional faults.
2. Program Rollahead - Has the same probability of transient
recovery as program rollback, but has a much smaller recovery
time associated with transfer of state vector information.
3. Memory Copy - Should correct all transients if information
from other computers is correct and no additional faults occur
during the long copy duration (in the order of seconds).
2.1.5.6 Internal Cross Connections
1. Failure Treatment Failures in the internal cross connections
have the identical effect of failures in computers for nearly
all failure modes. Failure of an output drivers and input
receivers are associated with their related computers as is
the corresponding failure rates.
2.1.5.7 I/O Structures
Dedicated and non-dedicated I/O busses and peripheral interfaces are
architectural features requiring comparative simulations for evaluation.
Dedicated and non-dedicated I/0 are included in the simulator and treated in
the following fashion:
1. Non-dedicated I/O allows separation of the computers, bus
structures, and sets of redundant peripherals such that the system
reliability is reasonably expressed as the product of their
individual reliabilities.
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2. Dedicated I/0 allows interactive failures such that the
computers, bus, and I/O must be simulated together to account
for dependent failures. (For example failure of a computer may
disable a large set of sensors).
2.1.5.8 Bus Fault-Detection
Two techniques are commonly utilized for bus fault detection:
wraparound checks and error detecting codes. The use of bus fault detection
techniques must be examined in conjunction with the manner in which redundancy
is applied to the I/O buses. If multiple buses are provided with voting at
the receiving modules, fault detection and correction is readily implemented
in the associated voters as long as three buses are functioning properly.
However, when only two buses remain functional, the failure cannot be resolved
by a voting process and additional fault detection techniques must be employed
to identify the one which is functioning properly. If a standby redundant
bus configuration (one active with spares) is utilized fault detection is
essential to identify the fault and activate a spare bus.
1. Wraparound checks are characterized by periodically generated
test outputs which are returned from one or more peripheral
devices to verify proper functioning of the bus. While these
checks have very high coverage with respect to permanent bus
faults, they have two disadvantages: (a) faults are not detected
instantaneously, but only at the occurrence of the next periodic
check; (b) transient faults are not detected.
2. Coding techniques provide concurrent fault detection with a
coverage determined by the failure modes of the bus and the
amount of redundancy employed in each message. The simplest
fault detecting code is multiple parity bits which can be imple-
mented to provide high coverage at minimal cost [ULTRA 74].
In order to prevent erroneous commands from being accepted by
actuators (in the case of standby or residual duplex buses), coding techniques
should be employed. The use of error detecting codes allows TMR buses to
function after the failure of two component buses. The effect of this RET is
modeled in Section 9.
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2.2 HARDWARE - AIDED SOFTWARE CONFIGURATIONS (HASW)
Hardware-aided configurations are characterized by the use of
external hardware for fault-detection and synchronization. The goals of
this approach are to (1) increase speed of computation and simplify software by
performing the task of comparing state vectors and outputs in hardware, and
(2) to allow the use of off-the-shelf computers with minimal I/0 facilities.
A block diagram representing the general class of hardware-aided configurations
is shown in Figure 2.2-1.
A set of N computers is connected to a set of I/0 busses through a
special External Hardware Interface (EH). This interface may be a single,
massively-redundant structure or a set of identical modules dedicated to either
individual computers or busses but in either case the following functions are
required:
1. Detection of faults by comparison of outputs and notification
of the computers of the identity of the disagreeing unit by
generating levels or interrupts.
2. Synchronization of computers (when applicable) and buffering
bus information.
3. Exchanging of information between computers in order to effect
transient correction.
4. Supplying the bus(ses) with correct information in the presence
of faulty computers. (This is done using either switching or
voting as in the MSW case).
The computer I/0 interface to the EH interface is assumed to have the
following properties (which are simple but consistent with a large number of
computers.)
1. Programmed output consists of a single word including device
address, data, and an associated strobe signal. The output
may consist of parallel, serial or byte-serial data.
2. Programmed input accepts a single word which, upon issuance
of a command output, is sampled after a short fixed time (in
the order of a few microseconds).
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3. A DMA input accepts data, as delivered from external
devices and stores this information, within a worst-
case time of a few memory cycles, in pre-defined
sequential locations.
A byte-serial or serial computer interface is preferred if the I/0
data rate is acceptably low in order to reduce connections between the computers
and EH interface.
The EH interface must provide buffering for incoming bus informa-
tion for the following reasons. First a typical processor expects "immediate"
availability of requested data within a few microseconds of issuance of an input
command. This is often not consistent with delays imposed by a bus structure.
Secondly, a typical avionics bus is serial, self-clocking (Manchester) and
synchronized by the sending unit, while the typical processor accepts parallel
or at best byte-serial information. Thus the approach is to command the sensors
to return data to one or more buffer registers in the EH interface and all
computer input commands access registers within the interface.
Similarly output information is buffered for transmission on the bus
for three reasons: (1) to allow parallel or byte-serial to serial conversion
(where applicable), (2) to hold information from loosely synchronized computers
until all outputs are available for comparison, and (3) to provide a mechanism
for holding information for transfer between computers.
The simplest means for describing the functioning of the EH interface
is to consider the non-redundant case. The following section will present a
simplex model of the external hardware associated with a hardware aided redundant
configuration. Subsequent sections will deal with options for its redundant
implementation and example configurations.
2.2.1 The External Electronics Module (EEM)
The non-redundant building-block element of the external hardware
interface is designated the External Electronics Module (EEM), and is
shown in Figure 2.2-2. The EEM accepts and buffers outputs from the computers,
synchronizes the machines, provides voting for outputs, provides for inter-
computer communications, and buffers returning inputs. Examples are given for
the case of a non-dedicated EEM with multiple buffers for inputs, and the case
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where an EEM is dedicated to each computer and has only one input buffer. The
following paragraphs describe the functioning of the EEM and its interaction
with the redundant computers to effect fault detection and recovery.
2.2.1.1 Case 1 - No Faults
At the point of outputting or comparison of state vector information
(by outputting to a non-existent peripheral) the computers load the EEM output
buffers and halt. Upon receiving two agreeing outputs, the EEM waits for a
"worst-case" time interval (e.g., a few nsitruction timesIII during which the other
computers should have completed the output. At this point all outputs are
compared, the result of the comparisons are conveyed to the computers via the
disagreement indicators and a completion interrupt is sent to the computers to
re-establish computation. If the output was addressed to a sensor or actuator,
the output buffers are voted and conveyed to the bus and, if a data return is
commanded, the returning information is loaded into the input buffer. Each
computer has control of its associated input buffer for subsequent access to
its returned information.
(The information on the bus is derived as an adaptive 2-out-of-n
vote. Two agreeing output commands must occur within a very short time interval
before a command is allowed to each the bus. Two nearly simultaneous identical
outputs from faulty computers are considered to be a sufficiently remote
possibility that it is not protected against in the EEM). For the case of a
dedicated EEM, information is only returned to its associated computer and thus
only one input buffer is provided.
2.2.1.2 Case 2 - One Computer Disagrees
In this case N-l computers complete an identical output and a faulty
computer either fails to output or outputs incorrect information. The machines
are restarted by the EEM by raising the completion interrupt, and simultaneously
the disagreement level associated with the faulty computer is sent to all
computers. The disagreement indication causes two actions:
1. If capable of doing so, the disagreeing computer is halted
by its disagreement interrupt.
2. The agreeing machines have two options; (1) classifying the
disagreeing machine as faulty, masking out its disagreement
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interrupt and ignoring its further outputs, or (2) attempting
a transient recovery.
Typically the first disagreement is considered to be caused by a
transient and a transient recovery is attempted under control of the agreeing
computers using rollahead, memory copy techniques, rollback, or restart.
Recurrence of the disagreement after one or more transient recovery attempts
is considered evidence of a permanent fault, the disagreement indication is
masked in the working computers, and the faulty computer is subsequently ignored.
2.2.1.3 The Transient Recovery Mechanism
In order to effect transient recovery, a communication path must be
established such that the agreeing computers can enter data into the memory of
the faulty machine and command its restart. The adaptive voting capability is
utilized within the EEM to allow this intercommunication as described below:
1. The EEM will accept commands addressed to individual
computer units from the agreeing machines. If two or
more agreeing commands are received within a designated
time window, the information received will be transferred
directly to the input buffer of the addressed machine and
the corresponding message-alert signal(s) is transmitted.
(Note that in the case of dedicated EEMs, each EEM only
accepts commands for its associated computer).
2. The message-alert signal may be a single interrupt to a
subroutine which interprets the incoming information as
memory addresses, corresponding data, and transfer addresses.
This approach relies on the existence of a small interrupt
routine in the memory of the faulty machine which interprets
messages from the other computers and effects transient
recovery operations. A second approach is to utilize micro-
programming through AGE interface commands so that the response
to commands from the other machines resides in protected memory.
Transient recovery algorithms are similar to those used in the previous
software redundant configurations (see 2.1.3 and 2.1.4). When a computer dis-
agrees upon output of a state vector, the agreeing computers transfer the correct
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value of the state vector and the computation starting address to the dis-
agreeing machine. If the rollahead is unsuccessful, as indicated by recurrence
of a disagreement from the same computer within a pre-defined time period, an
(optional) memory copy may be attempted. The agreeing computers transfer the
contents of memory to the disagreeing machine and attempt a restart. If the
previous transient recovery attempts are unsuccessful, the disagreeing machine
is adjudged to contain a permanent fault, its disagreement interrupt is dis-
abled in the working machines, it is commanded into a halt state, and its sub-
sequent disagreement indications (if further outputs should occur) are ignored.
2.2.1.4 Case 3 - Multiple Faults
There exist two cases of multiple fault conditions; (1) the expected
case where one or more computers have previously failed and the "next" single
failure occurs, and (2) the case where more than one failure occurs simultaneously.
1. If one or more machines have failed previously and a single
computer fails, a single disagreement indication from that
machine is acknowledged by the remaining good computers since
the disagreement indications of previously faulty machines have
been masked out. Transient correction is carried out identically
to Case 2 above.
2. Recovery from multiple, simultaneous disagreements can be
effected if at least two computers remain in agreement, as
the two remaining computers can initiate transient recovery
in the other machines. If all computers disagree, no output
is acknowledged by the EEM which requires two agreeing outputs
to respond. A period without I/0 activity corresponds to this
condition and may be detected by logic within the EEM modules
which would cause a system restart in all computers.
System failure occurs in the previous configurations when all but two
computers have failed and one of the remaining computers suffers either an un-
correctable transient or a permanent failure. When two computers remain func-
tional, this condition is designated the Residual Duplex Configuration. The
following section is a discussion of techniques for recovery from failures in
the residual duplex configuration and continuing computation with a single
simplex computer.
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2.2.2 Residual Duplex and Augmented Voting Redundancy
In order to effect recovery when only two computers remain functional
it is necessary to employ program rollback for transient correction, diagnostics
for permanent fault isolation, and modifications to the EEM to override the out-
put vote and allow the remaining single computer access to the I/0 bus. The
following is a description of the response to faults in the residual duplex
configuration.
1. The EEM units ae n 4 otified by command from the two f nctionin
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processors (before occurrence of a fault) that only two computers
remain and the identity of those two processors is stored.
2. The two remaining computers modify the interrupt handling
routines associated with their disagreement interrupts such
that a program rollback is performed upon disagreement. (In
the residual duplex mode the EEM accepts outputs from either
machine and, if a disagreement occurs, it inhibits the output
and indicates disagreement to both computers).
Program rollahead is no longer applicable since it is not
known which machine contains correct information and thus the
rollback segment is re-executed using the previously stored
(N-lth) state vector.
3. If the disagreements continue, the EEM commands a diagnostic
in both machines which includes hardware tests and checksum
verification of programs. The machine which delivers a properly
computed (pre-determined) output will be allowed to continue
the computations. If both computers pass the diagnostic or if
both fail one computer is chosen and a system restart is
attempted. (The latter cases have a significant chance of
failure).
2.2.3 A Recovery Algorithm: Hardware-Aided Software Configuration
The following section describes an example recovery mechanization
for a Hardware-Aided Software RCS configuration. It is intended to indicate the
interaction between hardware and software in a typical recovery mechanization.
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2.2.3.1 Hardware EEM Functions
The EEM provides the following signals to (1) its associated com-
puter if it is dedicated or (2) all computers if it is non-dedicated.
1. I/O-Complete Interrupt Indicates that an output has been
completed by at least two agreeing computers and an elapsed
time At has occurred to allow all other machines to output.
As all computers halt after output the I/0 complete interrupt
serves as a restart/synchronization signal.
2. Disagreement Indicator Signals are sent simultaneiously
with the I/0 complete interrupt. There is one Disagreement
Indicator for each computer which indicates that computer's
disagreement with the threshold-voted result.
3. Rollback Interrupt When the EEM is notified that only two
computers remain functional, subsequent disagreements of the
two machines result in a Rollback Interrupt. This interrupt,
sent to the two residual duplex computers, causes a program
rollback.
4. Diagnose Interrupt If rollbacks prove unsuccessful in the
residual duplex configuration, the EEM commands a diagnosis
of the two machines. A machine which successfully completes
the diagnostic is connected to all buses and continues in
simplex.
5. Message Alert Interrupt Two agreeing computers may transmit
a word to any other computer by specifying a unique device
ID upon output. The data word is transferred to the input
buffer associated with the addressed computer by the EEM and
a Message Alert. The Message Alert interrupt is sent to that
machine (see Figure 2.2-3). In the case of dedicated units,
the EEM associated with the addressed machine recognizes the
device I/D and loads its associated input buffer.
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2.2.3.2 The Software Function
Figure 2.2-3 represents a block diagram of the software algorithms
utilized to carry out fault recovery. The software in each functioning
machine maintains a record of those computers which are properly functioning
and those considered to have failed. The disagreement indicators are per-
manently masked (ignored) for previously discarded machines. The recovery
software has four states: normal, rollahead, memory copy, and wait, which
are discussed below:
1. Normal During normal operation at the completion of each
output, the computer checks the unmasked disagreement indicators
and if there are no disagreements it resumes normal computations.
In the case of disagreements, the following actions are taken:
a. If the computer is itself in disagreement, it halts
(if possible) and waits for rollahead or memory copy
information from the other computer.
b. If a different machine is in disagreement, it examines an
error tally associated with the faulty machine (FC.).
If that machine has not previously disagreed, the rollahead
state is entered and the current state vector and restart
address is transferred to the disagreeing machine. If a
previous rollahead has been unsuccessful within some time
interval At, a memory copy is attempted.
2. Rollahead The current state vector and restart address are
transmitted from the agreeing machines to the disagreeing
machine. Fault indications are masked during the rollahead
with two exceptions. If one of the working machines disagree
during the transfer, it enters the wait state.
3. Memory Copy The programs, constants, and a minimal set of
variables required to permit a system restart are transferred
to the disagreeing machine at a low duty cycle. Since the
memory copy cannot be allowed to consume more than a few
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percent of the available processing time, the copy information
is transmitted periodically in short blocks. Thus a memory
copy is initiated by activating a periodic entry to the transfer
program. The Memory Copy State is only entered during the
transfer of each short block. The final block contains variables
necessary to perform a "warm" system restart.
4. Wait State A machine which recognizes that it is in disagree-
ment upon receiving an I/O complete interrupt or BITE error
indication halts until loaded by the other working machines
with a program rollahead or memory copy. If a memory copy is
unsuccessful the disagreeing machine is ignored. The fault
tallies associated with each machine not designated as perman-
ently faulty (FC j2) are cleared if sufficient time passes
without recurrence of a fault.
Two additional interrupts are shown in Figure 2.2-3 as single
arrows which are utilized by the EEM to command program rollback
and diagnosis when only two computers remain functional.
In the case of non-dedicated EEM's an additional level of
complexity is added to the software. A set of outputs is
received from each EEM and an adaptive vote must be taken on
these inputs in order to eliminate the effects of defective
EEM units on the recovery process. This is straightforward and
not included in the figure.
2.2.4 Utilization of Redundant EEM. Units
Two general approaches to implementing redundant EEM units are shown
in Figure 2.2-4. The first approach employs non-dedicated redundancy such that
any of several EEMs can be utilized by each computer. The second approach
utilizes a separate EEM dedicated to each computer.
2.2.4.1 Non-Dedicated Redundant EEMs
As shown in Figure 2.2-4a, there are N computers and J EEM units.
Each EEM accepts outputs and commands from all the computers and inputs from
all buses. Therefore, when functioning properly, each EEM delivers identical
data and control information to the computers. By a process of voting and/or
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switching, the computers can ignore the outputs of one or more faulty (disagreeing)
EEM units. (Typically the input to the computers from EEM units would be voted
using an adaptive software vote requiring one more than half of the inputs to
agree from EEM units which have not previously been adjudged faulty).
If each EEM can be commanded to output on one of several (s) redundant
bus lines failures in the EEM can be decoupled from bus failure, resulting in
a totally non-dedicated system.
2.2.4.2 Dedicated EEMs
In this case an EEM unit is dedicated to each computer resulting in
considerable simplification of the EEM (see Figure 2.2-2) and the associated
interconnections. This approach provides adequate reliability if the failure
rate of the EEM and associated bus is small with respect to the failure rate of
the computer. In this case failure of an EEM mayresult.in disabling the associ-
ated computer and bus. Failures which cause improper control signals result in
failure of the computations on the associated computer, while failures in voting
for output disable the associated bus. Non-dedicated sensors and actuators are
recommended using this configuration.
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2.3 MOSTLY-HARDWARE CONFIGURATIONS
Mostly-hardware configurations are structured in such a way as
to minimize the amount of software required to support fault detection and
recovery. Table 2.3-I indicates the additional supporting software functions
employed in software, hardware-aided and mostly hardware configurations.
Mostly- Hardware-Aided Mostly-
Software Software Hardware
Fault Detection by Comparison X
Synchronization X
Transient Recovery X X
Recording and Masking Perma- X X
nently Faulty Modules
TABLE 2.3-I SOFTWARE OVERHEAD OF FAULT-TOLERANT
CONFIGURATIONS
The special software features associated with hardware-aided con-
figurations are:
1. Rollback/Rollahead structured programs.
2. Identifying recurring faults and the decision to employ
rollahead, memory copy, or classify a computer as permanently
faulty.
3. Control of data transfers for rollahead and memory copy.
4. Disabling (fault response) faulty machines.
5. Diagnostic programs for recovery when only two computers
remain functional.
6. A "warm" restart capability. A restart point at which compu-
tation can be resumed with a minimum of variables required for
initialization. (Employed to minimize downtime for transfer
of variables at the end of a memory copy.)
Mostly-hardware configurations perform the functions associated
with the previously discussed hardware-aided software configurations along
with implementing one or more of the above functions in hardware.
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The associated.hardware recovery elements will be considered as
extensions to the EEM previously discussed. And the augmented EEM's will be
protected utilizing non-dedicated redundancy as shown in Figure 2.2-4.
2.3.1 Augmented EEM Units
The primary augmentation of the EEM units to effect mostly-hardware
control over the recovery process is the addition of a "system state" store
consisting of a working/failed flip flop and a tally count for each computer.
Using this information the augmented EEM acts as a finite-state machine. The
current system state and disagreement indications are combinatorially mapped
into a specific recovery action. Similarly the fault indications are utilized
to update the system state. This mechanization is shown in Figure 2.3-1.
The state control is similar for a large number of implementations while the
recovery net implementation is custom to the particular recovery algorithms
employed. Thus an informal description of the state control function will be
given below, followed by descriptions of the custom recovery control for the two
example configurations in the following sections.
2.3.1.1 The State Control Function
The state control function is to update the system state store
to indicate the current status of the redundant computers within the system.
Associated with each computer is a tally count which is advanced upon its
disagreement with the other working machines. The tally counts are periodically
reset if a sufficient period of time has elapsed to indicate that a transient
has been corrected. Typically, after the first disgareement, (Ti=l) a tran-
sient recovery is attempted. If subsequent disagreements recur, the count is
advanced (Ti+Ti+l), additional recovery techniques are attempted and, after
a prescribed number of unsuccessful recovery attempts (Ti=N), the computer
is adjudged permanently faulty (W-F) and further recovery attempts are
discontinued.
2.3.2 Recovery Control
A logical starting point in the description of the recovery
functions carried out by the augmented EEM is the control levels between
the AEEM and computer units. The following control levels are a "typical"
set generated by the augment EIM.
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1. I/0 Complete Interrupt (ICI) - Same as HASW configuration
provides synchronizing restart after computers output.
2. Send Rollahead (SR) - Causes computer to output a state
vector and rollahead address. This information is
received from all computers thus commanded, voted in the
AEEM and loaded into the input register of the disagreeing
machine.
n . ... n 'I I fnnN T. -^4 -^ - -- -
3. Receive Rollahead (RR) - Is sent to disagreeing computer
to accept rollahead information from its input buffer.
(Details of control can be implemented several ways. A
typical case is to treat SR, RR, and ICI with the following
interpretation: SR - ITI - send first word, SR • ICI -
send intermediate word. The last word is a transfer address
for rollahead restart. The AEEM is notified by a special
device code. Similar interpretations are utilized by the
receiving computer (RR • ICI - first, RR • ICI - intermediate,
and RR • ICI - last word and start.))
4. Send Copy Block (SCB) - Causes computer to output a block
of data for memory copy.
5. Receive Copy Block (RCB) - Is sent to disagreeing computer
to accept memory copy information from its input buffer.
(Several detailed implementations are possible similar to
the example in 3 above).
6. Halt - Halts the commanded machine.
7. Cold Start - If all computers disagree the AEEM commands a
cold start of all machines currently classified as working.
8. Diagnose - Causes computer to execute a self-diagnostic
including program check-sums.
Two recovery strategies will be discussed in the following sections.
The first employs only memory copy techniques for transient recovery and, at
the cost of slower recovery of the disagreeing machine, eliminates the.require-
ment for rollahead/rollback structured programs. Unfortunately, this approach
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requires system restart to recover from transients in the residual duplex
configuration. The second approach utilizes program rollahead, rollback,
and memory copy techniques.
2.3.2.1 Memory Copy Implementation
The memory copy recovery algorithm is indicated in Figure 2.3-3a.
If a computer disagrees upon output (Di) and it has no previous disagreements
within a fixed time interval At (TCi=O), then a memory copy is attempted.
Periodically on the order of every millisecond a small block of program data
is transferred to the disagreeing machine. This transfer is maintained at
a low duty cycle so not as to degrade the computations of the remaining compu-
ters. After transfer of the final block, which consists of variables necessary
to restart all computers in an initialized state, the memory copy state is
terminated and the disagreeing computer is brought back into operation. If
the disagreement recurs within a short time (TCi=1 and Di) the computer is
assumed to contain a permanent fault, is classified faulty, and the voter is
commanded to ignore any further outputs from the machine.
Two approaches are suggested for multiple faults:
1. If the state control is disabled during a memory copy
additional faults in other computers are ignored during
the memory copy. As long as sufficiently many additional
computers do not fail such that the voted output remains
valid, correction of additional faults can be deferred
until the current copy is completed.
2. A second approach is to re-initialize the memory copy
when an additional fault occurs, and perform the memory
copy into both (or all) the defective machines.
Residual Duplex
Items 3, 4, and 5 in the memory copy algorithm (Figure 2.3-3a)
correspond to actions taken in the residual duplex and simplex configurations,
i.e. when only two or one computers remain functional. The only mechanism
available for transient correction when one or two computers remain
functional is a system restart (3,5). If in the residual duplex case a
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1) If TC.=O and D. and pw>2 then Memory Copy*
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3) If TC. =O0 and D. and pw=2 then Restart
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system restart is unable to correct the disagreement between the two
machines, a diagnosis is commanded (4) and, if it is successful, the
system degrades to simplex operation.
2.3.2..2 Rollahead - Rollback - Copy Implementation
A recovery algorithm which includes rollahead, rollback, and
memory copy techniques is indicated in Figure 2.3-3b. When more than two
computers are functioning (pw72) the transient recovery sequence consists
of program rollahead followed (if unsuccessful) by memory copy. If the fault
persists after a memory copy it is assumed permanent, the computer is classi-
fied as faulty, its outputs are excluded from the vote, and further recovery
attempts are abandoned.
When two computers remain functional (pw=2) a rollback is attempted
for transient correction. If unsuccessful, both computers are commanded to
run a diagnostic. One is selected and, if successful, the computation continues
in simplex with program rollback upon BITE-detected faults for partial transient
protection.
2.3.3 A Comparison of MHW and HASW Implementations
The principal difference between the mostly hardware and hardware-
aided software configurations is that in the former the system state informa-
tion and recovery decision mechanism resides in a central "hard core"
In the HASW configurations this information and control mechanism is distributed
and replicated within the software of the individual computers. The tradeoff
between the two implementation types is largely a matter of cost.
Implementation costs in the mostly hardware case includes not only
augmentation of the EEM units, but also a mechanism for protecting against
and correcting transient errors in the augmented EEMs. A process of voting
on all internal states (NMR synchronization) is required as well as a well
defined AEEM restart in case of information loss. To protect against transients
it is advisable that the AEEM control states be maintained in non-volatile
storage. Thus the augmented EEM is considerably more complex than the HASW
EEM without augmentation.
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The additional software necessary for HASW implementations with
respect to the mostly hardware case is estimated to require on the order of
1000-2000 words of storage. (Note that program diagnostics and in many
cases rollback-structured programs are required in both implementations).
Memory is allocated for most of the candidate computers in 8k
modules, thus the machine is procured with 16k or 24k or 32k words. Often
under these circumstances, additional memory exists beyond that required for
the flight programs and thus the implementation of HASW routines can be placed
in this extra "core space" at nominal extra cost. If this is the case (as
expected) for the RCS application, the HASW-type implementation is the most
cost-effective.
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3.0 EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE
The structure of the executive designed for the RCS study is
described in this section. The design goals for the executive are discussed
first. Then each module of the executive is described. Several scheduling
mechanisms are then presented and compared. Finally, the adaptability of
the design is considered.
3.1 DESIGN GOALS
Four design goals have been established for the executive. These
goals specify general guidelines for the executive design as well as indicating
a particular application in which the executive could be used. These goals
are to design an executive which:
1. Can be readily adapted as an executive model for all RCS
configurations under consideration.
2. Is general enough to support any reasonably foreseeable
*avionics application.
3. Makes clearly visible all the features required to support
a digital flight control application.
4. Makes available the necessary parameters for configuration
evaluations.
The RCS configurations under consideration in this study all use
hardware, software, and program-execution redundancy in varying degrees to
obtain fault tolerance. The modeling undertaken as part of the RCS work is
of a much broader scope than that.attempted in the past. This modeling not
only gives explicit consideration to both permanent and transient faults,
but also treats the actions of the relevant software. In considering the
relevance of the various portions of the software, it was recognized early
that the details of the actual applications programs have little to do with
the fault-tolerance of an RCS. However the executive structure is important
and thus must be considered.
Since this study is directed toward multicomputer systems rather
than encompassing multiprocessors, a single executive may be designed, for
use in each of the computers of the configuration. Thus,.the first design
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goal ensures that the executive which is designed can be used in all computers
of all configurations being considered, adapted as required by the configuration.
An earlier study [RATN 73] has shown that the computational environ-
ment imposed by avionics applications is such that the majority of computations
must be performed periodically, although the computations performed will vary
with the phase of the flight and the mode(s) used. Thus the computational
requirement imposed by the avionics environments in which the computer systems
being considered will operate involves primarily periodic, cyclical tasks of
varying complexity, rate, and duration. The processing of occasional aperiodic
tasks is also required. The executive has been designed to meet both of these
requirements and thus be generally applicable to all avionics applications.
The structure of the executive which has been designed is applicable to all
applications, but details are application-dependent to varying degrees. The
digital flight control application is being used as an example of a specific
application to ensure that the general design can be specified in some degree
of detail for one specific application. Thus, the second and third design
goals, are complementary.
3.2 SKELETON MODULES
The design of an executive for a fault-tolerant computer system
includes all the features required for an executive designed for a conventional
(i.e., non-fault-tolerant) computer plus those unique features required in
the software to implement the fault-tolerant capability designed into the
fault-tolerant system. The Reconfigurable Computer Systems (RCS's) under
consideration by this study are, by definition, fault-tolerant computer
systems. Although each different RCS organization will impose different
requirements on the executive, a common skeleton can provide the basis for
the entire series of RCS executives since the same applications programs will
be performed on all RCS's.
The executive skeleton consists of four distinct modules, each
providing one of the four basic facilities required in an executive for an
avionics computer. The four modules are the scheduler, the input-output
driver, the interrupt processor, and the machine error handler. Each of the
modules is described in the following subsections, followed by a discussion
of the interaction between pairs of the modules. A block diagram of the
executive skeleton is shown in Figure 3.2-1.
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3.2.1 Scheduler
The scheduler provides for periodic execution of programs in the
computer. Most applications programs run periodically, although the frequency
and duration of each program may be different. Collectively, the applications
programs must deliver correct periodic outputs at the time required. The
scheduler insures that each program will be run when required.
The flight of an aircraft can be partitioned into phases and modes.
Phases of flight include takeoff, ascent, cruise, descent, landing, etc. The
modes of flight include manual and autopilot. The subset of active programs
(out of the set of all loaded programs) is determined by the phase and mode
of the flight. Whenever a phase or mode change is made, the subset of active
programs may change.
Once the subset of active programs is determined, the programs are
scheduled for periodic actuation. Tables and queues are maintained to
accomplish the scheduling function. A priority is also maintained for each
active program to determine whether an asynchronous program activation
request will be honored when it occurs.
3.2.2 Input-Output Driver
The input-output driver provides the external communication capa-
bility for the other executive modules and the applications programs.
Although input-output could be performed directly by the requesting program
in many cases, the use of the executive skeleton as the basis for additional
fault-tolerant features requires that all input and output be provided
by this module of the executive. Both aircraft-computer communication and
intercomputer communication are provided. The former is characterized by
primarily one-word (single) data transfers while the latter is characterized
by primarily multi-word (block) data transfer.
The aircraft-computer communication consists of sensor and control
panel inputs and actuator and display console outputs. These communications
generally require only one computer word (or a part of a word) to hold all
the data. Also, these communications usually require no waiting for the
device. Thus, single word input/output is usually accomplished immediately
and no further action is required after returning to the calling program.
The intercomputer communication consists of data to be verified or
memory words to be loaded. When verification data are exchanged for checking
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or voting, all pertinent state vector information must be communicated.
When a recovery is being attempted through use of a memory reload, a
significant portion of the memory may be affected, and thus, the volume
of data may be rather large. Furthermore, the communication channel (e.g.,
bus) may not be immediately available. Thus, block data transfers are
usually queued when the routine is called but completed as the channel
becomes available. The completion of the data transfer may set a status
variable or actuate a dormant program.
3.2.3 Interrupt Processor
The interrupt processor services all interrupts which are not handled
directly by other executive modules. Interrupts processed by this module
include executive requests and program exception interrupts such as fixed-
point overflow, floating-point exponent overflow, and division by zero. This
module also provides program suspension and resumption routines.
The executive request interrupt is processed by this module because
several different requests are multiplexed into the one interrupt. After
decoding the parameter of the request, the interrupt processor invokes the
program which will process the specific request which was received. The
program may be in another module or in the same module. After the request
has been processed, control returns to the program which made the request
unless the request resulted in a scheduling alteration.
The program exception interrupts are often maskable under program
control. When one of them occurs, the interrupt processor first determines
whether or not the interrupt will have any effect. If the interrupt is to
be ignored, the program is resumed immediately. If an algorithm is specified
(e.g., setting the result to zero for floating-point exponent underflow), it
is applied immediately and the program is resumed. If the program is to be
terminated because of the condition, control is transfered to the scheduler.
The program suspension and resumption routines are required for
saving and restoring the machine state when an interrupt occurs. Some
machines provide alternate register sets for the executive, thus minimizing
the functions of this routine. However, executive pointers, tables, and
queues must always be updated when switching programs.
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3.2.4 Machine Error Handler
The machine error handler processes all program and machine errors
which occur. Even computers which are not designed with fault tolerance
as a design goal usually include address checks, memory parity checks, and
other self-checks. Some computers include self-test hardware which can be
used when an error is indicated. This module utilizes whichever hardware
features are available on the particular machine, combined with software,
to act upon any errors which occur.
Software errors (e.g., address out-of-range) which occur indicate
that either the program contains a design error or the program or its data
has been affected by a fault. Since programs used in aircraft applications
must be thoroughly verified before being put into use, the assumption must
be made that a hardware fault has occurred. (This decision could be modified
for program checkout on the hardware.) Thus, whenever a software error
occurs, the same procedure is followed as when a hardware error occurs.
Hardware errors (e.g., memory parity check) indicate that a failure
has occurred in the hardware. The resolution of the failure depends on the
fault-tolerance capability provided in the computer. If self-test is avail-
able, the module may be able to determine the error and reconfigure to
eliminate the error or set an indicator to cause erroneous outputs to be
ignored. If only minimal fault tolerance is provided, a degraded mode of
operation may still be possible.
3.2.5 Interaction
Each of the modules of the executive skeleton implements a logi-
cally complete and distinct set of functions. Every one of the modules,
however, requires functions in at least one other module. Thus, executive
modules communicate with each other just as applications programs communicate
with the executive modules. A brief discussion of the interaction follows.
The int:eraction is indicated on the block diagram of the executive skeleton
shown in Figure 3.2-1.
The scheduler is activated primarily by the time interrupts. The
scheduler is also used by the interrupt processor to activate and terminate
programs as phase and mode changes occur. It uses the program suspension
and resumption routines in the interrupt processor.
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The input-output driver is activated primarily by input-output
interrupts. The interrupt processor passes applications programs input-output
requests to this module. The machine error handler can also request this
module to reload the memory. This module uses the program suspension and
resumption routines in the interrupt processor.
The interrupt processor is activated primarily by the executive
request and program exception interrupts. It is also used by all other execu-
tive modules for program suspension and resumption. It uses the scheduler to
activate and terminate programs and passes input-output executive requests
to the input-output driver.
The machine error handler is activated by hardware and software
error detection mechanisms. This module uses the interrupt processor for
program suspension and the input-output driver for memory reloading.
3.3 SCHEDULING MECHANISMS
The choice of a scheduling mechanism for an executive is the single
most important decision in the design. The selection of the scheduling mech-
anism affects other modules in various degrees. For the avionics application,
there exists a complete spectrum of executive scheduling mechanisms ranging
from totally synchronous to constrained asynchronous. A study has been made
[TSOU 73] which investigated five distinct scheduling mechanisms and their
applicability to the space shuttle and space tug, applications with computa-
tional requirements not too different from those assumed for this study. The
five mechanisms are investigated in detail and compared to each other as candi-
dates for the executives in various onboard computers. The mechanisms are
described here in sufficient detail to permit investigation of the effects on
simulation of selecting one scheduling mechanism over another for a general
avionics application.
The scheduling mechanisms considered can be differentiated by the
following three characteristics:
1. Fixed vs variable processing time intervals;
2. Fixed vs variable task execution order;
3. Polled vs interrupt-driven aperiodic event registration.
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The synchronous executive, while limited in terms of flexibility
and growth, is conceptually very simple and its behavior is completely pre-
dictable. The synchronous mechanism utilizes fixed time intervals, fixed
execution order, and polled aperiodic event registration. The constrained-
asynchronous mechanism is the most flexible scheduling mechanism usable for
an avionics application. The constrained-asynchronous executive schedules
tasks on a demand basis. It thus provides a more flexible structure which
permits growth to be achieved more easily. This mechanism utilizes variable
processing intervals, variable task execution order, and interrupt registra-
tion of aperiodic events (even during periodic processing). There are a
number of intermediate designs which utilize various combinations of the
above approaches. These are the synchronous-with-asynchronous-overlay, hybrid,
and hybrid-with-external-interrupt mechanisms provide more and more flexibility.
It is not sufficient to differentiate between these scheduling mechanisms by
any one characteristic alone; all characteristics must be considered when
comparing the mechanisms. A description of each of the five scheduling
mechanisms being considered follows. Typical time lines for the various
mechanisms are illustrated in Figure 3.3-1. A comparison of characteristics 7
of the mechanisms is given in Figure 3.3-2.
3.3.1 Synchronous
The synchronous scheduling mechanism divides processing time into
fixed-length slots. Two types of computations are distinguished: minor-cycle
and major-cycle. Minor cycle computations are high-frequency tasks while
major cycle computations are low-frequency tasks, often of longer duration
than minor cycle tasks. The minor and major cycle computations are allocated
to fixed time slots, arranged to form one complete cycle for all major cycle
tasks. Each time slot is activated by an external interrupt. Some idle time
usually exists at the end of each time slot.
The minor cycle tasks may be scheduled in one of two ways. Either
the beginning of every time slot is used for minor cycle tasks or alternate
time slots are devoted entirely to minor cycle tasks. The major cycle tasks
are performed, one per time slot, either in the time remaining after minor
cycle computations in the first case or in the slots between minor cycle
computations in the second case. Two types of major cycle tasks exist:
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FIGURE 3.3-1 EXECUTIVE SCHEDULING MECHANISM TYPICAL TIME LINES
unconditional and conditional. The unconditional major cycle tasks are
executed every time their time slot occurs. The conditional major cycle
tasks are performed only if specified conditions are met.
3.3.2 Synchronous with Asynchronous Overlay
The synchronous-with-asynchronous-overlay scheduling mechanism
eliminates the idle time associated with conditional major cycle tasks which
are not executed in the synchronous scheduling mechanism. With the overlay,
unconditional major cycle tasks are allocated fixed slots as before. Condi-
tional tasks, however, are scheduled by a master controller during time slots
which are allocated to it. In this way, conditional major cycle tasks are
executed on a priority basis rather than having to wait until the fixed time
slot arrives for processing. The synchronous-with-asynchronous-overlay
scheduling mechanism is the first to schedule any tasks other than by a fixed
time slot.
3.3.3 Hybrid
The hybrid scheduling mechanism combines the minor-cycle scheduling
of the synchronous scheduling mechanism with the list processing of the
asynchronous mechanism. An external interrupt is used to initiate the minor
cycle computations. The minor cycle tasks include a subsystem scanner which
registers events required to service subsystems requesting attention. As soon
as the minor cycle tasks are completed, the list processing (asynchronous)
mechanism regains control. Aperiodic tasks may be registered by the subsystem
scanner or by other aperiodic tasks. The hybrid scheduling mechanism is the
first to use the list processing mechanism which schedules aperiodic tasks and
the first to have variable minor cycle processing times.
3.3.4 Hybrid with External Interrupts
The hybrid-with-external-interrupts scheduling mechanism replaces
the subsystem scanner, in the minor cycle tasks of the hybrid mechanism, with
interrupts which are enabled during the asynchronous processing. The hybrid-
with-external-interrupts scheduling mechanism is the first to use any interrupts
other than a real-time interrupt which initiate minor cycle computations.
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3.3.5 Constrained Asychronous
The constrained-asynchronous scheduling mechanism is the most
flexible which could be used in an avionics application. The constraints
applied include required precise, periodic computations; debugged, cooperating
programs; and a minimum number of interrupts. When this scheduling mechanism
is used, interrupts are enabled most of the time. The tasks are scheduled
using a cyclic list which contains entries such as interrupt-scheduled tasks,
studies, queues, and ordered lists. A real-time interrupt initiates a
special task which processes the high-frequency tasks which are on a special
ordered list. The constrained asynchronous scheduling mechanism is the only
one to allow interrupts at almost all times, even during the periodic high-
frequency computations.
3.3.6 Comparison and Contrast
The five executive scheduling mechanisms which are being considered
here range from the totally synchronous mechanism to the constrained asynchronous
mechanism with three other designs between. The synchronous mechanism is the
least flexible but easiest to verify. All computations are scheduled at a
fixed time and are limited to a specified amount of processing time. No
asynchronous processing is allowed and conditional tasks are allocated time
even if they are not run. The synchronous-with-asynchronous-overlay mechanism
improves on this by allocating some of the time slots to aperiodic event
scheduling. Thus tasks which are conditional can be scheduled only when the
conditions exist which as required for processing. The hybrid mechanism
goes one step further by allocating all non-minor-cycle time to asynchronous
scheduling. This is the first use of the list-processing algorithms employed
in the asynchronous mechanism. The hybrid-with-external-interrupts mechanism
uses interrupts to register aperiodic events rather than the polling mechanism
used in the other three mechanisms. The asynchronous mechanism allows interrupts
even during periodic events. A cyclic list is used to schedule tasks. Periodic
tasks are activated by a high-priority interrupt.
Thus it can be seen that the scheduling mechanisms considered range
from the synchronous in which everything is fixed to the constrained asynchronous
where everything is variable. The synchronous mechanism is the easiest to verify
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because everything is fixed. As more asynchronism is introduced, verification
becomes more and more difficult because more and more variability. The asynchro-
ous mechanism, in which almost everything is variable, can never be totally
verified because the number of combinations of events is very large. All that
can be done is to test all branches in a reasonable number of ways.
The choice of an executive scheduling mechanism is made on the basis
of the environment, the machine capabilities, and the applications programs
requirements. Once the choice of an executive scheduling mechanism is made,
the other portions of the executive can be considered.
3.4 ADAPTABILITY
Adaptability is an important design goal for the executive. This
goal can be interpreted in two different contexts: configuration adaptability
and scheduling adaptability. Configuration adaptability is the ability to adapt
to any configuration considered by the RCS study. Each different configuration
imposes a slightly different set of requirements upon the executive although
each configuration accomplishes the same tasks for the avionics environment
in which it resides. Thus adaptations of the same executive skeleton should
provide executives for all configurations. Scheduling adaptability is the
ability to use any scheduling mechanism from totally synchronous to constrained
asynchronous. The synchronous scheduling mechanism implements a strictly fixed
time and order for task processing while the constrained asynchronous scheduling
mechanism permits demand scheduling except for strictly-periodic, high-frequency
events.
The executive skeleton described in this section provides both
configuration adaptability and scheduling adaptability. The same basic set
of four modules (scheduler, input-output driver, interrupt processor, and
machine error handler) is used for all executives. Additional modules and/or
enhancement of the basic four modules are provided to satisfy the requirements
imposed by the various configurations. The various scheduling mechanisms can
be implemented internally within the scheduler module with minor changes in
the interrupt handler module. It should be noted that even for the totally
synchronous executive, machine error conditions must be processed immediately
when they occur.
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The RCS configurations being considered by this study are all
to be used in an avionics environment. The results of the study, however,
should be usable for other environments such as spacecraft, process control,
etc. Thus, although the executive is designed to support an avionics environ-
ment, it is not constrained to that environment. Even in the avionics
environment, a wide range of applications exists. Furthermore, the purpose
of undertaking the design of an executive is to provide a model for the
simulator which is being written. Thus the level of design of the executive
is that which is necessary to support a model for the simulator. The level
which has been chosen, the module level, provides complete generality while
still specifying the structure and functions of the executive.
3.5 SOFTWARE STRUCTURE AND FAULT-TOLERANCE IMPLEMENTATION
3.5.1 Software Structure Considerations for a Duplex System
It is important to study the impact of the executive scheduling on
a duplex system since adaptive configurations are able to degrade to duplex.
The structure of the software used in a duplex computer configura-
tion has an effect on the probability of recovery from a fault given detection
of an error. The software features which must be investigated to determine
the effects include the executive scheduling mechanism, a typical cycle of
minor-and major-cycle computations, redundancy requirements, and tradeoffs
which must be made between conflicting requirements.
3.5.1.1 Executive Scheduling Mechanisms
Evaluation of scheduling mechanisms which could be used in
a duplex computer configuration leads to a dichotomy of the mechanisms
presented in Section 3.3. The breakpoint is the inclusion of an
asynchronous mechanism which does not require segmenting of major cycle
computations into pieces which can be completed between Real Time
Interrupts (RTI's). The synchronous and synchronous-with-asynchronous-
overlay mechanisms do require such segmentation. These mechanisms
will be called synchronous-type mechanisms in this discussion. The
hybrid, hybrid-with-external-interrupts, and constrained-asynchronous
mechanisms do not require segmentation of major-cycle computations and
will be called asynchronous-type mechanisms.
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The requirement that all programs running on a duplex
system must incorporate rollback has a significant effect on the
choice of a scheduling mechanism. For minor-cycle computations, a
rollback point can be established at the end of each iteration. If
new data are input immediately prior to the next computation cycle,
the input mechanism must be protected separately. In any case, it is
assummed that the previous state vector and the new input data are
correct and available at the beginning of a minor-cycle computation.
If the minor cycle completes successfully, a new state vector is stored
and the major-cycle computations are performed. If an error occurs, the
minor-cycle computations can be repeated, possibly at a cost of delaying
the major-cycle computations. Thus the rollback structure of minor-cycle
computations corresponds with the scheduling of the computations for any
of the scheduling mechanisms (except for the constrained-asynchronous
mechanism where minor-cycle computations can be interrupted briefly).
For major-cycle computations, the choice of a synchronous-type
or asynchronous-type scheduling mechanism has significant consequences.
If a synchronous-type scheduling mechanism is chosen, then the major-cycle
computations can have a rollback point at the end of each segment. At the
end of a segment the state vector is known and is usually reasonably small.
Each segment of a major-cycle computation is similar to the minor-cycle
computations in that the rollback structure and the scheduling of the
segment correspond. If an asynchronous-type scheduling mechanism is
chosen, the situation is entirely different. Rollback points will not
correspond temporally to processing segments. Zero, one, or several
rollback points may be established during one computation period.
Filrthermllre, there may not be time to complete a rollback before another
minor-cycle is initiated. A rollback point could be forced by storing
every variable the program uses when an RTI occurs at a cost of time and
memory.
The interaction between the minor-cycle computations and the
major-cycle computations depends on the choice of a scheduling mechanism
and comparison period for major-cycle computations. If a synchronous-
type scheduling mechanism is chosen, the rollback structure corresponds
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to the scheduling so each execution segment is independently protected
by its own rollback mechanism. If an asynchronous-type scheduling
mechanism is chosen, a fault can cause a rollback in more than one program
segment. If a fault occurs during a major-cycle computation which is
interrupted by a minor-cycle computation, the minor-cycle computation can
get an error, causing rollback and then the major-cycle computation can
get an error when it reaches a rollback point, resulting in another rollback.
The comparison period for major-cycle computation determines the length
of rollbacks. If a comparison is made only when an output occurs, the
entire computation must be repeated if an error occurs. If rollback'
points with comparisons are inserted at a reasonable number of places in
each major-cycle computation, errors will be caught sooner and rollbacks
will be shorter. Also, the chance of an error affecting both a minor
and major cycle is reduced if more rollback points are used. However,
the time required for the complete major-cycle computation is increased.
3.5.1.2 Typical Computational Cycle
A typical computational cycle consists.of all processing
between two consecutive Real Time Interrupts (RTI's). Immediately
following an RTI, minor-cycle processing is performed. After the
minor-cycle processing is completed, the remaining time before the next
RTI is used for major-cycle processing.
The minor-cycle processing consists of high-frequency
activities which must be performed regularly. These activities include
input, calculation, checking, and output of high-frequency control
information and memory copy when it is active. The input, calculation,
checking, and output must be protected by rollbacks. Furthermore, the
original input should by used again if a rollback occurs. A way of
accomplishing this is to use three minor-cycle periods for a complete
iteration. A minor cycle would begin by issuing the output data
generated by the calculations during the last minor cycle. Calculations
would then be performed on input data obtained during the last minor
cycle with checking of the results. Then input would be obtained for
the next minor cycle. Finally, a rollback point would be established
for all minor-cycle processing up to that point.
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The last portion of a minor cycle is devoted to memory copy
when it is active. If the other computer has suffered a suspected
memory failure, and if memory copy is considered a viable option for
the application, the memory of one computer can be copied to the other.
When the memory copy is active, however, the system is running in the
simplex mode, since one computer contains a fault. Thus no rollback
is included in the programs which implement memory copy. A fault in
the sending computer during memory copy would constitute a second fault,
while another fault in the receiving computer would not change its
faulty status. During each minor cycle, as many words as possible would
be transmitted, subject to the limitation that the multiplexed bus must
be available for input and output during the next minor cycle.
When the minor-cycle processing is successfully completed,
major-cycle processing is initiated or resumed, depending on the scheduling
mechanism. The major cycle continues until it completed or is terminated
by another RTI, again depending on the scheduling mechanism.
Major-cycle processing consists of low-frequency activities which
occur regularly and aperiodic activities which respond to external
or internal stimuli. If no other major-cycle processing is required,
self-test is run. The self-test may also be scheduled as one of the
regular major-cycle activities to insure a minimum amount of self-test.
Major-cycle computations tend to be longer than minor-cycle computations.
Major-cycle computations would be likely to have several rollback
points in a single task. As an absolute minimum, rollback points would
be required after input, calculation and output. The rollback point
after input would protect the input. More than one rollback point
during calculation, with checking, would prevent completely restarting
the task in case an error occurred. Finally, a rollback point after
output would prevent repeated outputs.
The rollback structure of a period between two RTI's has
three distinct sections. During the minor-cycle processing preceding
the memory copy, all computations can be protected by a single rollback
point at the end. Once this rollback point is established, the second
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section, the memory copy, is initiated if it is active. As stated above,
the memory copy is not protected by rollback. Finally, the major-cycle
computations each have one or more rollback points which may or may not
correspond to RTI intervals, depending on the scheduling mechanism.
3.5.1.3 Redundancy Requirements
The use of duplex redundancy imposes three requirements on
the hardware and software which are not required in a simplex system.
First, increased memory is needed for state vector storage and comparison
programs. Second, increased execution speed is required for time to
do the same function. Third, rollback must be included in the software.
In addition to these three requirements, reconfiguration mechanisms must
be provided if the duplex operation is part of an adaptive system which
degrades from TMR to duplex to simplex.
The increased memory required for duplex redundancy is used
to store the state vectors at program rollback points and for programs
which compare state vectors control reconfiguration. The state vectors
must be saved by double buffering or an equivalent technique which
preserves the information from a previous rollback point until a new one
is established. Programs are also required to store the state vector and
to reload it from the same area when a rollback is required. These programs
may be executive routines provided for use by application programs or code
in each of the application programs themselves. It is preferable for the code
to exist in a set of executive routines to minimize duplication and to provide
for adaptive redundancy by reconfiguration.
The increased speed is required to provide time for storing
and comparing the state vectors. The time which is required to store
the state vectors depends on the length of each state vector which is
stored and the frequency at which they are stored. Increased time is
also needed to compare the state vectors when they are stored and/or
compare outputs before they are issued to aircraft actuators. When
a failure occurs, time is needed to reload the state vector, repeat the
computation which was in progress when the error occurred.
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Rollback capability must be provided for programs running
on a duplex computer configuration in order to determine the faulty
computer when an error occurs. When the results of the two computers
differ, each must rerun the program first to check for a transient error.
If the faulty computer cannot be determined, a self-test must be used.
When the faulty computer is determined, it must be removed from actively
controlling the aircraft. Then the remaining good computer must continue
in the simplex mode.
An extra redundancy requirement is imposed if adaptive
redundancy is being used. Some additional speed and memory will be
required for reconfiguration. The system life will be maximized by
progressively degrading from TMR to duplex to simplex as failures occur.
If a failure is due to memory damage, memory copy may be used to correct
the fault and upgrade to a mode using one more computer. Changing
modes, however, requires special considerations. Adaptive TMR requires
rollahead while duplex requires rollback. The same code can be used to
save and compare the state vectors. The primary difference is whether
the segment in which the error occurred is repeated or the state vector
is corrected and the program continues.
3.5.1.4 Tradeoffs
The three major tradeoffs which must be considered when deter-
mining the value of p for a duplex configuration are the scheduling mech-
anism, the frequency of rollback points, and the lengths of the state
vectors. In all cases, the software influences the v2w2 factor (see Section
5.5.1), the probability of correct recovery given detection and correct
diagnosis of the faulty unit. A summary of the tradeoffs and the effects on
v2w2 is presented in Table 3.5-I.
The choice of a scheduling mechanism has a significant effect on
v2w2 . If a synchronous scheduling mechanism is used, the rollback segments
can be established at the end of each time slot. Furthermore, a synchronous
scheduling mechanism has idle time distributed to a part of each time slot.
Thus the synchronous scheduling will yield a higher value of v2w2 since
recovery will be faster (at most one rollback series is needed per error)
and the time is available for immediate rollback without delaying other
computations (due to the distributed idle time).
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ITEM LARGER v2w2  SMALLER v2w2
SCHEDULING MECHANISM SYNCHRONOUS ASYNCHRONOUS
Faster Recovery Slower Recovery
Distributed idle Time Concatenated idle Time
Number of Rollback Points More Less
Length of Rollback Segments Shorter Longer
Faster Recovery Slower Recovery
State Vq-tor Length Shorter Longer
Faster Slower
TABLE 3.5-I SOFTWARE EFFECTS ON v2w2
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The frequency of rollback points also affects v2w2. The greater
the number of rollback points which are inserted, the faster the recovery
will be when a rollback is required. At the extreme, the length of the
state vector and the time required to store it can become significant, but
in most cases this is small relative to the processing time of the rollback
segment. A greater number of rollback points also increases v2w2 when
transient duration is considered. If a transient is of relatively-long
duration, more than one rollback may be required before the transient fault
disappears. The shorter the length of the rollback segment (greater the
number of rollbacks), the faster the successful one will complete.
Finally, the lengths of the state vectors affects v2w2 in two
ways. Shorter state vectors require less memory which results in a larger
v2w2 value. Also, the shorter the state vector, the shorter the time needed
to save and restore it, resulting in greater probability of recovery in time.
3.5.2 Software Structure Considerations for a TMR System
Although this section considers the TMR case, its conclusions
are also valid for 4-MR and 5-MR systems.
This section considers for TMR the same topics which were con-
sidered for the duplex configuration in Section 3.5.1. The probability of
recovery given detection, v2w2, is used-only in adaptive TMR when running
in the duplex mode. The topics discussed in this section are executive
scheduling mechanisms, minor-and major-cycle computational requirements,
redundancy requirements, and tradeoffs between conflicting requirements.
3.5.2.1 Executive Scheduling Mechanisms
The executive scheduling mechanisms which could be used in a TMR
configuration again are separated into the synchronous-type which require
segmentation of major-cycle computations into pieces which can be completed
between Real Time Interrupts (RTI's) and the asynchronous-type which do not
require segmentation. Programs running on an adaptive TMR configuration,
which can degrade to duplex, require rollback segmentation. When the system
is used in the TMR mode, rollahead is used when an error occurs, since a
majority vote is possible. When the system degrades to the duplex mode,
rollback is used when an error occurs.
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For minor-cycle processing, a rollahead/rollback point can
be established at the end of the minor-cycle computation period for
any of the scheduling mechanisms. For major-cycle processing, however,
rollahead/rollback points will correspond temporally to processing
segments only if a synchronous-type scheduling mechanism is used. If
an asynchronous-type scheduling mechanism is used, zero, one, or several
rollahead/rollback points may be established during one computation period.
If a synchronous scheduling mechanism is used, an error
which occurs will only affect the active processing, since rollahead/
rollback points will be established at the end of each processing segment.
If an asynchronous-type scheduling mechanism is used, however, an error
may affect an interrupted major-cycle computation as well as a minor-cycle
computation. In the TMR configuration no major problem exists when this
occurs, since rollahead requirements are not critical in comparison to
rollback requirements. The time required to update the state vector is
small relative to the time needed to repeat a program segment.
3.5.2.2 Typical Computational Cycle
The structure of a typical computational cycle, which consists
of all the processing between two Real Time Interrupts (RTI's), does not
vary with configuration changes. Minor-cycle processing always immediately
follows the RTI, after which the major-cycle processing uses the remaining
time before the next RTI.
Although the structure of a typical computational cycle
is more dependent on the scheduling mechanism used than on the amount
of redundancy the system is using (TMR, duplex, etc.), the details of the
rollahead/rollback and reconfiguration code are different. In the TMR
configuration, the faulty computer can be identified by a majority vote.
A rollahead is used first to attempt to correct the faulty computer.
If this fails, a memory copy can be tried. In any case, no significant
amount of time is lost while applying these procedures. The two computers
which do not have any errors continue to perform the required computations
while also attempting to correct the faulty computer.
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3.5.2.3 Redundancy Requirements
Redundancy requirements for TMR include memory, speed and
rollahead. Increased memory is required for programs which compare
the state vectors at rollahead points. Increased execution speed is
required for state vector correction. Rollahead is used to correct a
faulty state vector when it is damaged by an error. The use of adaptive
TMR also requires reconfiguration mechanisms which can change the system
to a duplex mode of.operation and back to TMR.
The only requirement for additional memory in a TMR configuration
over simplex is for the checking and reconfiguration programs. One
important function is the comparison of state vectors at the end of a
rollahead segment. If an error is detected, the erroneous state vectors
corrected by a majority vote and computation continues (rollahead).
If adaptive TMR is used, provisions must also be included for reconfiguring
to duplex mode when an error is detected. The system will run in the
duplex mode while attempting to restore the faulty computer to operational
status. If the faulty computer recovers, the TMR mode of operation can
be resumed, otherwise duplex operation continues.
A moderate speed increase is needed for state vector
comparison, rollahead and reconfiguration if used. The state vector
comparison is a short task. If an error is detected, the state vector
can be corrected by using a majority vote among the three computers.
Although this task is also short, it is essential that it be performed
rapidly, since all system computation is suspended during rollahead.
The reconfiguration process also must be rapid when it is required,
since no other activity may be in progress during reconfiguration.
The incorporation of rollahead in programs running on a
TMR configuration provides the capability of restoring a faulty
computer to service when a transient error occurs. When an error is
detected in a state vector, the state vectors in .the two good computers
can be used to correct the state vector in the faulty computer. If an
error remains after rollahead, the system can be reconfigured to duplex
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while the memory of the faulty computer is reloaded. If the error
is removed, the system can again be reconfigured to TMR.
3.5.2.4 Tradeoffs
The two major tradeoffs which must be considered for an
adaptive TMR configuration are rollahead/rollback structure and the
memory copy option.
There are essentially four different TMR configurations
which can be considered, each increasing the recovery mechanisms
provided. The basic configuration is classical TMR with no recovery
for a faulty machine. Some improvement can be expected if rollback
is included in each of the computers with comparison with the state
vector of the other machines. A better configuration includes rollahead
rather than rollback so that an erroneous state vector is corrected by
a majority vote and no time is lost for recovery. Finally, the inclusion
of memory copy would permit correcting damaged memory words in a computer.
All configurations except the classical TMR can be adaptive so that they
degrade to duplex and then simplex as permanent failures occur.
The use of adaptive TMR requires that programs include
rollback capability for use when running in the duplex mode. If
rollback rather than rollahead is used for TMR, the same mechanisms can
be used for duplex and TMR operation. The availability of the third
computer, however, provides a voting capability which can be used to
eliminate the time penalty imposed by rollback. The cost is in extra
memory for the rollahead mechanism and extra complexity which is introduced
into programs which must include provisions for using either rollahead or
rollback.
The inclusion of a memory copy capability requires time,
memory, and complexity. Time must be provided during each minor cycle
when memory copy is active to transmit words between computers.
Memory is required for buffer space and for programs which accomplish
the data transfer. Also, additional reconfiguration complexity is
introduced. The advantage of using memory copy, however, is that a
computer in which a transient fault damages memory may be corrected
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and the configuration returned to TMR, resulting in correction of errors
by rollahead rather than rollback. Thus, there will be three good
computers operating in case a fault occurs in one of the computers
which did not have the initial memory fault.
The same considerations which were discussed in Section
3.5.1 pertaining to effects of software on p are also applicable to
adaptive TMR degraded to the-duplex mode. As can be seen from Figure
3.5-1, all software considerations ultimately lead to a consideration
of the recovery time. With three computers running, at least two of
which are good, recovery is immediate by voting, thus software
considerations are not involved until the system degrades to duplex
operation.
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4.0 MEASURES OF FAULT-TOLERANCE
4.1 THE CONCEPT OF FAULT-TOLERANCE
4.1.1 The Reliability Problem for Computers
The reliability problem in computer operation is caused by
imperfections in the physical implementation of the logic structure.
Reliability theory defines the reliability of a system as the probability
of correct operation up to the "mission time" t=T, given that the system
was operating correctly at the "starting time" t=O. Computer systems are
a special case among all physical systems because in their case "correct
operation" means the correct execution of a set of programs, rather than
the continued functioning of a set of components of the system. It is the
purpose of this section to present a unified view of those aspects of computer
system design that are specifically directed toward the assurance of correct
program execution in the presence of physical imperfections (called faults)
in the components of the system. (AVIZ 72)
The following four criteria form an operational definition of
"correct execution of a set of programs:"
1. The programs and their data are not altered or halted
by faults;
2. The results of operations do not contain fault-caused
errors;
3. The execution time of each program does not exceed a
specified limit;
4. The storage capacity that is available for each program
remains above a specified minimum value.
It is to be noted that the definition excludes the question of correctness
of the programs and of accuracy of the algorithms, both of which are separate
fields of study.
The set of programs and data, the definitions of required operations,
the time limits for program execution, and the storage requirements are
specified by the users of the system. The goal of the designer is to raise
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the system reliability (i.e., the probability of correct execution of
these programs) to an acceptably high value, given that faults may occur
during execution. Such faults are caused by three classes of physical events
that affect the hardware:
1. Permanent failures of computer components;
2. Intermittent malfunctions of components;
3. External interference with computer operation.
When these events occur, they cause logic faults, defined as the deviations
of one or more logic variables within the computer system from their design-
specified values.
4.1.2 "Fault-Intolerant" Design for Reliable Operation
There exist two complementary approaches that can be employed to
attain satisfactory reliability of computer systems. They are designated
as: 1) fault-intolerance, and 2) fault-tolerance, respectively.
Fault intolerance is an approach that aims to reduce the probability
of occurrence of the first fault during a specified time interval OtsT to
an acceptably low value. In this approach the system is designed without
redundancy, and every component of the system must function correctly in
order to assure correct program execution. The procedures which lead to the
attainment of "fault-intolerant" reliable systems are:
1. The most reliable components are selected for the system
within the existing cost and performance constraints;
2. Proven techniques are employed for the interconnection of
components and assembly of subsystems;
3. The system is packaged to screen out the expected forms of
external interference;
4. Quantitative prediction of the system reliability is made on
the basis of known or predicted failure distributions and
rates for the components and interconnections.
In the "purely" fault-intolerant (non-redundant) design, the probability of
fault-free hardware operation is equated to the probability of correct program
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execution. This design is characterized by the decision to invest all
the reliability resources into procurement of high-reliabilitycomponents
and refinement of assembly and packaging techniques.
4.1.3 Design of "Fault-Tolerant" Systems
An alternative to the "purely" fault-intolerant approach is
offered by the use of various forms of redundancy. Known as fault-tolerance,
this is an approach that increases computer system reliability by the use
of design techniques that allow faults to occur without disrupting the con-
tinued correct execution of its programs. Fault-tolerance does not entirely
eliminate the need for reliable components; instead, it offers the option
of allocate part of the reliability resources to the use of redundancy. The
end goal of a fault-tolerant design is either: 1) a system reliability
prediction that cannot be attained by the purely fault-intolerant design; or
2) a system reliability prediction that matches the purely fault-intolerant
design at a lower overall cost of implementation.
A fault-tolerant computer system is defined as possessing the
following three attributes:
1. It consists of a set of components (hardware) and programs
(software);
2. It is initially free of design errors;
3. It executes its set of programs correctly in the presence
of faults.
The first attribute stresses the fact that the ability of a computer system
to continue operating correctly in the presence of faults depends not only
on the properties of the hardware, but also on the nature of the software--
both the system programs and the user (application) programs. For example,
the ability to recover from the errors caused by transient faults frequently
depends on special restart features incorporated in the system software as
well as on proper partitioning and state vector storage of user programs.
The second attribute requires that design errors be eliminated from
both hardware and software prior to the initiation of fault-tolerant computing.
Design errors are caused by errors in the translation of the original system
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specifications into the operational forms. They are eliminated by validation
of the hardware and software designs prior to their operational use. Since
a complete a priori verification cannot yet be assured, computer systems also
need provisions to detect and trap various abnormal conditions during operation
which may be symptoms of remaining design errors. A completely fault-tolerant
operation is attained only when all design errors are eliminated from the system.
The third condition for fault-tolerant computing postulates correct
execution of the entire set of programs in the presence of faults. Program
errors that are caused by faults in the hardware can be avoided or corrected
by means of protective redundancy. Protective redundancy is introduced into
the computer system in three forms:
1. Additional hardware (hardware redundancy);
2. Additional programs (software redundancy);
3. Repetition of machine operations (time redundancy).
These redundant features would not be needed in a fault-free computer. Given
that faults will occur in the hardware, the redundant features provide a
fault-tolerant computing system, which carries out its programs correctly in
the presence of faults. Partial fault-tolerance ("graceful degradation")
results when one or more programs fail to satisfy criteria (1) or (2), and
also when some (or all) programs fail to satisfy criteria (3) or (4) for
correct execution (Paragraph 4.1.1).
Research results and design experience that have been accumulated
during the past decade show that the systematic introduction of protective
redundancy to provide fault-tolerance in a computer system can be accomplished
by the following design procedure.
1. The computational requirements are established and the
system architecture is specified with the initial assumption
that faults will not occur (the "fault-intolerant" design).
2. The classes of faults that are to be tolerated in the design
of (1) are identified, and the extent of tolerance is specified
for each class of faults.
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3. The most cost-effective methods of protective redundancy
(time, hardware, software) are chosen to cover every class
of faults identified in (2), and the system architecture
is modified to incorporate the redundancy.
4. Analytic or heuristic techniques are applied to estimate
the extent of fault-tolerance that is provided by the methods
of protective redundancy selected in (3).
5. Checkout methods are devised to test all redundancy features
specified in (3). Where applicable, fault-t6lerance features
are extended to effect automatic maintenance of peripheral
systems that are.connected to or controlled by the computer.
Design experience has shown that the initial results of task (4)
often lead back to (3), and that several iterations of (3) and (4) may be
necessary to arrive at a satisfactory fault-tolerant system architecture.
The measures applicable to task (4) are discussed in the next section.
4.2 QUANTITATIVE SPECIFICATION OF FAULT-TOLERANCE
4.2.1 Classification of Measures
There are three distinct quantitative measures that can be applied
to measure the fault-tolerance of a computer system. They are:
1. The Discrete Fault Tolerance d
2. The Reliability R(t)
3. The Survivability S(t)
The discrete fault tolerance (DFT) d is a deterministic measure
that specifies how many faults of a given class can be tolerated by a computer
system or by a module of the system. The remaining two measures - reliability
R(t) and survivability S(t) - are probabilistic measures that predict the
probability of the system continuing its correct operation over a specified
time interval. The three measures are discussed in the following parts of this
section.
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4.2.2 Discrete Fault Tolerance (DFT)
DFT is defined as the ability of a Module Set M to operate
correctly for at least d faults within the Module Set. The value of d
is an integer:
d(M) l
in a fault-tolerant module set M.
The DFT measure applies to permanent faults that are taken from
a specified Fault Set F. The fault set F must also be explicitly stated
for a complete DFT specification, i.e., we have:
d(M,F)!l
It is important to note that DFT is not a function of time, i.e.,
the probability of continued correct operation is stated to be unity as long
as not more than d faults from the fault set F occur within the module set M.
In practical DFT implementations for which d(M,F) 2 is specified it may be
necessary to specify a minimum time interval T between successive faults.
The interval is needed in the case of dynamically redundant systems that
require a recovery procedure to be completed before the next fault occurs.
This gives the specification
d(M,F,AT) 2
In the case of d = 1 the value of AT is not important, since the.second fault
is assumed to lead to system failure.
As defined above, the DFT is a "worst case" specification of fault-
tolerance, since d refers to the most critical set of faults. Given that
faults other than the "critical faults" occur, the module set M is usually
able to survive more than d faults.
The Module Set M itself refers to a redundant set of modules, in
which a "module" may be an entire computer, a functional subsystem, a logic
package, or even a single physical component of the system. For example,
d = 1 applies to both a "quadded" set (M1 ) of diodes (Figure 2.2-1) and to a
"TMR" configuration (M2 ) of complete computers (Figure 2.2-2). In both cases
the fault set F includes independent failures of single units. The "unit"
is one diode in M1 , and one computer or one voter in M2.
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FIGURE 4.2-1 QUADDED DIODES, d = 1
Computer 1 Voter
Computer 2 Voter
Computer 3 Voter
FIGURE 4.2-2 COMPUTERS IN TMR CONFIGURATION
4-7
A common extension of the DFT specification is a "fail-safe"
condition for the (d+l)St fault. This means that after d faults have
occurred, the next "worst case" fault will lead to a systematic shutdown
of the function performed by the module set M. An example is the "FO-FO-FS"
specification, which translates to d=2 and a fail-safe condition for the
third fault in the worst possible location within the module set M. The
set M is usually composed of system "modules" in this specification.
S4. 3 PRelabihlit
The reliability R(t) also refers to a set F of permanent faults
that can occur in the hardware module set M. It is defined as the probability
that the set M will not experience a disabling hardware failure during a
specified "mission time" interval 05t<T. When a system is composed of several
module sets Mi with reliability R (t), it is usually assumed that all module
sets must survive in order for the system to survive, i.e.,
n
R(t) = 17 Ri (t)
sys i=l
for a system composed of n module sets M. (1_in).
The current state of the art in reliability modeling (BOUR 71)
specifies the reliability of a module set Mi with respect to a fault set F
in terms of seven parameters as
R(Mi,F) c fR (T, )*1 -Cs
where the parameters are defined as follows:
q quota _ number of modules within the set M. required to survive
to time T
s sparing = number of modules provided as spares within Mi
c coverage = conditional probability [system recoversimodule fails]
f = discrete fault tolerance within one module of M.
_ power-on failure rate for one module of M.1
The symbol A means "is defined as."
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A power-off failure rate for one module of Mi
T A mission time
The analytic expressions for R(t) as a function of these parameters
are found in BOUR 71.
4.2.4 Survivability
It is known from experience that computer systems are also subject
to transient faults, which can terminate the correct execution of a set of
programs without causing a disabling hardware failure in the module set Mi.
Our goal is to incorporate the survival probability with respect to the
occurrence of transient faults into one probabilistic measure of fault-
tolerance that also contains the reliability R(t) as defined in the preceding
section. This measure will be called the survivability S(t) of the module
set M..
In order to include transient faults, it is necessary to define a
transient fault set F' which is described by two properties: their arrival
characterization and their duration (AVIZ 72). Both properties are statistical
in their nature. The arrival time of a transient fault is a discrete random
variable, while its duration is described by a probability density function.
These concepts are illustrated by specific examples in Section 5.2.
In a dynamically redundant system both transient and permanent faults
require a two step fault-tolerance procedure:
1. The existence of the fault is detected.
2. A recovery action takes place.
The detection of permanent faults may be by means of periodic diagnosis
or by concurrent error-detection procedures; only the latter are suitable to
detect transient faults. In the present study we assume concurrent error detec-
tion by a comparison of the outputs of two or,more copies of identical modules.
The same comparison procedure will detect errors caused by both transient and
permanent faults; however, at the time of detection it is not known which type
of fault has been detected.
The recovery procedure first must distinguish whether a permanent
or a transient fault has occurred, next the faulty module must be located
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(identified). After fault location, an appropriate corrective action is
implemented. In the case of a transient fault, it consists of bringing the
affected module back into correct operation ("rollback" or "rollahead");
in the case of a permanent fault, it requires the continuing of correct opera-
tion without assistance from the failed module. The failed module may be
removed (e.g., in replacement, hybrid-redundant, adaptive systems), or it may
remain in the working module set (e.g., in TMR systems).
In the case of dynamically redundant systems, the time requirement
becomes an important parameter. We distinguish the following time intervals
that affect the success of recovery of a dynamically redundant system:
1. Time interval from the occurrence of the fault to its detection.
During this time the fault continues to affect the computation,
and errors may proliferate in the program being executed.
2. A specified time delay before the recovery action is initiated.
This delay is part of the recovery function; computing is
suspended during this time. The function of the delay is to
allow transient faults to end before recovery is initiated.
A fault that lasts longer will be treated as a permanent fault.
3. Time interval needed to execute the recovery action. At the
end of this interval the system is again in an operational state.
This state is identical to the pre-fault state after a successful
recovery from a transient. After a successful recovery from a
permanent fault, the system enters the specified "next state",
which depends on the redundancy technique employed.
The recovery action itself consists of two components:
1. The fault must be located by identifying the module that has
been affected by the fault.
2. The operational state must be re-established by an appropriate
technique.
Each component requires a time interval and has a certain probability
of unsuccessful execution. Furthermore, we note that certain complications
may occur after a transient fault has been detected:
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1. Its duration may be long enough to overlap into the
recovery period and thus.create the false indication of
a permanent fault.
2. A second transient fault may occur before recovery is
complete. If it affects the same module, the effect is
the same as that of a "long" transient discussed above;
if it affects a different module, recovery may become
impossible. Both of these possibilities must be incorpo-
rated in a realistic model of a fault-tolerant system.
4.2.5 Quantitative Measures of Survivability
The preceding discussion has identified several functions that.
must be successfully executed before the system returns to its operational
state after a fault event. It is convenient to partition the probability
of successful system response to a fault into three components:
1. Detectability, denoted by u and defined as the probability
that fault is detected, given that it occurs;
2. Diagnostibility, denoted by v and defined as the probability
that the faulty module is correctly identified, given that
the fault has been detected;
3. Recoverability, denoted by w and defined as the probability
that the operational state is successfully re-established,
given that the fault has been located.
A time interval is associated with each one of the three measures.
It may be given either as a fixed value for a "worst case" upper bound, or as
a random variable with a specified density function.
In order to generate a reasonable estimate of the probabilities and
their associated times, we need some fundamental information about the hardware
organization and about the software of the fault-tolerant system.
The hardware information includes:
1. The description of the fault-detection mechanisms;
2. The description of the sequence of operational states after
permanent faults have been identified and recovery has succeeded;
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3. The description of hardware aids for fault-location and
execution of recovery;
4. The description of inter-module communication paths that
may serve the purposes of fault-tolerance.
5. The identification of possible related failure modes (affecting
more than one module simultaneously) and their probabilities.
The software information includes:
1. Fault-tolerance features of the executive;
2. Nature of available test and diagnosis programs;
3. Scheduling mechanism for application programs;
4. Time available for recovery purposes;
5. Constraints on restarts (singular events, rel-time interrupt
scheme, etc.)
The probabilities and times for the survivability measures are
derived from the above information. Survivability then is determined either
by analytic modeling or by simulation, as described in the following Sections
5 and 6.
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5.0 ANALYTIC MODELING
5.1 MODELING APPROACH
5.1.1 General
Available reliability models consider all faults to be of a
permanent nature, but some faults are known to be transient. We direct our
analytic modeling effort toward the inclusion of transient faults.
A transient fault is a fault that disappears some time after its
arrival. During its stay it alters the contents of registers and/or memory
and/or disrupts the normal sequence of program execution. We recover from
.a transient that has passed by restoring altered data and/or program and
by bringing the recovering computer into synchronization with the fault-
free computers.
5.1.2 Solution Approach
We approach the problem by drawing a state diagram representing
the fault/recovery status of the system. Each state represents the number
of fault-free units in the system and the level of fault recovery being
undertaken. The transitions between states represent the occurrence of
status changing events. The events are random in general so that the state
diagram is probabilistic in nature.
Such a state diagram is illustrated in Figure 5.1-1 for an
enhanced TMR configuration. Enhanced TMR differs from classical TMR in
that transient fault recovery is provided. The system begins a mission
time t=O in the no-fault state, and we wish to find the probability of
arriving in the system failure state before t=T, the mission length. We
study this simple model to provide insight into the inclusion of transient
faults into more complex models.
From the no-faults state a transient fault moves us into the
transient recovery state. From the transient recovery state one of three
things may occur:
1. Successful recovery -- go to No-Faults.
2. Transient mistaken for a permanent -- go to One Computer
Faulty.
3. Fault in a previously fault-free computer during recovery --
go to System Failure.
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Note that a fault in a fault-free computer during recovery leaves a TMR
system with two faulty computers. We make the assumption that a TMR system
fails if two computers are faulty.
A permanent fault will certainly be interpreted by the recovery
procedure to be permanent. Therefore, for analysis purposes, a permanent
fault in the no faults state moves us to the one computer faulty state
without passing through the transient recovery state.
The steps to be taken in analyzing our model are:
1. Characterize transient faults,
2. Model transient recovery, and
3. Find the failure probability.
The results obtained will be estimates of system reliability and the effec-
tiveness of recovery procedures.
5.2 TRANSIENT FAULTS
5.2.1 Transient Arrival
In this analysis we make the assumption that transient faults arrive
with an average rate r that is constant over the life of the system. With the
constant rate over time, the probability of the arrival of a transient fault
in a small interval of time dt is dt. It is well-known that under these
conditions (see PARZ 60, Ch. 6, Section 3, or DAVE-58 Section 7-2) the prob-
ability of exactly k transient fault arrivals between 0 and t obeys a Poisson
probability law. That is
Pr{ k arrivals in (O,t)} = e-Tt ( k
If we let k = 0, we have
Pr{ No transients in (O,t)} = eTt
which is analogous to the simplex reliability equation for permanent faults.
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FIGURE 5.1-1 FAULT RECOVERY STATE DIAGRAM OF A TMR CONFIGURATION
5.2.2 Transient Duration
There is little known about the nature of transient faults. A
reasonable assumption is that they have a definite duration. There is a
dilemma concerning the probability density function of the duration: We
could be of the opinion that short transients are much more likely than long
transients which would lead us to an exponential density as a mathematically
tractable approximation. We could also be of the opinion that there is
definite mean duration with an associated spread which would lead us to the
gamma, normal or Weibull densitities as an approximation. We could also say
that transient faults are caused by several sources, each source with a differ-
ent average duration. But there are more sources with a small duration than
with a large duration. In this case, the composite density function of all
the durations could be a "lumpy" exponential.
The above, along with its mathematical tractability lead us to
choose the exponential density function to represent transient duration.
Hereafter
fDT(t) = ye-Yt
where fDT is the probability density function of transient fault duration.
5.3 TRANSIENT RECOVERY MODEL
5.3.1 Components of Transient Recovery
A recovery procedure is composed of three stages as shown below.
First there is the detection time (Tu) between fault occurrence and detection
which is random (It is random because we assume milliseconds between successive
comparisons). Then there is a delay Tv before starting the recovery procedure.
The delay is the diagnostic time which is a design constant for transient
recovery. Then there is the recovery time Tw to accomplish the recovery
procedure. The quantity Tr is convenient variable which is defined as
Tr = Tv + Tw, the time between detection and recovery completion. The quantity
TA is the total time consumed between fault occurrence and recovery completion.
We assume the distribution of Tu does not vary during the mission. This three
stage recovery sequence is also applicable to permanent fault recovery, but is
presented here in the transient fault context.
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For the time being we assume that Tr is a constant. We hope to
relax this restriction in the future to include more sophisticated recovery
procedures.
5.3.2 Fault Detection
We now focus our attention on T . Let us make the following
U
assumptions:
1. Faults are detected by comparison only.
2. The time between comparisons Tc is a constant.
3. The probability of detecting a fault at the first comparison
time is independent of the point in time it arrives between
comparisons.
Under these assumptions, the probability density function of Tu is a
descending staircase function as shown in Figure 5.3-1. The width of each
step is Tc , the time between comparisons. The origin is the time of fault
occurrence. The quantity ATc  is the probability of detecting the fault on
the first comparison. The area under the entire staircase is one.
There are now three approximations to the staircase that come to
mind:
1. Exponential: fTu(t)= 6-6t
2. Uniform: fTu(t) = - tE[o,Tc
u c
SA tE[o,T ]
3. Uniform-Exponential: fTu(t) :ae-=t t>T
c
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where fT (t) is the probability density function of the detection time, Tu
u
The exponential is a gross approximation. The uniform assumes perfect fault
detection. The uniform-exponential assumes an exponential density for the
detection of lurking faults and is illustrated in Figure 5.3-2. A lurking
fault is an undetected error in program and constants caused by a transient
in the memory.
Since fT is a density function, we have
4 ffT ( t ) d t = 1
o u
so for the uniform-exponential approximation we have
f Adt + e-t dt = 1
o T
c
which implies
-aT
AT = 1-e c
aTc = -log(l-AT ),
relationships that will yield one parameter knowing the other.
5.4 ANALYSIS OF AN ENHANCED TMR CONFIGURATION
5.4.1 Definitions and Assumptions
We assume the system fails if a computer suffers either a transient
or permanent fault whenever another computer either (a) has suffered a previous
permanent fault or (b) is recovering from a previous transient fault. We
define the following configuration parameters:
1. x A* Permanent Fault Rate.
2. T A Transient Fault Rate.
3. cT A Pr {Recovery from TransientlTransient Occurs}.
4. T A Pr {Transient Fault is interpreted as a Permanent).
* A means equal by definition.
5-6
fT (t)
P
R
0
B
A
B
I
L
I I
T
YA
D
E
N
T IY  _
TT _ !
Fault
Occurrence
FIGURE 5.3-1 PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTION OF THE TIME TO FAULT DETECTION
The quantity cT is the transient coverage in triplex, and is the
probability of returning to the no faults state from the transient recovery state.
We can see that AT is given by
zT = 1 - cT - Pr {System Fails During Recovery from 
a Transient}.
The quantity aT decreases the transient coverage. Therefore, we call kT
the transient leakage. We will find leakage directly, so we need to identify
some of the mechanisms that contribute to it:
1. Transient duration lasting into the recovery procedure,
2. A second transient occurring in the recovery computer during
the last recovery attempt before being declared a permanent,
and
3. An imperfect recovery process.
This leads us to our model of the TMR configuration as shown in the
fault/recovery state diagram of Figure 5.4-1.
It is important for us to distinguish between an uncovered transient
and a leaked transient. Uncovered transients include both leaked transients
and transients that end in system failure.
5.4.2 Failure Probability
We now find the probability of reaching the system failure state
within a mission. Let F denote this probability. Then
F = Fp + FT
where Fp A Pr {System failure through the one computer faulty state}
and FT A Pr {System failure through the transient recovery state}
The two system failure events are made mutually exclusive in the
following way: Let
au X +(l-cT)T
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Defined in this way, qu is the rate parameter for the occurrence of perma-
-a t
nents and uncovered transients. We use e as the probability that no
permanents or uncovered transients have occurred up to time t. We then
express Fp as:
T
F = Pr {No permanent failures c(O,t), no uncovered transients
0 E(0,t), a permanent at t, and a transient or
permanent in another computer c(t,T)}
+ T Pr {No permanent failures (0O,t), no uncovered transients
0 C(O,t), a leaked transient at t, and a transient or
permanent in another computer (t,T)
3f T  -3out -2X (T-t) -2T(T-t)
e edt [l-e e
0
T  
-3ut -2x (T-t) -2r(T-t)
+ 3J e u TT dt [1-e e ]
0
-3auT -20 tT 2T
l-e 3e
= H - u-t  [1-e ]}I a 3a -20-
u u t
where at = X +
and a =X + zT T
Let FT(TA) Pr {System fails through the transient recovery state ITA}.
The quantity TA is a random variable since the detection time Tu is
random (T. = T + T ). Then since T is random, F(T ) is also a random
variable. And FT = E(FT), where-E denotes the expectation, so that
F= FT (Tr t) fT(t) dt
0 U
since the T r  portion of TA is assumed to be a constant at this time. We
then express FT as
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TFT = Pr{No permanent failures e(O,t), no uncovered transients
c(O,t), a non-leaky transient at t, transient or
permanent in another computer e(t,t+T )}
-T 3aut dt  -e -2atT ]3 f e ,dt [l-e
0
-2at]T " -3a T
= [l-e ] - [1-e u]
U
-
2 a' T
= a[l-e tA
T -30uT
where a A - [l-e ] and = (1-z )
u
The quantity t. is the rate of non-leaky transients. We now find FT
using the above notational simplification as
FT = a f (1-e-2 t(t+Tr) fT (t) dt
0 U
= a - a e-2t(t+Tr) Tu(t) dt
0
Now we apply the three detection density function approximations to FT.
Using the exponential approximation, FT  becomes
T a - a 6e2atTr  -(2at+6)tdt
0
6+2a )
2 a t+6(l-e 2tTr))
6+25 t
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With the uniform approximation, FT becomes
Tc -2cTr 
-
2ctt
FT = a[- e T e t dt
o c
-2 T c
t-2 r 
-2a tT
2= a[ c (l-e t
And using the uniform-exponential approximation, FT becomes
F T Ae -2a T -
2 tt
FT = a - a Ae e dt
0
- a2 te eT dt
C
-2 r  2T -2atT -(2at+a)Tc
= a[l- 2 (l-e c) - te 
2ot  20t+a
Note that if we set A = I/Tc and a= 0, FT  becomes the same as for the case
of the uniform approximation. And if we set A = 0, Tc = 0, and a = 6; FT
becomes the same as for the case of the exponential approximation.
5.4.3 Transient Leakage
We will model transient leakage due to two causes:
1. A second transient occurring in the recovering computer
during recovery.
2. Transient duration continuing into the recovery process.
Here we consider ideal recovery procedures. A complete loading of state vector
and program/constants (if DRO memory) would approach such an ideal for
this modeling.
Let L1 be the event we receive no transient in the recovery process
and L2 be the event that the transient is still active during the recovery
process. Then the transient leakage becomes:
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t Pr L 21
= 1 -Pr (L1 } + P [L 2 } - Pr ^L1L2 )
We compute the leakage in this manner so that we can examine the two causes
of leakage separately.
Let
0 1 - Pr { 1  (Transient upon a transient)
2 = Pr { L2} (Excessive transient duration)
then
£I = 1 - Pr { L1IT = Tr+t} Pr {T = Tr+t} dt0
_ -/e t(t+T)
f e fTu(t) dt
o u
For the uniform-exponential approximation to Tu
T =
SI-aT -at(T +t) CT -(a t+c)tI = 1 - e tr{ Aet r dt +J ae dt
0 T
c
Ae-T -a T tTr-(a t+)Tc
= 1 Ae -tTc) e tr t c
=- -- (1-e )
t t+a 
Setting A = and = 0, we have 1 for the uniform approximation
-otT
a = 1 e )
atTc
And setting A = 0, T = 0, and a = 6; we have the exponential approxi-
mation case
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-at' r
-atT
ot+6(1-e .r)
at+6
Turning to £2'
=£2 f Pr {L2ITA = T+t} Pr {T = Tr+t} dt
0
To find Pr {L2 1T }
Pr {L2 1TA} = Pr {DT> Tu+Tv}
= ye- t dt = e
Tu +TV
where y is the duration parameter as defined in Section 3.2.2.
So £2 becomes
2 = e-T e-Yt fT (t) dt
0 U
yTv f
=e -y j cAeYt dt + J e-(a)t dt
0 0
-yTv A -YT) + -(y+a)Tc
=e {- (1-e ) + e }y y+a
for the uniform-exponential approximation. For the uniform approximation,
£2 becomes
e-yTV ( yTc)
2 YTc
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And for the exponential approximation, £2 becomes
-yTv
2  6'+y
Then we move to P { L1^L 2}
Pr {L1 ^L 2 } Pr {LI^L 2 ITA = t+T+T } Pr{TA = t+T +T } dt
-yTf -T
o u
Computing the above for the uniform-exponential approximation and combining
with £1 and £2 , we have for IT
tTr A (-atTc ae- (at+a)Tc ,  T A -(at+Y)Tc) e-(t+Y+a)Tc
t = 1-e (I-e ) a - e [ a A (-e a + y-T t t
Setting A = - and a = 0 gives the uniform caseTC
-atT -e t c eYT v - (at+)Tc
T 1 - e [ (t+)T (1-e )]
atTc (at+y)Tc
And for the exponential case
-yTv
S= 1 - e-atTr 1 e
T 6+c ot+y+6
5.4.4 Transient Coverage
Turning to transient coverage, we can see that it is the probability
of the joint occurrence of two events. Let C1 be the event we receive no
transient in any computer during recovery and C2 be the event that the tran-
sient is not active during the recovery process. Then the transient coverage
becomes
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cT Pr{C 1AC 2 }
=f Pr{C1\C 2ITA = t+Tr P{T = t+Tr) dt
Sy(t+Tv) -3 at(t+T r)
S(l-e ) e fT (t) dt
0 u
which for the uniform-exponential case becomes
-3atTr A -3tTc e-(3at+a)Tc -Tv A -(3-e t+)Tc
CT =d t (-e + t - e [ 3)3 at 3at+a 3at +Y
-(3at+y+a)T c+ ae
3at+y+a
Setting a = 0 and A = l/Tc  gives us the uniform case
3a -3T c  e YTv (-( 3a t+Y)Tc
c = e 3r[ tT (3 t+)(l-e )]
And the exponential case becomes
-3T e-YTv
cT e +3[ t 3at+y+6
The equations obtained so far are summarized in Table 5.4-I.
5.4.5 Simplifying Assumptions for Shorter Mission Times
The basic assumption used here is that XT<<l. This could apply to
either shorter mission times or certain transient burst environments. If
xT<<I, then uT<<l and XTA<<l. Another reasonable assumption to make i'.
that y,6>>. Using the exponential approximation to fT (t) our expression
for. F is
3
-eau T 3-2atT -(3a -2a )T -3a T 2 t+6(1-e  tr
l-e 3-e [ u- t-e
u u t u t
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By using the series expansion
eX- x +1 2 +
we have
1 + 6Tr
F 3P otT 2 + 6RtT( 6 T
Similarly,
I= (l+6Tr)
-yTv
6e
R2 6e y+ 6
6e t
____+ - (1+6T )T ~  Y +6 6 (1+6Tr )
-yTv 3t
and l-cT _ e + - (1+6Tr)T y+6 6 r
20t
Note that tT and 1-cT differ by T (1+6Tr) This means that
2a
Pr{System FailurelTransient Occurs}~--- (1+6Tr)
5.4.6 Extension.of TMR Modeling to N Computers
5.4.6.1 Fault/Recovery State Diagram
Here we will extend the basic enhanced TMR model to 4, 5, and
finally N computers. A natural extension to the fault occurrence/recovery
state diagram is shown in Figure 5.4-2.
We begin at T=O with N working computers with the computers under-
going permanent and transient faults. On receiving a fault a transient
recovery procedure is initiated. In transient recovery, four conditions
can result in three outcomes:
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TABLE 5.4-I SUMMARY OF EQUATIONS FOR THE TMR CONFIGURATION
UNIFORM-EXPONENTIAL* EXPONENTIAL* UNIFORM*
2at ~ - 2a T tr (2a )T2arT r 3
F -Z 3 T Ae-2tTr c e-2 tTr (2t Tc _ -3u T 20 +6(1-e 2 T - T e2-t3r -2a T
St(1-ea) (- -2e (1e )- 2a-c (1-e )]
£ 1 - r (1-e t C 
1 (-e-)
-T - T -(t+a)TTc)+T -( ]}) (-a'°trr-T- - " YT V  
--aTy "v a y
atLTT 3t at + a  at+y3 at + y+T 3 a +a v Yr t ]l [ Tc yTclc ( 3-e' t )T)
S  - A "(1-e- c- eatTre (t+)T c at+ (l-e 'xTr) 1 -+ tt[ -( e
ot +a t at +6 •
c T  ( 1-t e  e ( -e 6e .e e1-e (}
P P ( uT [lTe -e -(3au ET2a tT)T~~APPROXIMATIONS +6FUTDFETO
1. Permanent fault - Go to N-I working computers.
2. A fault occurs in a computer assisting in transient
recovery - Go to N-2 working computers.
3. A transient fault is leaked - Go to N-I working computers.
4. The time TA passes (successful recovery) - Return to N
working computers.
The system continues to undergo faults and with the passing of
time degrades to three working computers. In three working computers, we are
in the familiar enhanced TMR.
5.4.6.2 Definitions and Review
We define the following failure probability as a function of the
number of computers working.
FN(T) = Pr f System failure before time TIN computers are
working at time 0}
And the probability of one or more of n computers suffering a
fault in time TA is
-no TA
fn(T ) 1 - e
We can express F2 as
-2a tT
F2(T) =1 - e
where
t = +
5-20
Recovery Recovery
N-1
Working
Computers Permanent Permanen
Fault Four ault Two
T Working IT Working
erComputer Computersn Permanent
omputeFault ermanen FailureComputers Five Fault Three
c-' Working IT Working T
Transient
Recovery
Transient Transient
Recovery Recovery
FIGURE 5.4-2 EXTENSION OF ENHANCED TMR MODEL TO N COMPUTERS
And recall that
FT -3aut -2at(T-t)
F3 (T) = 3  e U(1 - e )dt
0
3 e -3t[l 
- e -2a t dt
0
fT -3au t
-
3oe F2 T-t)dt
0IT -30 t
T 3Te f2 (TA)dt
0
where a + ITT
a X + (1 -c )T,
u T
f (T ) [ - e-n TA
T _ (l-XT)T
The quantity fn is the probability of receiving any fault during the time TA.
5.4.6.3 Finding Failure Probability for Four Computers
From the state diagram of Figure 5.4-2, we can find F4(T) as a
function of F2 and F3 by the sum of the probability of going to system
failure through the two working computers state and the probability of going
to system failure through the three working computers state. We formulate
F4 as follows:
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T
F4(T) Pr { No permanent or uncovered transients from 0 to t, a
0 permanent or leaked transient at t, system failure
from three working computers between t and T}
+f Pr { No permanents or uncovered transients from 0 to t, a
0 non-leaky transient at t, a fault in a computer assist
ing in recovery between t and t+T,, and system failure
from two working computers between t and T}
sT - 4 a t
e u 4azdt F3(T-t)
0
ST -4a t
e u 4T dtf3(T ) F2(T-t)
0
-40 T -30 T e-3au0 T  -20tT
2 1+3e u -4e u 12
= at 2  ' + 3-2 t  [ u 40 -2ot
a(4 -2 t f2 TA) a 2
-
4u aT -4 T  -30 T
+ zf 3(T) l-e u 
4 T [e t -4a T3 (4u 4u0 -20t
For smaller otT this simplifies to
F4 (T) z 4 2 at T3
5.4.6.4 Finding the Failure Probability for Five Computers
In the same manner as in finding F4(T) as a function of F3 and F2,
we can find F5(T) as a function of F4 and F3. So F5(T) becomes
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F5 (T) 5 Sa e F4(T-t)dt
T -5 t
+ f 4 (T ) 5t e u F3 (T-t)dt
0
2 -50 T -4o T -30 T
_= 9 r I f2T NI ri u 15 e u -10 e u I
3 L0T 2 2kA JL LI- u I.J -
6 3
600, -4auT - T
[e ( -e u )
Ou2 (4au-2t)
3 - 30 T -2a T -2atT -(50 -2oT)T
S600 e u (l-e u )_ e (l-e3au-2at 22 (5- u-2 t)( 4 u-2 t)
U
aTf3(T) -50 T -40 T
+ T (T [1+4e u -5e u
e-2atT -(50 -2at)T -4a T -a T20 .f3(TA) (l-e U ) e u (l-e u )
40 -20 50 -20 u4au t u a t u
Tf 4 (T ) a3 -50 T 5 -3 uT+~ [oa +f(T )] [1 +2 3e 2e
4  (T-2tT -(5a -2at)T -3a T -2a T15-f_4(Ta) e (l-e u e u (l-e u)
3 &u-20t 5au-2t 2au
which for small otT simplifies to
F5(.T) 5a 3t5o T4
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5.4.6.5 Generalization to N Computers
An examination of the integral expressions for F4 and F5 shows a
recursive relationshipbetween FN(T) and FN_1 and FN_2 which may be given as
follows:
_T -Na t
FN(T) fj Na, e. u FN_1(T-t)dt
0
T -No t
+ fn-l (T ) N e U FN-2(T-t)dt
0
This relationship may be expanded into an (N-l)-fold convolution
integral. An example of this is shown in Figure 5.4-3 for F5 (T).
5.4.7 Recovery Start Delay
When formulating a transient recovery procedure we are faced with
a dilemma. If we begin the recovery procedure too soon, a long transient
duration could hinder recovery; and if we delay the start of the recovery
procedure too long, we leave the system unnecessarily vulnerable to other
faults.
We seek an optimum delay associated with this tradeoff by maxi-
mizing transient coverage. Using the exponential approximation to transient
detection we have for cT
-yT
-30Tr 1 e v
c = 6e r eT 6+3a6t 3at
-3T w 3aa tTv - (3t+y)Tv
6e T tv t v6+3a 3dt+y+6
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by breaking T into T +T
r v w dcT
Differentiating and setting dT = 0
v
-3a tTv  -(30t+y)Tv
dcT  -3tT 3 ate v (3t+y)e ] - 0
dv = -6e [ 6+3 t  3at+y+ 6
This yields
T (3at+y)(3at+6)TD - ogD = Y 30t(3a t+y46)
which will be a maximum if the second derivative is negative at that point.
The second derivative is
d2cT 3 tTr 92 (3at+)
2e-yTv
dT2 6e +3at  3t+y+6
and it becomes
d2cT -3 atT
- (3T e +3) < 0
dT2  3a +6
v t
when Tv is as given above.
Therefore, we have found a maximum. Similarly, the uniform approx-
imation yields the following optimum delay
-(3t+y)Tc
T log [ t
v Y -3atT c
l-e
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F5 (T) = dt5 fe T td 4aie u - fdT3-e d d 2 ae 2at77
o 0 0
T 
-5a t T-t 
-4 T- 3 a
+ dt 5 a, e 5ut d e4o T dt 3  eu' [1 - e-2tTA1
0 0 0O O O
+ 1 dtd-5 0  t T-t -4 u e - tTA T- -2at
dt5 e 1 - e4 d 2aet
0 o 0
+ T dt5 -5t 1 4otT T-t t3 f -
0 o
FIGURE 5.4-3 FAILURE PROBABILITY FOR FIVE COMPUTERS
5.5 MODELING OF GENERAL CONFIGURATIONS
Here we present a general model for the analysis of adaptive and
non-adaptive configurations consisting of 1 to 5 whole computers. This
model includes transient leakage as well as the components of coverage
discussed in Section 4.
5.5.1 The Recovery Process
5.5.1.1 Coverage
Coverage is defined as (BOUR 71):
c A* Prf System recoversjfault occursi
Here we break coverage into a triplet as follows: Define
u a Pr { Fault is detectedifault occurs}
v a Prf Fault is locatedlfault detected}
w a Pr{ Recoverylfault is located}
as in Section 4.2.5. Here u, v, and w are the detectability, diagnostability,
and recoverability, respectively and
c = uvw
The quantities u, v, and w are probabilities that also have times
associated with them. We define
T U  Detection time
Tv A Diagnosis time
Tw 4 Recovery time
The times may be modeled as random variables or as "worst case"
values.
*A means "equal by definition"
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5.5.1.2 Transient Leakage
Transient fault recovery is divided into three states as shown
below:
Detection Dela Recovery
T T T
u v w
In this case detection is the fault indication generated by output comparators
or by error detection RET's. Diagnostic time is a design delay to allow the
transient to disappear. Recovery consists of one or more of rollback, rollahead,
and memory copy depending on the number of operating computers and recovery
design.
5.5.1.3 Permanent Recovery
Permanent fault recovery begins after an unsuccessful transient
recovery. An uncovered transient, as well as a true permanent, may be declared
as a permanent fault. After a fault is declared (or detected) as a permanent,
diagnosis and recovery may proceed.
The overall picture of fault detection, diagnosis, and recovery in
the presence of transients and permanents is shown below:
Recovery
Transient
Detection I Delay I Recovery i Diagnosis I Recoveryl
Tut T Tw T T
t t t p p
Fault Fault Recovery Transient Start Recovery
Occurs Detected Start Recovery Switch Cycle
Complete. to N-1 Complete
Permanent Computers
Detected
Second Level
Diagnosis and
Recovery
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The subscripts t and p represent transient and permanent, respectively.
The times and probabilities are dependent on the particular config-
uration, the recovery procedure, and the number of computers that are working.
5.5.1.4 Notation System
Coverage and its component parts are in general different for the
number of working computers in the configuration. We need to identify the
number of computers and whether we are talking about transients or permanents.
The notation is defined by the following table:
Type of
No. of Recovery
Computers Permanent Transient
1 cl, U1 ,' v' W 1' T ul T ,' Twl I U' V, Ws' , Tus T Vs Tws
2 c2 , etc. Y2 ud'
3 c3 , etc. z3 ut'
4 c4 , etc. k4 uf,
5 c5 , etc. 5 Uq,
5.5.2 Analysis of a Duplex Configuration
5.5.2.1 Definitions and Assumptions
We define the following parameters for a duplex configuration:
1. z2 6 Pr{Transient mistaken to be permanent while in Duplexi
Transient occurs}
2. v2w2 A Pr{Successful adaptation to SimplexlPermanent or
Leaky Transient occurs}
3. i 1 = Pr{Transient mistaken to be permanent while in simplexi
Transient occurs}
4. 2 + k2T
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The quantity k2 is the transient leakage in duplex. Transient
recovery while in duplex is achieved by a rollback. Duplex transient leakage
is composed then if:
1. Pr{Failure of rollback}
2. Pr{Transient duration lasts into rollback}
3. Pr{Other fault occurs during rollback}
The quantity v2w2 is the product of the diagnostability v2 and
the recoverability w2. Diagnostability is the probability of correctly
locating a fault given the fault is detected as a permanent or uncovered
transient. Recoverability is the probability of a successful adaptation to
a simplex configuration given a correct location of the fault. The quantity
02 is the average rate of occurrence of permanent and leaky transients.
Diagnosis is achieved by software self test in conjunction with BITE.
5.5.2.2 Fault/Recovery State Diagram
The fault occurrence/recovery state diagram of our duplex config-
uration is shown in Figure 5.5-1. From the no faults state a transient will
send us the rollback state where a rollback is attempted. It is successful
with probability l-z2. If the rollback is not successful, then the fault is
taken to be a permanent from where diagnosis and recovery is initiated. If
the fault is permanent, then it is taken to be permanent with probability 1.
In diagnosis and recovery, a recovery to simplex is achieved with probability
v2w2 '
In simplex, it is possible to have some transient fault recovery.
Detection is accomplished by error checking RET's (e.g., BITE). After
detection, diagnosis is immediate. Recovery consists of rollback attempts.
The simplex transient leakage is then
£1 = 1 - us s
where vs =1
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5.5.2.3 Failure Probability
We define FN(T) as the probability of system failure before time
t=T, given N working computers at time t=O. The probability of failure in
simplex then becomes:
T
-al
F1(T) = 1 - e
where a! _ A + ~!T
If we set = 1, then F1 (T) becomes the ordinary simplex failure
probability.
And the probability of failure in duplex becomes:
I T -2 2t
F2 (T) =f e 2 2dt (l-v 2w2 )
0
f T e2t 2 0 2 v2w2 F1 (T-t)dt
0
-2a 2T
= (l-v 2w2 )(l-e 
)22T
T 
-22t
+ v 2w2  202 e 2  F1 (T-t)dt
0
where 02 = + k2T as before, and
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0 T -202T (T-t)F2 (T) = e T 2 2dt [1 - v2 + 
w2 (l - e )1
-2a 2T 20c2 etT -(2a - al )T
= l - e 2O2-t (l - e ) v2 w2
If we let A = 0 and = , then F(T) becomes
-2y2 T 22 e T T  -(292-1) T
F2 (T) = 1 - e +2 (1 - e ) v2w21-2(1-z 2)
This is an approximation for the case where transient faults occur much
more often than permanents. And if we let T = 0, we have for F(T)
F2 (T) = 1 - 2v2w2e-XT + (2v2w2 - l)e-2AT
which is the case when transients are not considered.
5.5.3 Extension to N Computers
5.5.3.1 State Diagram
The extension of Figure 5.5-1 is straightforward and is shown in
Figure 3.5-2 for up to 5 computers. The state diagram presented in Figure 5.5-2
contains several states labeled "transient recovery." When there are three
or more non-faulty computers prior to the occurrence of a fault, then the
transient recovery process involves rollahead and memory copy (if utilized).
The probability of success of the recovery procedure is reflected in the
transient leakage parameter. The probability of a transient resulting in
system failure is reflected by both the leakage (zi) and recoverability (w i)
parameters, each of which is determined through simulation runs using the
simulator described in Section 6. Similar remarks apply to the duplex and
simplex cases, but include the diagnostability (v2 ).
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With 3 or more computers, we assume diagnosis is certain (v n=1)
since two or more faultless computers can point the finger at the faulty
one; and un is considered to be one as in duplex since output comparison is
used for fault detection. Permanent coverage then becomes
c = wn n = 3, 4, 5
5.5.3.2 Failure Probability Determination
The flure U probabilities then become
-3a3T
F3(T) = (l-w3) (1-3- )
+ w3  33 e-3 3t F2 (T-t dt
0
-44 T
F4 (T) = (l-w 4 ) (l-e 4
+ w4  404 e 4  F3 (T-t)dt
0
-5a T
F5(T) = (1-w 5 ) (1-e5
+ w5  505 e 5  F4 (T-t)dt
0
where 03 = + Z3 as before
and 04  + k4T
If we assume k3 = £4 = 5' then a general recursive expression for the
failure probability can be given as
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FN(T) = (-w N) (l-e NT)
+ N N e FN(T-t)dt
where we replace NaN by aN for rotational simplification.
5.5.3.3 General Solution
A general solution to FN(T) may be found by finding SN(T) = 1-FN(T).
Here we use CN for w n, N_3; C2 for v2 w2 , and C1=0 as well as using aN for
NoN. If we substitute 1-SN(T) in for FN(T) and simplify we get:
-NT fT -aNt
1 - SN(T) = (1 - cN)(1 - e ) + CN T oNe (1 - SNl(T-t))dt
0
= (1 - cN)(l - e NT) + c N  Ne-NT cN  Ne TSN-1(T-t)dt
0 0
= ( - eN) - N( - eNT) + cN( - eNT - cN Ne SN-1(T-t)dt
By rearranging terms we have:
SN(T) = + cN N / e SN-1(T-t)dt
0
Thus we have a recursive expression for the survivability of our N computer
configuration. Since this is a convolution integral, we can re-write this
as:
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(U
SN(T) = e + cN N  (T-t)SN-1l(t)dt
0
= e (1 + cN aN fe SN-1 (t)dt)
0
Since S1 (T) = 1 - Fl(t) = e-lT
We can find S2(T) by substitution. Thus
S2 (T) = ea2 (1 + c202fT e 2t dt)
0
= e (l + c 2 fT e 2-l dt)
0
-a2T c2a2  (a2-ol)T
= e (1 + (e 
-l))dt
02-"1
c2 2  -al T c2a2  -2 T
S- e + (1 )e
Note that both S1 (T) and S2 (T) can be expressed as a linear combina-
tion of exponential functions. It seems reasonable that SN(T) could also be
expressed as a linear combination of exponential functions. In particular,
assume
-alT -a 2T -aN T N -. T
SN(T) = eN 1  + a N2 e + +aNN e Nj e J
j=1
By substituting this expression for SN(T) into the recursive equation
and simplifying, we obtain
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SN+l(T) =eNl ( + CN+ 1 aN+1fT eN+t SN(t)dt)
0
-aN+ T T N+ t N -a.t
= (1 + CN+1 e+1  ( aNj e J )dt)0 j=l
a N+lT N T (a N+l-a.)t
= e N+  + a eN+1 3  dt)N+1 N+1 3 =i Nj
0
= e-N+1T (1 + CN+1 aN+l x: -~j- (e (aN+1-q)T -1))j=1 aN+l -j
CN+1N+1"Nj e- j T + (1 - CN+ lN+l Nj) e-aN+1T
j=1 0 N+1 -a j=1 oN+ 1 - j
N+1  -j.T
Y- ON+ ,jj=1
where
cN+l N+1aNj
aN+1 ,j aN+1 -jj
N
aN+1,N+1 1 -F N+l,jj=l1
Thus by mathematical induction we have shown that the surviv-
ability of an N computer system can be expressed as a linear combination of
exponential functions, and in the process have found an iterative expression
for finding these coefficients. A FORTRAN program has been written to
evaluate these coefficients on a computer and to plot the results on an
automatic plotter.
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5.5.4 Simplifying Assumptions
The formulas obtained for the failure probabilities of the various
configurations can be simplified by representing the exponentials in each of
them by a power series, and discarding higher order terms (i.e., let
S 2 3 2  3
e x ++ " and assume that 6, etc. are small in
comparison with x). This is a valid procedure as long as it is assumed that
atT< < 1. (Note: This implies that aNT< <1)
In the following discussion, define
F3_E(T) = Pr{Enhanced TMR fails before time T}
F3_A(T) = Pr{Adaptive TMR fails before time T}
E = Relative error in simplified formulas
(Relative error = actual error)
correct value
5.5.4.1 Simplex
-alT
F1 (T) = 1 - e
but e-iT  2T 2 3T3
but1 o1
1but e -T + 2 6 = . 1-0lT
hence F1 (T)a 1 T
The relative error is given by
-01 2T2/2 + 13T 3/6 - ... olT/2 OlT
aT-a2 2 1
-
oIT/2 < 2
y1T - 12T 2/2 + 13T3/6 _ ... 1
OlT
thus F1 (T) = alT with J < 2
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5.5.4.2 Duplex
-202T 2a2v2W2  -lT -2a2TF2 (T) = 1 - 2e 2 (e - e )
202 l-v2w2T + v2w20 2o1T2 where jel < o2T
Note that the second term can be ignored if p is not close to 1, i.e.,
with v2w2T
F2 (T) 202 (l-v2w2)T with <2(1-v2 2
5.5.4.3 Enhanced TMR
-3auT 
-2a tT 
-(3a 
-2a )T
F3  (T) = - e 3e [1 - e t3-E a 3u-2at
-3u T 2 - 2 atTR3a u 2a t + 6 (1-e ))
T 2 ot + 6
If we assume that a. ou = 03 and that failures caused by transient overlaps
are negligible, then we have
F3 -E(T) z 3o3t T2 with IEi< (otT)
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5.5.4.4 Adaptive TMR
-3 03T 60302 (1-v2w2 ) - 30301 -202T -302T
F3 -A(T) = 1 - e - (20-a)(303-20 (e -e )
6030 2 v2 w2  -olT -3a 3T
(202-al)(3a3-1) (e -e )
30302 (1-v2w2)T2 + Po3a2l T3 with Ie1 < a3T
Note that F3-A(T) 30302 (l-v2w2)T2 with < 32 2v2w2T3(1-v2w
2)
5.6 MARKOV CHAIN ANALYSIS METHOD
The basic approach is to model the computer configuration as a
continuous parameter Markov chain, by assuming state transitions occur
continuously. Once this is done we can develop a vector differential
equation* representing the system and then obtain an expression for the
state probabilities at any time t. This technique was used with the aid of
computer programs to determine the state probabilities for the duplex and
adaptive TMR configurations. The results agree with those of previous
models.
5.6.1 Mathematical Model
Given a fault tolerant computer configuration, we model it by
drawing a state diagram representing the status of the system.
In Figure 5.6-1 the nodes (Sl S2 S3, S4 ) represent the states
and the branches represent the state transition paths. A transition occurs
at each small time increment h.
* This is a compact form for a system of differential equations.
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p2 12 (t, h)
I \\ /
52
Pll (t, h)
P313(t, h)
FIGURE 5.6-1 MARKOV CHAIN EXAMPLE
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To each state Si , assign a state probability function Pi(t) defined
as follows.
Pi (t)  Pr{ The system will be in state Si at time tI
Also assign to each branch a conditional probability that is a function
of t and h, defined by
Pilj(t,h) = Prf System in state Si at time t+hlit was in state Sj
at time t}
We make the assumption that pi j(t,h) is independent of how we arrived in
state S.j, and thus model the system as a discrete parameter Markov chain.
5.6.1.1 Development of the Differential Equation
We want to determine P (t), the probability that the system will be
in state S. at time t. Because of the Markov assumption,
1
Pi(t Pij(t,h)Pj (t) (1)
Given that a state Si is occupied at time t, state Sj must be occupied at time
t+h. Hence,
Z p (t,h) = 1 For i = 1, 2, 3, ... N
By solving for pili(t,h), it follows that
pili(t,h) = 1 - jpi(t,h)
j~i
By substituting this equation into Equation 1 we obtain
Pi(t+h) = pilj(t,h)Pj(t) + [I - Pj li(t,h)]Pi(t)
j i j i
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An equivalent expression obtained by subtracting Pi(t) from both sides is
Pi(t+h) - P (t) = i Pilj(th)Pj(t) - Pi(t) Z Pjli(t,h)
j i jii
By defining
pilj(t,h) for ifj
ij(t,h) = i
- pjli(t,h) for i=j
We can write the above equation as
Pi(t+h) - P.(t) = . .ij(t,h)Pj(t)1 13
or in vector notation, we have
P(t+h) - P(t) = s (t,h)P(t) (2)
where Pl(t)
' l(t)
P2(t)
P(t) 0
0
0
P N(t)
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and
1 1(t,h) D1 2 (t,h) 0 o 0 N(t,h)
D(t,h) = 2 1 (t,h) ' 2 2(t,h) 0o 0 0 N(t,h)
0
0
0
L Nl(t,h) DN2 (t,h) o 0 0 NN(t,h)
Equation 2 represents an iterative relationship, that may be used
to obtain the various state probabilities for any time t. However, we can
obtain a result that is easier to evaluate if we make some further simplifi-
cations. Assume that state transitions occur continuously, so the system can
be modeled as a continuous parameter Markov chain. The above result is then
extended for a continuous model as follows.
By dividing both sides of Equation 2 by h and taking the limit as
h approaches zero, we obtain
lim 1(P(t+h) - P(t)) = lim 1 D (t,h) (3)
h-o h-o h
Now, let
B(t) A lim 1 D(t,h)
h-o
Then since
d 1
d P(t) a lim - (P(t+h) - P(t))
h-+
We can rewrite Equation 3 as
dP(t) = (t)P(t)
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If we make the further assumption that B(t) is independent of time, we obtain
d P(t) = B P(t) (4)
dt
which actually represents the system of N linear homogeneous differential
equations
dP (t)dt Bij P(t) for i = 1, 2, ..., Ndt i
5.6.1.2 Solution Procedure
To solve Equation 4, we define an operator e--t as follows
e t  1 2 2 1 3t + ... (5)
Then d at d= d 1 3 d 2 1 3 d 3dt =- I + a t + -t + t +"".
a 6(I +B t + t2 + ...
= B e- t
It then becomes apparent that the solution to Equation 4 is
P(t) = (e- t)P(o) (6)
Since
d P(t) = (e-Bt)P(o) = 6 P(t)
*Here I is the identity matrix, and m is defined by the recursive relationship
m m-l 1
B =  _B and B B.
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and
P(o) = (e-Bo)P(o) = I P(o) = P(o)
et can either be evaluated by means of the above series, or in closed form
by a spectral expansion.
5.6.1.3 Closed Form Solution
The approach here is to expand _ on a set of matriciesf { Q , 2...' "" N
called projectors. Projectors have the following properties (see DENN 67 Ch 2).
2
. i = Q Q = Q
2. Qi * Q. = 0 for ijt
3. 
_ + Q2 + ' +q
4. B =  ~1Q1 + 2Q2 + ... +ONRN where{ a } is the set of
eigenvalues of B.
Using these properties, it is easy to show that
= am + am2 + ... + m
and thus
e- I + Bt +l2t2 + 2 2
(Q1 + ... +N) + (a 1 .+ ... + aNqN)t + ' +
2)t2 +
(l + l t + t "1 ) ql + ... + +tNt + t2 +...)
cl t +Nt
=e Q + . + e Q-N
A matrix can be expanded on projectors having the above properties, if and
only if it has a set of N linearly independent eigenvectors. This will always
be the case if the matrix has N distinct eigenvalues.
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If it is assumed that the configuration can only get worse (it can
only go from N computers to N-1 computers, and not vice versa), then the state
diagram will have no loops in it. In this case, the transition matrix B can
always be written in lower triangular form (all elements above the diagonal are
0) for a proper ordering of states. Since the eigenvalues of a triangular matrix
are just its diagonal elements, the projectors{ q , ...RV , N} can be easily
calculated as follows:
1. i= Bii
2. qi =~ where 9i (x) _ 7 (x-ck)
k=l
kfi
P(t) then turns out to be
n 04 t
P(t) : e QtiP(o)
i=1
5.6.1.4 Power Series Evaluation of P(t)
P(t) can also 'be evaluated directly using the power series expansion
for P(t). This approach is useful for determining algebraic approximations for
the state probabilities. It is also a much more general procedure, and can
be used for a system whose transition matrix is not easily expanded as a linear
combination of projector matricies.
From Equations 5 and 6 we have
P(t) = (I + 3t + B 2 2 1 3 + 
SP(o) + (a P(o))t + (1 2p(o))t2 + (1 3p(o))t3
=A + At + A2t + At 3 +...
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where the A., are column vectors defined by the iterative relationship
A = P(o)
A- A
5.6.2 Application to the Duplex Configuration
To determine the state probabilities for the duplex configuration,
we make several assumptions.
1. Permanent and transient failures occur independently with
mean rates x and T respectively.
2. The failure occurrences have an exponential density function.
3. The system is continuous - i.e., the time spent in the transient
recovery states is negligible, and a multiple fault cannot occur.
5.6.2.1 Determination of the Transition Matrix
In Figure 5.6-2, the important states are duplex, simplex and
system failure. The time spent in the other 2 states (rollback and diagnosis)
is negligible (zero if it is assumed that the system is continuous), hence
we combine them with the duplex state to obtain the following state diagram.
In this example, we assume w2 = 1 and z1 = 1.
2v2ah Simple
Duplex5
ath
O Failure
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X = Permanent fault rate
r = Transient fault rate
0t = T + x = Total fault rate
System
p=V 2W2 = Pr {System switches successfully fromduplex to simplex}
C2  = Pr {Transient error corrected by rollback} (= -2)
ath = Pr (Fault occurs in time increment h}
t/at = Pr {Fault is transient}
02 = x + (1-C2 )T = Gt (l-C 2 ( -))
FIGURE 5.6-2 STATE DIAGRAM FOR THE DUPLEX CONFIGURATION
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Where the transition duplex - simplex actually corresponds to the sequence
of transitions.
Duplex - Rollback + Diagnosis -* Simplex
and the transition
Duplex System Failure
corresponds to the sequence of transitions
Duplex -+ Rollback - Diagnosis System Failure
The new conditional transition probabilities are the product of the conditional
probabilities along the path, hence since
Pr { Duplex-* Rollback} = 2ath
Pr{ Rollback-*Diagnosis} = 1 - C (--)
and Pr{ Diagnosis - System Failure} =1-p
We have
Pr{ Duplex -+ System Failure} = (2ath)(l - C2(,-))(1-v2)
2
= 2(1-v 2 )a 2 h
Similarly we obtain Pr{ Duplex Simplex} = 2v2 a2 h
Let S1 = Duplex
S2 = Simplex
S3 = System Failure
Then from the above figure we obtain
P2 11(t,h) = 2v2 a2h > 2 1 (t,h) = 2v 2 a2 h
p3 11 (t,h) = 2(1-v 2)o 2h 43 1(t,h) = 2(1-v 2 ) 2h
P3 12(t,h) = oth e32 (t,h) = ath
Also 1 1(t,h) = -(P 2 11 (t,h) + P3 11 (t,h)) = -2o2 h
22(t,h) = - ath
and 33 (t,h) = 0
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-2a2h 0 0
Thus the transition matrix is o (t,h) = 2v2a2h -th 0
2(1-v 2 )a2h ath 0
-2a2 0 0
_ = lim 1 Q (t,h) = 2 -a 0
5.6.2.2 Closed Form Solution for Duplex Configuration
P1 (t)
P(t) = (e-t)p(o) where P(t) = P2(t)
L P3(t)
and Pl(t) = PF{ System is in duplex state at time t}
P2(t) = Pr{ System is in simplex state at time tI
P3(t) = Pr{ System has failed by time t}
Earlier it was stated that
N a.t
P(t) = e i  qiP(o)
i=l
where a ~ ii
4i - (a i)"
N
and 9'(x) = 17 (x-ai)
1 j=1j i
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-22  0 0
For the special case where B = 2v2 2  -at  0
2(1-v 2 )a 2 at  0
The eigenvalues are
1= -202
a2 = -at
3 = 0
and the 'is are
1 (x) = x(x+at)
T2(x) = x(x+2a2)
P3(x) = (x+ot)(x+2a2 )
so 1(cl) = i(-2a2) = 202(202-at)
2(a2= P2(-at)= -at(2a2-at)
"3(3) = ' 3 (o) = 2 t2
Also
-202 0 0 ot-2a 0 0 -202 (at-2a ) 0
l () = 2v2G2  -at  0 x 2v2a2  0 0 = -4v2a 2  0 0
2(1-v 2)a2  at  0 2(1- )ao2  t t  2at2-4(1-v 2) 22  0 0
0 0 0
2(_)= -2v2a2  -at( 2a2-at) 0
2 v2a2at ot(2a2-at) 0
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and
0 0 0
93 ( ) 0 0 0
2202t 2a2at 202at
Thus the projectors are
1 0 0
1i(_) -2v202S-2v 2 2  0 01 (al) 202-a t
2v2a2
-(1- 2 0 0
0 0 0
2v2a2
A2 2a- t  1 0
-2v202
-1 0
and
0 0 0
Q3 =  0 0 0
1 1
A closed form solution is thus
P(t) = e 2 q P(o) + e -a P(o) + t 3 P(o)
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where P(o) = O since the probability of being in the duplex state at
t=o is one.
Hence,
-
2a2t -2v2 2  -1 tt 2v2a 2 1
rkP(t = e -+ e 2G a u2a2-at 2a2-a2t
2v2a2  
-2v2a 2
-(1- ) 22_t
2a2-at 2 a2-at
Thus Pl(t) = Pr { System is in duplex state at time t}
-2a2t
= e
P2(t) = Pr{ System is in simplex state at time t}
2v2a2 [ett 
-2a2t
e e ]
202-a t
P3 (t) = Prf System has failed by time t}
2v2o2  -2a2t 2v2 2  -ott
= 1 -(1- ) e - e2c2-a.t 2a 2- at
Note that P3 (t) agrees with the other results.
5.6.2.3 Approximation for Small Mission Times
A quick approximation for small mission times, suitable for hand
computation, can be obtained by evaluating the first few terms of the power
series expansion.
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The transition matrix is
-2G2  0 0
=  2v2"2 -Ct 0
2(0-v 2 )a2  t  0
Earlier it was shown that P(o)= A + At + A2 t 2 +
where Ai = T-B Ai and A = P(o)
Using this for the duplex case we have
A = P(o) = 0
0
-2a2
2(l-v 2)a2
2a2 2
A 27 .A1 = -2v2a2(a2+at)
222(1-v 2)o2 +v2 2at
1 
-
202  2022
Thus P(t): 0 + t 2v2c2  + t2  -2v2a2 (a2+at)
0 2(1-v 2 )a2  -2(1-v 2) 2 2+v2a2at
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So we have
Pl(t) = Pr{ System in duplex state} = 1-2odt + 2ad 2t 2
P2(t) = Pr{ System in simplex state} 2v2a2t - 2v2a2(G2+ut)t 2
P3(t) = Prf System has failed} 2(1-v 2 ) 2 t(1-a 2 t)+ (v2c 2ct)t 2
The approximation for P3(t) agrees with the result obtained in Section 5.5.4.2.
5.6.3 Application to Adaptive TMR Configuration
The same assumptions are made in this analysis as were made earlier
for the analysis of the duplex configuration.
5.6.3.1 Determination of the Transition Matrix
The state diagram for the adaptive TMR configuration is
3ath
Transient t a Dupl ex uTMRex
: : Recovery Configuration
CT(O)
where CT= Prf Transient error corrected by rollahead} (= 1-k3)
The time spent in the transient recovery state is negligible, so we
combine it with the TMR state to obtain
s. l Duplex Configuration I
TMR Duplex Simplex 3
s2 "I
System
Failure S4
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The transition matrix is thus
-3a 3  0 0 0
303  -2'2 0 01
0 12v2 2 a- 022 t
0 2(1-v 2 )a 2  at 0
Note that the outlined portion surrounds the transition matrix for the duplex
configuration.
5.6.3.2 Approximations for Small Mission Times
An approximation for the state probabilities can be obtained by
evaluating the first 4 terms of the power series expansion. Thus
1
0
A=0 0
0
-3a3
A =  3G
-1 0
0
9a3 2
1 -(9a 3 2 + 6 30 2 )
6v20 3 2
6(1-v 2)a3 2
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-27033
3 2
1 27a3 + 202(90 3 +603 2)
6 v2a2 (93 2+6a3 2) -6v2c3a2at
-2(1-v 2 )a2(9G32 +6a 3 2 )+6v2 302 t
Thus since P(t) ; A + tA + t2A + t3A
-- -1 2  -3
we have
P4(t) = Prf System has failed by time t}
' (6 (vl 2 3(6(-v2)a3a2)t2 + (2-(l-v2 )a2 (9a3 +6a3G2 ) + 6v2a3 2at)t3
(1-v2)a3a2t2 [3-(3a3+2a2)t] + v2a3+2at
t3
;3(1-v 2)a3o2t2 + v2o3a2att3 assuming (3a3+2a2)t<<3
5.6.4 Programs
Several programs have been written in APL to aid in calculating state
probabilities for various mission times. These programs have been tested for both
the duplex and adaptive TMR, and the results agree with those obtained earlier
for the Interim Report.
5.6.4.1 Projector Method
VPROJECTOR U] V
V PROJECTOR A;I;N;P;J;K;Q
[1] I+(pA)pl,(N+ltpA)pO
[2] EVS- 1 i PA
[3] TRANS(0,pA)p0O
[4] P+((N,pA)pA)-EVSo.xI
[5] J.1
[b] LP1 :K-2
[7] R(~I[J;I])/tN
[8] Q-PER[I] ;;]
[9] LP2:Q-Q,.xPLR[K];;]
110] +(N>K-Kil)/LP2
[111 TRANS-TRANS,[1] Q+x/(~I[J;])/EVS[J]-EVS
112] +(NaJ+I#1)/LP1
V
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This program determines the eigenvalues and projectors of a tri-
angular matrix - A. The resulting eigenvalues are returned in the vector - EVS,
and the projectors are returned in a multidimensional array - TRANS.
VE VAL1LU ]V
V HRIC EVAL1 T
[1] R-(*To.xEVS)*.xTRANSt.xIC
V
This program uses the results returned by PROJECTOR to determine the
state probabilities for various mission times. The initial condition - IC,
and a vector of mission times - T are the arguments of EVALI. An array of
state probabilities is returned as a result.
5.6.4.2 Power Series Method
VTRAN U] V
V R-IC THAi A;M
[1] MAt.xIC
[2] R-M, 0.5] 1IC
[3] I-2
[4] LP:M-Ai.xM+I
[5] R4-1,[1] R
[6] *( NTtl I #I1 ) /LP
V
This program returns the set of column vectors A , A , A
(see Section 5.6.1.4) in the form of a matrix. The number of terms (column
vectors) is determined by a global variable - NT. The initial conditions - IC,
and the transition matrix - A are the left and right arguments of TRAN
respectively.
VEVAL U] V
V R-A EVAL T
[1] R_(((p 1 ), )pT) "A
V
Given a matrix of column vectors [A, A ... , AN] and a vector
2 N
of times - T, this program returns the sum A + Ait + A2t + AN
t for each t.
It is used in conjunction with TRAN to obtain P(t).
VERR[U] V
V RHT ERR A
E1] R-A E VAL T
[2] R-(R-(((ppA)fl)+A) EVAL T)+R
V
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This program gives an upper bound on the error of the power series
expansion. The maximum time - T is the left argument, and the matrix of column
vectors - A is the right argument.
5.6.5 Conclusions
The above procedure for determining the failure probabilities of a
fault tolerant computer has several advantages over the earlier approach.
1. All state probabilities are obtained as a function of time.
This allows a more detailed study of a given computer configuration.
2. The model is general for any number of computers only the tran-
sition matrix is needed to obtain numerical results on a
computer.
3. It is much easier to obtain approximations for the state
probabilities as a function of time.
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6.0 SIMULATION
6.1 OBJECTIVES OF SIMULATION
The function of the simulator portion of CAST has been described
briefly in the Summary and is treated in more detail in Section 8.1. Trans-
lating this function into simulation objectives yields the following three
items. The simulator should produce:
1. The fault-tolerance effectiveness of each of a wide
variety of reconfigurable computer system configurations;
2. Global parameters for use in analytic modeling;
3. The behavior of a configuration in various fault
environments.
The requirements imposed on the simulator design by these three
objectives are examined in the following paragraphs.
6.1.1 Configuration Fault-Tolerance
Measures of fault-tolerance have been defined in Section 4. The
simulator should be able to produce these for a wide variety of configurations.
This requirement can be satisfied in a reasonable way by structuring the simu-
lator such that the various fault-detection and recovery algorithms are imple-
mented as subroutines. Thus a configuration can be described by specifying
the applicable set of subroutines, plus the necessary parameters. This simu-
lator structure provides versatility and modularity, and minimizes the impact
of addition of new subroutines.
6.1.2 Determination of Global Parameters Used in Analytical Modeling
Global parameters are those required when using the analytic model
for analysis of a configuration. An example will help in understanding what
we mean. The reader may recall that in Section 5.4.1, the transient coverage
in triplex, cT has been defined as the conditional probability that a triplex
system recovers, given that a transient has occurred.
If a configuration is analyzed by mathematical modeling, cT is one
of the input parameters of the model. However, it is difficult for the designer
to evaluate cT , since it may depend on:
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- the location of the transient fault
- their occurrence rate T
- the time between occurrence and detection of a fault
- the recovery algorithm used
By introducing these factors into the simulation, and gathering statistics
describing the computer system reaction to transient faults, cT can be esti-
mated by computing the ratio of the number of successful recoveries from
transient faults to the total number of transients.
Thus, for the configurations where the mathematical modeling is
applicable, one simulation run gives an estimate of these parameters of the
modeling. Then using the model, the reliability, R(t), of the configuration
can be easily determined for any given time t.
6.1.3 Fault Environment
The fault environment provided in the simulator should be suffi-
ciently versatile to provide all expected possibilities to test the recovery
algorithm utilized in the configuration under simulation. Thus low or high
failure rates, existence and duration of transient bursts, long transients,
mathematical fault-distribution functions, etc. must be provided. Implemen-
tation of this fault environment should be accomplished so as to provide
maximum flexibility of environment choice by the user.
6.2 GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SIMULATION
6.2.1 General Approach
Certain aspects of the general approach to the design of the simu-
lator are implicit in objectives 1 and 3, namely the need for versatility
and flexibility. There is a third, as-yet-unstated requirement, and that is
for an efficient implementation that results in a reasonable computer-cost
per run.
The versatility and flexibility requirements can be satisfied by
designing a modular simulator that is easily modified (flexibility), and that
models many configuration and fault-environment possiblities (versatility).
Since we are concerned with behavior of the computer system following occurrence
of a fault, we can obtain an efficient implementation by designing a "fault-
6-2
driven" simulator, rather than one that simulates the continuous operation
of the system.
Having chosen the general structure of the simulator, the next
choice is that of implementation language. There are three contending
possibilities. These are the computer system simulation languages such as
ASPOL, ECSS, CSS-II, etc.; the discrete-event languages such as SIMSCRIPT,
GPSS, SIMULA, etc.; and finally the general purpose languages such as FORTRAN.
The computer system simulation languages offer ease of inclusion of peripheral
devices such as tapes and discs, and the gathering of statistics as to their
use. However this is not an issue for the RCS study. Similarly, the discrete-
event simulation languages offer easy simulation of user queues and related
items but these are not a factor in the type of simulation considered here.
Thus we are left with the general purpose languages. Since FORTRAN is available
both to Ultrasystems and NASA Langley, and provides the possibility of good
program efficiency, this is the language that was chosen.
6.2.2 Organization of the Simulator
The approach taken to the formulation of the simulator is somewhat
similar to that described in KRUU 63. Utilizing an extension of this approach,
the computer system is seen as a finite state automaton. A state is defined
by:
1. The number of good computers.
2. The action performed by the system at a given time.
A simplified state-diagram of the computer system is presented in Figure 6.2-1.
This diagram shows all the states and the transitions between states, but does
not show all state entry and exit conditions as does Figure 6.4-1. Basically
the computer system states can be divided into five categories. These are:
NORMAL OPERATION
Multiplex (N 3)
Duplex (N=2)
Simplex (N=l)
TRANSIENT-FAULT RECOVERY
Rollahead
Memory Copy
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Rollback
System Restart
PERMANENT-FAULT RECOVERY
Introduction of a Spare
DIAGNOSIS
Diagnosis
FAILURE
System Failure
A more detailed state diagram and the related details are provided
in Section 6.4.
The simulator program consists of a collection of FORTRAN IV computer
programs (to be run in a CDC 6600 CYBERNET computer environment) organized and
designed to satisfy the objectives of simulation (Section 6.1). The main routine
in charge of directing the processing flow of the simulation is designated the
Driver. A collection of subroutines are accessible to the Driver via FORTRAN
CALL statements. Each of the computer system states (Section 6.4) are repre-
sented by a subroutine. Other supportive subroutines perform statistics gathering
and probability generating functions. The gross organization of the simulation
is presented in Figure 6.2-2.
The simulator program is structured to simulate the detection of
faults within a computer system and the computer system's successful/unsuccessful
recovery actions taken in response to the detected faults. Each simulated mis-
sion is assigned a mission time. A simulation run consists of the repetitive
continued simulation of a designated number of missions (each with the same
mission time).
The initialization box of Figure 6.2-2 encompasses mainly of reading
the run parameters and generating the fault table (see Section 6.5).
The simulation box is detailed in Figure 6.2-3. As stated earlier
the simulation is fault driven. Nothing happens in the simulator until a fault
occurs. This is very important in terms of simulator efficiency. The computer
time spent in one run will be roughly proportional to the number of faults and
not to the simulated mission time.
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MULTIPLEX ROLLAHEAD SYSTEM
(N3) RESTART
OPERATION
INTRODUCTION DUPLEX MEMORY SYSTEMOF A OPERATION COPY FAILURESPARE
ROLLBACK DIAGNOSIS SIMPLEX ROLLBACK
IN OPERATION IN
DUPLEX SIMPLEX
FIGURE 6.2-1 SIMULATOR STATE DIAGRAM
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Nvo -More Runs
End
Initializations
Simulate given
number N
of missions
4
Report
FIGURE 6.2-2 GROSS ORGANIZATION OF THE SIMULATION
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of the Nth
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To box 4 of 12
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which the
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FIGURE 6.2-3 PRINCIPLES OF A FAULT DRIVEN SIMULATION
(BOX 3 OF FIGURE 6.2-2)
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Figure 6.2-4 shows how the simulator makes the transition between
the various states. For example, when simulating a triplex configuration,
simulation begins in State I. The fault table is scanned, a fault is found
and its detection time is determined. The next state is determined (variable
NEXT) and the transition occurs. The simulation continues in a similar
fashion for each state until the mission ends.
6.3 INPUTS/OUTPUTS
6.3.1 Inputs
The parameters of a simulation run are listed below. An asterisk
indicates that an explanation of this parameter is given in a following
subsection.
Number of simulated missions
Mission dependent parameter
Mission time
Machine-dependent parameters
Permanent failure rates
BITE Detection probability of a CPU fault*
BITE Detection probability of a memory fault*
Self-test program efficiency*
Self-test program duration
Configuration-dependent parameters
Number of computers
Number of spares
Dedicated/Non dedicated EEMs (External Electronics Modules)*
Probability that an EEM fault hits the bus
Number of non-dedicated EEMs
Dedicated/Non-dedicated buses (see Section 6.5.7)
Number of non-dedicated buses
Number of external devices
Coverage and relative failure rate of each device and of
the buses
Applicable recovery algorithms*
Recovery algorithm characteristics
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From box 2 of figure 6.2-3
Simulate State I
(Normal N-Plex
Operation)
NEXT=?
Simulate State II
3 Simulate State III -
6 To box I of figure 6.2-3
12- Simulate St a t e X II
FIGURE 6.2-4 RCS HANDLING OF FAULTS
(BOXES 3, 4, 5 OF FIGURE 6.2-3)
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Duration
Unacceptable recurrence interval*
Maximum number of rollbacks
Program Integrity*
Memory-copy Efficacy
Scheduling parameters
Iteration period
Time between comparisons
Major and minor cycle durations
Asynchronous/synchronous mechanism
Environment dependent parameters
Transient failure rates
Transient failure duration
This list of inputs is presented in a slightly different and more
detailed way in Figure 6.3-1. Filled in spaces contain either the impl-icit
value of a parameter or its name. For example, among the transient fault
recovery parameters, we see that the duration of a rollback is the time between
comparisons and that its efficiency for a CPU transient fault is always 100%.
6.3.1.1 Detection Probabilities
These are the probabilities that a computer detects its own faults
(except through diagnosis). This is not significant for N-M-R configurations
(N 3) since all faults are detected and located through voting or comparison.
However, these probabilities become critical in duplex and simplex. In duplex,
faults are detected through comparisons. However, if no other RETs are
available, it is not possible to isolate the faulty computer. In simplex,
these RETs are necessary, since they provide the only way to detect transient
faults.
For simplex operation the detection probability of CPU faults
is low. Faults in the CPU usually cause only a wrong output which will not
be detected by BITE. However some will be detected. Those are the ones
which cause a forbidden address to be computed or those which modify the
computing sequence in such a manner that a go/no-go counter detects them.
Intuitively, we can set this detection probability in the range from 5 to 20%.
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1) PHYSICAL PARAMETERS 3) PARAMETERS AFFECTING FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION IN THE COMPUTERS 5) TRANSIENT FAULT RECOVERY PARAMETERS
a) Design Decisions a) Detection Efficiency
Efficiency for Efficiency for Maximum Number
CPU Fault Memory Fault Duration of Trials Time Limit In Use
Number of Computers Number of Computers 3 or more 2 1
Dedicated/Non o edicated EEM Comparisons 100% 100% 
Rollahead 100  0) Program Delay(
15) + Rollahead Duration NA Recurrence Interval Yes(10)
Number of EEMs Rollback 
Survivability Time Between Comparisons Max Number NA Yes()
Number of EEMs () CPU BITE of Rollbacks
Dedicated/Non Dedicated Buses Memory Copy NA
4  Memory Copy Memory Copy Duration NA(14 ) Recurrence Interval
Memory BITE EfficacyNumber of Buses (1) iO0) (14)
Number of External Devices Per Bus System Restart 100%
(10) 100(0) System Restart Duration NA(14) NAYes(O)
Number of Spare Computers b) Isolation ciency
)  Duration
Number of Computers 3 or more 2 6) PERMANENT FAULT RECOVERY PARAMETERS
b) Failure Characteristics Comp riso ns(7)  100%(10) 0 0) Always done by switching off or ignoring the faulty computer,
once the permanent has been recognized. If a spare is available,
h(3) (3) (3) (3) CPU BITE it is switched in.
Memory BITE
CPU () NA(4)  iagnosis(8) Number of Computers 3 or more 2 1
Memory (II) NA' 4) (STP) Efficiency 100%(1O) STP Efficiency 0%(lO)
EEM(12) (III) NA(4)  Duration 0
(lO)  Diagnosis + NA
Bus and External 4) PARAMETERS AFFECTING FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION IN THE EXTERNAL 
HARDWARE . ondSpare Switch-off Duration
Devices (IV) NA 4)  tioning
a) EEM (11 Time
Impact of EEM Failure on Bus
Number of Faults in the Bus Number of EEMs 3 or more 2 1
IV Detection Efficiency 100%(lO) 100%(lO) %(0)F
Number of Faults in Each Isolation Efficiency 100% EEMCoverag10 16 N-A.14) FOOTNOTES
External Device
IV b) Bus and External Devices (1) Implicit parameter when each EEM/bus is dedicated to (8) This parameter is valid only for permanent faults. Diagnosis is
Bus and External Devices one computer. no hemp with transient faults.
- Bus (2) The bus by itself is considered as an external device. (9) Isolation efficiency Is 100%, once the fault has been detected in simplex.
2) SOFTWARE CHARACTERISTICS Number of Buses 3 or more 2 1 (3) X: permanent fault rate; p.: dormant fault rate. 
(10) impliit parameters.
: transient fault rate; /y: mean transient duration. (11) These parameters are not applicable with dedicated EEM: in this case, faults
Detection Efficiency 00l%(O) 100%lO) 0% ) (4) Non applicable when there is no spare. in th EEM are considered as equivalent to CPU faults.
SynchronousAsynchronous Isolation Efficiency % 
)  
Bus Coverage (5) In this example, t is assumed that the four external (12) These parameters are 0 with a software TMR since there s no EEM.
Isolatio Ef c % Cdevices have the same fault rate. (13) Rolla ead is used for 3 or more computers.
Iteration Period (6) Non applicable when synchronous scheduling. Rollbhck is used for 2 or 1 computers.
- For Each External Device (7) These parameters are implicit. However, the 100% (14) Non a plicable.
MinorNumber of Redundant Devices 3 or more 2 1 efficiency is reached onlyafter the whole memory (15) Rollaead is preceded by an imposed delay to allow the transient to dissipate.
has been exercised, i.e. after a full major cycle.
Major Cycle Duration %[) 0%0) Thus BITE feature may speed up detection. (16) Irrel vant when EEM are dedicated.(In terms of iterations) Detection Efficiency IlW1 Oo%(lO )  1en at
Time Between Comparisons Isolation Efficiency 100%(10
)  Sensor Coverage N.A.
14 )
Maximum Down Time
Relative Size of Minor
Cycle Program
Interrupt Rate
FIGURE 6.3-1 LIST OF INPUT PARAMETERS
FOLDOUT FRAME FOLDOU~
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The main technique to detect a memory fault is parity encoding. When
it exists, the probability of detecting a memory fault is 80%. When it does
not exist, this probability is quite smaller.
6.3.1.2 Self-Test Program Efficiency
Self-test programs (diagnosis) are run in a duplex system where a
fault has been detected but not isolated. Note that if the fault is transient,
the self-test does not diagnose it, since it likely will have dissipated when
the test is run.
6.3.1.3 Dedicated/Non-Dedicated EEMs
If the configuration includes some additional hardware for the External
Electronics Module, the consequence of faults in this hardware has to be assessed.
We partitioned the configurations in two classes. In the first class (dedicated
EEMs), we assume that a fault in the EEM is equivalent to a fault in the compu-
ter and some times on the corresponding bus. In the second one (non-dedicated
EEMs), we assume that EEMs are independent from the computers. The system can
work as long as one computer and one EEM are good. Note that the dedicated case
includes software TMR.
6.3.1.4 Existing Recovery Algorithms
In the present simulator, the recovery procedure for a NMR system is
the state vector transfer. Memory copy is optional.
6.3.1.5 Unacceptable Recurrence Intervals
Once-a recovery procedure has failed for a certain fault, it is use-
less to attempt to recover through the same procedure. Some other one has to
be chosen. If after completion of a recovery procedure, a fault recurs in the
same computer after a time less than the unacceptable recurrence interval, the
system decides that the recovery procedure was unsuccessful and attempts some-
thing else. Usually, the recurrence intervals will be chosen equal to the
duration of one major cycle (Section 5). The rationale is that the memory is
thoroughly exercised in one major cycle.
6.3.1.6 Program Integrity
This probability is listed with the other recovery algorithm charac-
teristics because a rollback and a rollahead (state vector transfer) cannot
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succeed when there is a program memory damage. Program integrity is strongly
linked to the type of memory: an NDRO memory is much better in this respect
than a DRO memory. The fact that there is no need to restore the information
makes it very unlikely that a transient fault damages instructions or con-
stants. In addition, in most NDRO applications, the write voltage for the
program memory is disabled except when altering the program under AGE control.
6.3.1.7 Memory Copy Efficacy
This is the probability that a memory copy corrects a transient
fault. They only reason why it should not succeed is that the transient
had hit the little (micro) program initiating the memory copy. This is very
unlikely since this program should reside in a read only memory or microstore.
6.3.2 Output
Output consists of the following results.
1. Number of system failures.
2. Causes of system failures:
- Too long unavailability. Failures caused by repeated
recovery procedures lasting too long.
- Non isolated faults. In duplex, even though a fault
may be detected, it is possible that the diagnosis
routines are unable to isolate the faulty computer.
- Simplex failures in simplex mode, permanent faults,
undetected or unrecovered transients cause system
failure.
- EEM failures.
- I/O and bus failures.
3. Number of switches to - quadruplex
- triplex
- duplex
- simplex
4. Transient coverages in multiplex, duplex, simplex.
5. Diagnostability in duplex.
6-13
6. Proportion of catastrophic faults. These are the faults
which cause a system failure even though there are 3 or more
computers in the system when they occur. (As long as the
Poisson hypothesis holds for fault rate (Section 4.3.1), this
number should be 0).
7. Number of missed iterations.
Causes of system failures are recorded because the dominant system
failure mode points to the area in the design where improvement would be
significant.
Similarly the number of switches to duplex and simplex are
recorded since these are less effective and less reliable modes. Further-
more, these results are useful when studying a non (fully) adaptive system.
For example, if a TMR system cannot degrade to a simplex mode, all switches
to simplex should be considered as failures. Thus, non adaptive configura-
tions are just considered as a special case of adpative configurations. They
don't need any special parameters. Coverages and diagnostability are determined
since these are parameters to be used in analytical modeling.
6.4 STATE DIAGRAM
Figure 6.4-1 presents the detailed state diagram of an adaptive
NMR configuration. The algorithms involved in States I, II, III, and VII do
not vary for three or more active computers. Thus we avoid a proliferation
of redundant states by maintaining a count in the simulation of the currently
active computers.
6.4.1 Normal Operation (3 or more Units)
In the normal operation state with three or more computer units, the
outputs of the computers are periodically compared. Disagreement of one or
more computers constitutes fault detection and requires exit from this state.
As long as two computers are fault-free, the rollahead recovery
procedure is used and, if it is not successful, the memory copy. If all
computers disagree at the same time, a system restart is initiated.
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2.3 A
STATE I Normal Operation STATE II State Vector Transfer or Rollahead STATE III System Restart
Multiplex (N>-3)
Description: A "good" computer transfers to Description: This is the recovery procedure
Description: The system is executing its I the bad one the information necessary for necessary for a multiple fault. It can consist
normal application routines under the super- A- the resumption of execution, assuming that no of extensive diagnostics and comparisons, to
vision of the executive. damage has occurred in the program memory. determine which memory contents are still
correct. There may be a reload from a backup
Entry Conditions: Entry Condition: memory. Execution is restarted from a well defined
1) Normal multiplex system start up. 1) Detection of a fault in State I. restart point. Depending on the application, this
2) Completion of recovery by: procedure may or may not exist.
2.1 State Vector Transfer Exit Conditions: Entry Condition:
2.2 Memory-Copy 2.1 A A) Completion of the transfer after the2.3 System Restart   21t~o1) Detection of simultaneous faults in State I.
2.4 Replacement of One Computer ROLLAHEAD DURATION has elapsed: go toby a Spare State I. The rollahead is successful
2.5 Switching off One Computer according to the ROLLAHEAD SUCCESS
PROBABILITY and if the fault had dis- A) Completion of the restart after the RESTART
Exit Conditions: 2.5 D.A appeared before entering the rollahead DURATION has elapsed.
(fault duration smaller than DELAY B) Too many missed iterations: go to system
A) Detection of a fault: go to start BEFORE RECOVERY). failure.
of a state vector transfer recovery B) Identification of a recurrent fault
attempt after the DELAY BEFORE (when State II is called twice in less
RECOVERY has elapsed, than the ROLLAHEAD RECURRENCE INTERVAL
B) Simultaneous faults: go to system duration): go to State VII (memory copy).
restart. C) Too many missed iterations: go to system C
failure.
2.4 j2.5 12.2 D) Another fault is detected during the
rollahead. The recovery is abandoned.
D.A) N>4: go to State I and N-N-1.
D.B) N=3: go to State IV.
D.B B
A,C.A B.B
STATE XII Introduction of a Spare A 11
Description: A spare is checked, condi- STATE VII Memory Copy
tioned and switched in by a "good" computer. A.B,C.A Description: A "good" computer transfers to the
Entry Conditions: C.B bad one the content of its memory and the stateEntry Conditions: vector. The memory copy is done on the base of STATE V System Failure
1) Identification of a recurrent fault in T4 B.A cycle stealing. Computation continues in the
State VII and a spare is available. STATE IV Duplex (N=2) good computers. It corrects the transient with D Description: Heaven or Hell.
2) Identification of a bad spare and a a probability equal to the MEMORY-COPY COVERAGE.
B. second spare is available. Description: The system is executing its normal 2 B.C Entry Condition:
Exit Conditions: application routines but 2 computers only are OK. EntryA) Failure conditions are listed in
1) Identification of a recurrent fault in each state.
A) Completion of the conditioning: go B.CC.B .3 Entry Conditions: State II.
to State I with S-S-1, after the 1) Normal duplex system startup. EExit Condition:
CONDITIONING TIME has elapsed. 2) Identification of a permanent fault and no 1) Alas, alas, alas -- no exit.
2 spare is available. A) Completion of the memory copy after the
B. If Sa2, restart State XII with S-S-I. aspare. State I.
B.B) If S=1 and N4, go to State I with A 4) Occurrence of a fault during a recovery procedure. B) Identification of a permanent fault
N-N-I and S=O. 5) Completion of recovery by rollback. (when State VII is called twice in less
B.C) If S=l and N=3, go to State IV with S=O. than the MEMORY COPY RECURRENCE INTERVALC) A fault is detected in a computer (but 5 Exit Condition: duration).the spare): B.A) A spare is available: go to State XII
C.A) If N>3 go to State I with N-.N-. A) Dete(introduction of a spare).
C.B) If N=3: go to State IV. B.B) No spare and N 4: go to State I with
N-N-1.
B.C) No spare and N=3: go to State IV (duplex).
C) Another fault is detected during the
memory copy. The recovery is abandoned.
C.A) N>4: go to State I and N-N-1.
C.B) N=3: go to State IV.
STATE IX Diagnosis D) Too many missed iterations: go to system
STATE VIII Rollback in Duplex failure. (The maximum number of itera-1 Description: Each computer runs a diagnostic on itself tions we can afford to miss is MAXIMUM
Description: The 2 computers repeat the last Description: Each computer runs a diagnostic on itself. DOWNTIME divided by ITERATION PERIOD).
segment of programming, hoping that this time they Entry Condition:
will agree. A 1) Unsuccessful rollback.
Entry Condition: Exit Conditions:
1) Detection of a fault in State IV. A) Successful completion of the diagnosis: go to
Exit Conditions: State X (simplex). The duration of the diagno- STATE X Simplexcription: The computer repeats the last
sis is computed from the MEAN DIAGNOSIS TIME. segment of programming hoping that this time
A) Successful completion of the rollback: B) Unsuccessful diagnosis: go to system failure. 1 Description: The last good computer is executing A the error condition will not reoccur.the probability of success of a rollback The proportion of successful diagnosis is given the normal application routines.is the same as the ROLLAHEAD SUCCESS by the STP EFFICIENCY. Entry Condition:
PROBABILITY. Rollbacks are repeated as B 1 C) Too many missed iterations: go to system failure: Entry Conditions: 1) Detection of a fault in State X.many times as the MAXIMUM NUMBER OF it is quite possible that because of successive 1) Successful diagnosis after the ISOLATION
ROLLBACKS. rollbacks and diagnosis, the system missed more DURATION has elapsed. Exit Conditions:
B) Unsuccessful rollback: go to start iterations than allowed by the MAXIMUM DOWNTIME. 2) Completion of recovery by rollback. 2 A A) Completin of the rollback: go backdiagnosis attempt. 2))Completiontoforecoverytby rollback.c2kA A)oCobackt
C) Too many missed iterations: go to B.C Exit Conditions:to tate . (The probability is stillsystem failure.the rollahead success probability).
The rollback duration is equal to the TIME A) Detection of a fault: go to start B) Too many missed iterations: go to
BETWEEN COMPARISONS. Too many rollbacks may rollback. The fault is detected system failure. (The same remarks as
cause a missed iteration, if the minor cycle according to the DETECTION PROBABILITY. in State VIII - exit C apply.
cannot complete during the ITERATION PERIOD. B) Undetected fault: go to system failure.
The MAXIMUM DOWNTIME gives the maximum number C B
of iterations we can afford to loose.
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6.4.2 Rollahead (or State Vector Transfer)
The rollahead state is entered to simulate the computer system's
attempt to recover from a detected single fault. The state vector (consisting
of program variables and all register contents) of one good computer is used
to replace the non-agreeing computer's state vector. However all transient
failures are not corrected by this procedure since a bad instruction cannot be
restored. The approach taken in the simulation is to provide for the specification
of a rollahead success probability. This probability can be formally defined
as:
P = Pr [fault is corrected given that a fault has occurred,
suc has been detected, and its physical cause has dis-
appeared when correction begins]
An analysis, which gives consideration to the type of memory (e.g. 2 1/2D, 3D,
DRO, NDRO, etc.) and the consequences of memory faults, will yield an estimate
of the rollahead success probability(or program integrity).
6.4.3 Memory Copy
This recovery procedure is entered after a specified number of rolla-
heads have been completed unsuccessfully. The memory contents of one good
memory are transferred into the faulty memory. In order to avoid interruption
of computation, the transfer is effected on the basis of cycle stealing. It
ends with the updating of the state vector of the faulty computer.
Since, during a memory copy, normal application routines continue,
it is possible that a new fault shows up. The following (conservative) assump-
tion has been made in order to simplify the simulation. Upon detection of a
second fault during a memory copy, the memory copy procedure is abandoned and
the computer for which this memory copy was intended is discarded.
It is assumed that memory copy provides recovery from transient
faults which have disappeared when the memory copy began with a probability
equal to the memory copy efficacy.
6.4.4 System Restart
The system restart state is entered when all computers disagree upon
comparison. The recovery procedure from this state may consist of a memory
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verification. Relevant memory locations are read, voted upon and restored.
Extensive diagnosis may also be run. Finally, if a backup memory is available,
reloading may be possible. Then the application program is reinitiated from
the restart point.
After a successful system restart, the system returns to the normal
operation state. However, since all computers stop their normal computation
during a system restart, this recovery procedure is time critical.
Note that in a benign fault envi ronment the probability of having
a system restart is quite small (=1 for 1 million faults). However, system
restart is necessary if the fault environment is so harsh that bursts of
faults can hit several computers at a time or if the probability of a
short power failure is not negligible.
6.4.5 Introduction of a Spare
If a spare is available, it should be activated once a permanent
fault has been recognized. As part of the activation process, the spare is
checked and conditioned by one of the good computers. In the state-diagram
of Figure 6.4-1, spares are not available for the duplex and simplex simula-
tion. This is thought to be compatible with the expected applications.
6.4.6 Normal Operation (2 Units)
The normal operation (2 units) state is entered upon the determina-
tion that a permanent fault exists in one of the three computers of the computer
system. This state is quite similar to the normal operation (N units) state,
except that the only available recovery procedure is program rollback.
6.4.7 Rollback
The rollback state is entered upon the detection of a fault when the
computer system is in the normal operation (2 units) state. Rollback is the
term used to describe repetition of the program segment executed just prior to
the detected output disagreement. The state vector at the beginning of each
program segment is maintained in order that the r'ollback procedure may be
accomplished.
After the program segment has been repeated, the outputs of the two
computers are compared; if the correction is successful, the computer system
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switches back to the normal operation (2 units) state. If the outputs differ,
the system rolls back again; this unsuccessful recovery process continues a
predetermined number of times before changing the computer system state to
diagnosis.
Since both of the active computers remaining in the computer system
must stop their normal computations during a rollback, this computer recovery
procedure may be time-critical. However, if comparisons are frequent enough,
a rollback should not last more than a few milliseconds.
6.4.8 Diagnosis
In triplex, voting provides a very easy and efficient way of isolating
the faulty unit. Unfortunately, a disagreement upon comparison in duplex does
not indicate which of the computers produced the wrong value. That is why the
main recovery procedure in duplex is the rollback since there is no transfer
of information from the good to the bad computer for such a procedure. But,
if the rollback does not succeed, the bad computer must be isolated. For that
purpose, self-tests are run. If they are successful, the faulty computer is
isolated and the system switches to simplex. If unsuccessful the system is
unable to decide which computer is faulty and the system fails. Diagnosis pro-
grams are obviously time critical. Note that it would be possible to include
a memory copy which would take place once a diagnosis had been successful: the
memory of the good computer would be copied into the bad one. However, this
improvement is not so good as it would seem since many transients cannot be
detected through diagnosis.
6.4.9 Normal Operation (Simplex)
In simplex operation, comparison is no longer available for detection
of faults. We must rely mostly on the RETs to detect faults. CPU transients
are difficult to detect. Some may be caught through go/no-go counters and
storage protection. Memory faults are easier to detect. Parity check is
especially useful. When a fault is detected a rollback is initiated. If the
fault is not detected, a failure occurs.
6.4.10 Rollback in Simplex
This is the same procedure used in duplex. Since it is the only
recovery algorithm available in simplex, it is repeated as long as it is not
6-19
successful. If recovery from the fault cannot be effected, a system failure
will occur when the system has been down too long.
6.4.11 System Failure
The system failure state is entered when the system is unable to
run properly any longer, or when computation requirements have not been met for
too long a period of time. Upon recognition of the condition of a system
failure, the DRIVER program discontinues the simulation of a mission.
Causes of fail ures are:
1. Excessive time in rollahead, memory copy, or rollback:
It should not happen since the system must be designed
so that a recovery procedure does not endanger it. How-
ever it might happen that the continuous repetition of
such procedures be fatal for the successful completion
of the mission.
2. A too long system restart: A system restart is a very
rarely called procedure. But it is long (a few seconds),
and may not always be tolerable.
3. Diagnosis incomplete when available recovery time expires:
Normally, diagnosis follows rollback. It is possible
that these two recovery procedures sometime take too long.
4. Undetected faults in simplex.
5. A too long rollback in simplex: This happens when a
permanent occurs or when a non-recoverable transient
occurs.
6. EEM failures: In case of non dedicated EEMs the system
fails when all EEMs fail or when all but one fail and the
computers are unable to decide which is the good EEM.
7. Bus failures: The system fails when all buses fail or
when all but one fail and the computers are unable to
decide which is the good bus.
8. Actuator/sensor failures.
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6.5 SIMULATOR IMPLEMENTATION
Because of the fault-driven nature of the simulator, the first
activity in the simulation is the generation of a ,table of faults occuring
in a given number of missions. The fault generator and the computer-system-
state subroutines are described in the follQwing subsections.
6.5.1 Fault Generation
6.5.1.1 Introduction
A major portion of the simulator is dedicated to the generation of
faults according to mathematical algorithms which describe the occurrence of
faults in the various components of the computer system. Two approaches to
handling this problem were considered:
1. Generation of one fault at a time.
2. Generation of a fault table describing the faults which
occur in the computer system between 0 and a time T.
The first approach is suitable if we consider only single faults
and if we simply describe fault occurrences within the computer system, e.g.,
the fault-arrival rate in the system is X and the probability that a fault is
in the ith part of the computer system is P . This procedure is described
in LYON 62.
Since we must deal with transient failures also, we want to know
how the computer system behaves in case of multiple faults. Furthermore, if
the faults do not occur according to a Poisson law in all modules (burst of
transient failures for example), the method described in LYON 62 is not
readily applicable.
A more efficient and more general approach is to generate a fault
table prior to simulation. This also makes the simulation program more
functionally modular since, once the simulation-has begun, we have only to scan
the fault-table to determine when and where the next fault occurs.
6.5.1.2 Parameters
The parameters necessary to generate the fault table for a simu-
lator run are a part of the parameters of simulation which are input by the
simulator user for each simulator run.
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6.5.1.2.1 Description of the Computer System
The computer system to be simulated is composed of n identical
computers, each composed of m modules.
6.5.1.2.2 Description of the Fault Distributions
For each of the m modules, the distribution functions to be used
in the generation of both permanent and transient faults must be indicated by
the simulator user. Specific subroutines for the chosen distribution functions
are then called and the parameters of the distribution are passed to these
subroutines.
For permanent faults, only the Poisson distributions have been
implemented. This is generally considered in the literature to be most
realistic.
For transient faults, Poisson and burst distributions have been
considered. Poisson distributions are considered because of their tracta-
bility and acceptance for the permanent fault case. Burst distributions are
thought to be important because many transients'likely are caused by compo-
nents working near the limits of their tolerance specifications. As long as
the conditions do not improve, faults will occur often in these components.
A burst of transients is defined by its duration and the rate of transient
occurrence during the burst. Bursts occur according to the burst rate.
6.5.1.2.3 Description of the Fault Duration
For each of the m modules, the distribution function of the
transient failure durations to be used by the simulator programs must be
indicated by the simulator user. Specific subroutines for the chosen distri-
bution functions are called by the Driver and the subroutines receive the
parameters of the distributions.
At the present time, the uniform and the exponential distributions
have been implemented.
1. Uniform Distribution -- The transient failure duration is
uniformly distributed between a minimum and a maximum
duration.
6-22
2. Exponential Distribution -- The transient failure duration
is exponentially distributed. The mean duration is 1/y.
6.5.1.3 Description of the Fault Table
The fault table consists of 300 records ordered according to the
occurrence time of each fault. This table can contain up to 150 permanent
faults and 150 transient faults. It has the following record format:
Occurrence
Time Duration Module Computer
Permanent failures are identified by a duration longer than the
mission time.
6.5.1.4 . General Organization of the Fault Generator
The first step consists of generating a table of permanent failures
and a table of transient failures for each module in the computer system.
Then these tables are merged into one sequentially-ordered (master) fault
table. The general organization of the fault generator is presented in
Figure 6.5-1.
6.5.1.5 Determination of the Occurrence Time of the Faults According
to a Poisson Distribution Function
Faults occurring by a Poisson distribution process have a probability
that one fault occurs during a small interval of time, dt, as follows:
P1 = Adt. (See PARZ 60).
The probability of no faults, Po, occurring during the time interval
dt is, Po = l-xdt, and the probability of more than one fault occurring is 0.
A Poisson distribution process has two very important properties:
I. It is memoryless: This means that the probability of a fault
occurring between times t and t+dt is independent of fault
occurrences before time t..
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Parameters:
Number of computers n
Number of modules m
Start in each computer.
i 1 i- 1
Enter the perma-
nent,transient Find the ith
distributions and fault
duration
distribution
Enter the Decide randomly
parameters of inwhichcomputer
the distributions the ith fault
occurs Merging
into one
Generate the Record the 
table
occurrence time ith fault in the
of thepermanents ith fault in the
Generation table
of 2 m
Generate the tables i + I I
occurrence time
of the transients
No Last
Fault
For each transient
generate its Yes
duration
End
ii + 1
No Last module
Yes
FIGURE 6.5-1 GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THE FAULT GENERATOR
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2. The probability density function for the random variable, T , i.e.
the interarrival time between two consecutive faults, is
fT (t) = xe- t
T
Thus the probability distribution function of Tr is:
t
P[Tr t] = fTr (u) du
-
At
Thus the probability of having no fault at time t is:
R(t) = e- t
A difficulty arises at this point since the random number generator
(function) available in the CYBERNET system produces outputs which are uniformly
distributed on the interval O0U<1. The outputs of this generator can be
converted using the approach described below. (HILL 70, SHRE 66).
We are concerned with the random variable Tr, the interarrival
time between faults, whose distribution function is given above as
P[Tr!t] = 1 - e-At
For the purposes of the simulation we wish to obtain values of t. We now
note two important facts. First, 0OP<1. Second, by algebraic manipulation
it is possible to solve for t, e.g:
t =1 In (1-P)
Thus, for any value of P in the valid range, a value of t can be calculated.
By generating values of P using the random number generator, which produces
uniformly distributed numbers between zero and one, t can then be
calculated.
A more formal description of the process follows. Using the
random number generator which gives a number U uniformly distributed on the
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interval O0U<1, we have to compute Tr which is exponentially distributed.
That means that we have to find a function f(U) such that:
T r = f(U)
and P[U*u] = u (uniform distribution):zz> P[Tr-t ] = l-e-At
(if O-u<l)
If Tr = f(U), we can define the inverse function g(Tr) such that
U = g(TT).
Thus, we have:
P[Tr-t] = 1-e-t
= P[f(U) t]
= P[U g(t)]
= g(t)
The last equation is true since U is uniformly distributed on
the interval, O0U<l. Thus we know that the unknown function f(U) is the
inverse of the function g(t) = l-e-At
Hence:
u = g(t) = 1-e - At
t in (l-u) = f(u)
Since we have just found the function f, we can write
Tr =-Iin (1-U)A
But we can have a simpler expression: U is uniformly distributed
on the interval, 05U<I. Hence 1-U is also uniformly distributed on the same
interval. This implies that the distribution of Tr does not change if we
replace 1-U by U.
Finally, we have shown that if U is uniformly distributed on
OU<1, then T= - 1in U is exponentially distributed, the parameter of the
distribution being X.
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Using the random number generator provided by the CYBERNET system,
we determine the different interarrival times and thus the occurrence times.
The flowchart of the generation of the occurrence times of the faults in
one module is presented in Figure 6.5-2.
6.5.1.6 Determination of the Duration
As stated earlier, both exponential and uniform distributions of
transient fault duration are available in the simualtor. If the transient
duration is exponentially distributed (parameter y), we determine a duration
DT for each transient:
D 1 In U using the same general procedure described
T  y
for the occurrence time. If the duration is uniformly distributed on O<DT<Dmax'
the duration DT is DT = Dmax x U.
6.5.1.7 Determination of the Occurrence Time of the Faults According
to a Burst Distribution Function
The occurrence time and duration of the bursts is determined as in
Sections 4.3.1.5 and 4.3.1.,6. Then, for each burst, the occurrence time and
duration of the transients are determined.
6.5.2 Normal Operation (3 or More Units)
The detailed diagram (Figure 6.4-1) shows that either single fault
detection, or multiple fault detection may happen in this state. A multiple
fault is detected when all computers disagree at the same time (or indicate an
error condition). Note that in quintuplex for example, a fault which would hit
only 2 computers at the same time is not considered as a multiple fault. This
is due to the fact that 3 computers still agree and the good state of the system
is known. Multiple faults necessitate special care since the good computers are
not known. A system restart is to be entered. Single fault detection initiates
a rollahead. Figure 6.5-3 is a flowchart of State I.
6.5.3 Rollahead
A general flowchart of the rollahead state is presented in Figure
6.5-4. A rollahead does not correct all faults. Memory damage cannot be
recovered from through this procedure.
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FIGURE 6.5-2 GENERATION OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE FAULTS
IN ONE MODULE (POISSON DISTRIBUTION)
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FIGURE 6.5-3 NORMAL OPERATION STATE I
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The probability of success of rollahead is estimated by analyzing the
memory organization. The main conclusions are:
1. With a DRO memory with protection bits, CPU and I/O faults
do not cause memory damage. For these faults, the rollahead
is always successful.
2. For memory transients, the analysis is more difficult. A
first consideration is given to DRO and NDRO memories. Then,
consequences of faults in the different circuits should be
assessed. It must be determined which transients are likely
to cause an instruction or constant to be destroyed. Thus, we
can get an estimate of the success probability of rollahead.
According to this estimate, each fault is marked as recoverable
(or not) by rollahead. (It must not be forgotten that in any
case permanents cannot be recovered from by such a procedure).
The probability of success is much higher for an NDRO than
for a DRO memory.
6.5.4 Other States
The subroutines describing the remaining states all have the same
basic structure. For all of them, the fault table is scanned and then a decision
is made as to which is the next state. Decisions are taken as described in the
exit conditions shown on the detailed state diagram.
6.5.5 Introduction of the Scheduling Mechanisms
In Section 4.1 one of the criteria for correct execution of a set of
programs is that the execution time of each program does not exceed a specified
limit. Thus it is necessary to provide in the simulator a method for determina-
tion of the consequences of output delays and the number of missed iterations
due to execution of recovery procedures.
Scheduling mechanisms are described in Section 3.3. Section 3.5
describes how recovery procedures fit in the different schemes. We list below
the fundamental remarks - as far as simulation is concerned - of Section 3.5.
1. Dichotomy of scheduling mechanisms into 2 classes:
synchronous type and asynchronous type mechanisms.
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2. The rollback structure of minor cycle computations
corresponds with the scheduling of the computations
for any of the scheduling mechanisms.
3. In the case of a synchronous mechanism, each segment
of a major cycle computation is similar to the minor
cycle computations in that the rollback structure and
the scheduling of the segment correspond.
. With an asynchironous type, things are much more
complicated. If comparisons take place only when
an output occurs, the entire computations must be
repeated if an error occurs in a major cycle.
Furthermore, rollback may also be necessary for the
minor cycle computation taking place during this major
cycle.
The main point of the simulation is to evaluate the probability that
a mission is successfully completed. One instance of failure is when, because of
recovery procedures, all computations necessary to the success of the mission
cannot be achieved. It can be assumed that for a specific type of mission
there is a maximum number of consecutively missed minor cycles. For example,
if the aircraft is unstable, this number may be no more than 1. For some other
type of mission, it may be a hundred. Thus, our first goal will be to count the
missed minor cycles, and record a failure whenever too many consecutive minor
cycles are lost. Note that because of the second remark, the simulation will
be very similar for both asynchronous and synchronous cases.
The main difference between these two cases is for major cycles. A
rollback, in an asynchronous system may considerably delay the completion of a
major cycle computation and may also cause more than one rollback.
We shall first look at the simpler case, i.e. synchronous scheduling.
6-32
6.5.5.1 Synchronous Scheduling
m MM m Mm M m M m M
I I I I I I
P
m: Minor Cycle Computations
M: Major Cycle Computations
I: Minor Cycle Initiation
P: Minor Cycle Period
After the minor cycle processing is completed, the remaining time
before the next RTI is used for major cycle processing.
6.5.5.2 Detection of Faults
Faults are detected when comparison takes place. A fault in
the CPU is detected on the comparison following its occurrence. Things
are different for memory fault. If a fault hits a minor cycle program,
detection will occur in the current minor-cycle period. But if it hits a
major cycle program, detection occurs during the major cycle following its
occurrence. Thus, it is quite possible to have an undetected fault for a
while. In any case, having frequent comparison points will make detection
faster.
Some faults are detected earlier than the comparison following their
occurrence. These are the faults detected by RETs. For example, a bad memory
word may cause a parity error. Let's examine the consequence of this feature.
If the recovery procedure is the rollahead, the error interrupt is left pending
since the state vector transfer can be initiated only at well-defined points.
It is at these points that comparisons take place. When the recovery procedure
is the rollback, the error interrupt can be immediately taken into account and
the rollback can be initiated.
6.5.5.3 Iteration Losses
Our goal is to determine if a recovery procedure has lasted too long.
A subroutine determines the number of consecutively missed iterations. The main
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difficulty is that it is not enough to determine if recovery from a fault took
longer than a specified time. We must be aware that another recovery in the
same cycle might have decreased the time available for the second recovery.
6.5.5.4 Asynchronous Scheduling
As explained earlier and in Section 3.5.1, a fault occurring in a
major cycle may cause more than one rollback/rollahead. This happens when the
major cycle routine where the fault occurs is interrupted by a minor cycle routine.
This is simulated in the following way. The interrupt rate and the average
length of a program segment are known. Thus it is possible to compute the
probability of having an interrupt coming between fault occurrence and the end of
the program segment, when the comparison and detection takes place. If an inter-
rupt has come in between, we assume that two recovery procedures take place.
The recovery procedure is assigned the highest interrupt priority.
If any other interrupt comes during the recovery, it is ignored, thus causing
a missed iteration.
6.5.6 EEM Faults
The External Electronics Module is the additional hardware in charge
of the voting and the recovery initiation. It is subject to faults and con-
sequence of faults in the EEM must be assessed. There are roughly two kinds of
organization: dedicated and non-dedicated EEMs.
6.5.6.1 Dedicated EEMs
An EEM is associated with each computer. A fault in the EEM causes
the computer associated with it to fail. Thus the failure rate of the EEM can
be added to the failure rate of each computer.
A fault in the EEM may also cause in some configurations the loss of
the corresponding bus. Analysis of the EEM design should yield the probability
that such a fault happens.
6.5.6.2 Non-Dedicated EEMs
In this case, EEMs are not directly associated with computers. The
computers vote on all EEMs or at any time, a primary EEM is chosen and switched
to all computers. In case of failure, another one is chosen. In both cases,
failure of an EEM does not cause a computer to fail. As long as one computer
and one EEM are still good, the system can continue to run.
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Faults in an EEM do not cause a recovery procedure. These are masked
by voting. If there are only 2 EEMs, self-checking properties are used to deter-
mine which EEM has not failed. Thus the probability of fault detection in an
EEM must be estimated.
6.5.7 Input-Output Faults
There are many possible I/O configurations (see Section 2). In order
to provide the user with a reasonable number of different possibilities, we have
modeled the two principal types of I/O configurations: these are the dedicated,
and non-dedicated bus configurations. It is expected that these will provide
useful approximations to systems employing variations of these approaches.
6.5.7.1 Dedicated Buses
This type of configuration is sketched on Figure 2.1-3. We list
below the assumptions made for modeling this configuration:
- When a computer fails, the bus and the sensors/actuators
associated with this computer cannot work any longer and
thus the simulator program considers them as if they had
failed.
- As long as two or more identical sensors have not failed,
the system is not endangered.
- When only one good sensor of a redundant set is left,
the system must be able to recognize the good sensor.
This is possible through use of reasonableness tests.
For each sensor, a coverage parameter must be estimated
by the designer. This coverage is the probability that
if all but one identical sensors are faulty, the system
is able to recognize the good one.
- Failure of a complete set of identical sensors is considered
as a system failure.
- Actuators are modeled in the same way as sensors. This is
a valid assumption if actuators can be partitioned, each part
being associated with one bus.
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The condition of each of the devices in the system is represented
by a Boolean variable, with a one indicating a healthy device, and zero in-
dicating a failed device. The device-condition set is summarized as a
Boolean matrix, M(B,S), where B is the number of busses and S is the number of
sets of redundant devices. In the case of dedicated busses, when computer i
fails, all devices connected to computer i's bus have been forced into what
is, in effect, a failed state since it is no longer possible to communicate
with them. For this case, M(i,j) is set to zero for all j.
Figure 6.5-5 is a sketch of such an organization. All devices of
set 2 are similar. When device 3 of set 2 fails, the device-condition matrix
M becomes
M 1 1 1 1
If subsequent to this, computer 2 fails, then in effect bus 2 and all devices
connected to it are unusable. Thus M becomes
1 1 1
M = 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
It appears that the good computers may have difficulties in deciding
which of the devices in set number 2 is still good. If there is no way of
deciding which is good, the coverage for the second set is input as 0 and a
system failure is the consequence of the failure of computer 2. If it is
always possible to decide which is good (totally self-checking device), then
there is no system failure in this case. Intermediate cases are possible.
The coverage is then a number between 0 and 1.
At the end of the simulated mission, each column of the matrix is
scanned. If a column has no "1", it is a system failure. If a column j has
only one "1", a random number Q£x<l is generated and compared with the coverage
of the jth device. If the random number is the bigger, it is a system failure
condition.
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FIGURE 6.5-5 EXAMPLE OF DEDICATED BUS CONFIGURATION
6.5.7.2 Non-Dedicated Buses
The modeling is the same as in the previous case except that the
failure of one computer does not cause a bus to fail. Thus, it would seem that
this system is always more reliable than a dedicated bus configuration. How-
ever this is not true since the reliability of the voter/switch must be taken
into account. It may be the EEMs which perform this voting function.
Whether the busses are dedicated or not, external device set 1
is by definition the bus: if a bus fails, all devices connected to this
bus fail.
6.6 TESTING
6.6.1 Fault Generator
This is the easiest part to test. Given a definite distribution its
mean and variance can be computed. They can also be computed from a sample ob-
tained from the fault generator. Comparison of the two sets of results and
taking into account the size of the sample permit to validate (or not) the
generator.
6.6.2 Simulator
Validation of the simulator is a more difficult task and as a matter
of fact, could only be completed when comparisons with experimental results could
be achieved. Obviously, this is not possible and some alternate route has to
be found.
First of all we test that the simulator does what we can expect of
it in many different cases where the faults are known. For these tests, the
faults are generated by hand so that the different paths of the program are
exercised.
After being sure that the program does what the programmer expects,
the results have still to be tested. The general case cannot be tested. How-
ever, by simulating simple configurations where some parameters are chosen
such that they do not affect the outputs, results are obtained which can be
compared with results of the modeling.
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6.7 SAMPLE RUN
The output of the simulator for the simulation of a software TMR
configuration without memory copy is presented in Figure 6.7-1. The remarks
below refer to some of the parameters.
1. In this run, we have not studied sensor reliability.
However, the program requires at least that 2 "sensors"
be indicated. By definition "sensor" 1 is always the
bus. In this case, sensor 2 never fails and thus does
not influence the simulation.
2. Here we have chosen a very short fault duration (lps).
Thus, it is not useful to wait for the dissipation of the
fault when initiating a recovery procedure, since faults
are detected only at the comparison every 5 milliseconds.
3. These parameters are irrelevant in this case since there
is no memory copy.
4. The restart duration is chosen longer than the maximum
down time (30 ms). Since computation is stopped during
a system restart, a restart implies here a failure
condition.
5. Here we mean the proportion of memory which is affected
by minor cycle programs. When memory damage has occurred,
detection will be 100 times slower if the fault hit a
major cycle program than if it hit a minor cycle. In this
case faults are four times more likely to hit a major than
a minor cycle program. The choice of .2 is arbitrary for
this case. It is not a critical parameter since even if
3 seconds elapses before detection of the fault, the
probability of having another fault in the mean time
is very low.
6. Coverage means here the probability that the system
recovers from a transient without discarding a computer.
7. From the size of the sample, we can conclude that
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o Multiplex coverage = 75% (+ 1%)
O Duplex coverage = 73% (+ 3%)
o Diagnostability = 89% (+ 2%)
O Failure Prob- = 149 = 3 (10)-3 + .4 10) 3
ability After 50000
100 Hours
The number of transients occurring in simplex is the difference
between the total number of transients and those occurring in multiplex
and duplex (recovered or not). In this case, this different yields
10175 -(6994+2319+615+223) = 34. Thus the value for the simplex coverage
is not very significant since the size of the sample (34) is too small.
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TRIPLEX
RECOVERY PROCEDURE WITH MORE THAN 2 COMPUTERSI ROLLAHEAD ONLY
RECOVERY PROCEDURE IN DUPLEXI ROLLBACK
DEDICATED EEMS
DEDICATED I/0 RUSSES
NOTATIONSI
MODULE 1: CPU
MODULE 21 EEM(EXTERNAL LOGIC)
MODULE 3t MEMORY
MODULE 41 BUS AND EXTERNAL.DEVICES
SENSOR 1 IS THE BUSI FAILURES OF THE BUS CAUSES FAILURE OF ALL DEVICES ON THE BUS
DESCRIPTION OF THE SIMULATION I
NUMBER OF MISSIONS 50000
MISSION TIME 100,000 HOURS
DESCRIPTION OF EXTERNAL DEVICES
NUMBER OF ACTUATORS/SENSORS
PER BUS 2
SENSOR 1 DUPLEX COVERAGE: 1.000 RELATIVE FAILURE RATEI 1.000
SENSOR 2 DUPLEX COVERAGEt 1,000 RELATIVE FAILURE RATEI 0.000 See remark 1
IMPACT OF EEM FAULTS ON COMPUTER .100E*01
IMPACT OF EEM-: FAULTS ON BUS O.
IMPACT OF EEM FAULTS ON BOTH 0.
FIGURE 6.7-1 SOFTWARE TMR WITHOUT MEMORY COPY
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RESULTS
NUMBER OF FAULTS 20402
NUMBER OF TRANSIENTS 10175
NUMBER OF USED SPARES 0
NUMBER OF QUADRUPLEX 0
NUMBER OF TRIPLEX 0
NUMBER OF DUPLEX 11613
NUMBER OF SIMPLEX 922
NUMBER OF ROLLAHEADS 18607
NUMBER OF MEMORY-COPIES 0
NUMBER OF SYSTEM-RESTARTS 0
NUMBER OF ROLLBACKS 1647
NUMBER OF FAILURES 149
NO. OF TRANSIENTS RECOVERED FROM IN MULTIPLEX 6994
NO. OF TRANSIENTS NOT RECOVERED FROM IN MULTIPLEX 2319
NO. OF TRANSIENTS RECOVERED FROM IN DUPLEX 615
NO. OF TRANSIENTS NOT RECOVERED FROM IN DUPLEX 223
CAUSES OF FAILURES: DUPLEX FAILURES 110
EEM FAILURES 0
I/O FAILURES 1
EXCESSIVE DOWNTTME 0
SIMPLEX FAILURES 38
PROPORTION OF MISSED ITERATIONS .6303E-08
LONGEST SERIES OF MISSED ITERATIONS 2
(BELOW, A COVERAGE HAS A VALUE OF -1 IF IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO COMPUTE ITIEMULTIPLEX COVERAGE: .751E+00 WHEN NO TRANSIENTS OCCUR IN ONE' 0 TME TWO MODES)
DUPLEX COVERAGE: .734E+00
SIMPLEX COVERAGE: .833E-01
CATASTROPHIC FAULTS: 0.
DIAGNOSTIBILITY .P93E+00
FIGURE 6.7-1 SOFTWARE TMR WITHOUT MEMORY COPY (Cont'd)
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7.0 PARAMETERS
Before either the analytic model or the simulator can be used for
the study of redundant computer configurations, values for their input para-
meters must be determined. The simulator-input values are obtained
by means of an analysis of the computer and configuration under study. The
simulator can then be used to obtain estimates of the parameters required by
the analytic model.
7.1 SIMULATOR
The simulator can be used to estimate the parameters required by
the mathematical model. It requires about forty inputs that are a function
of the system configuration, the application, the fault environment and the
computer's reliability and speed. Here we will consider the STP efficiency,
the program integrity and the BITE efficiency. The other parameters are
discussed in Section 6.3.
7.1.1 STP Efficiency
The Self-Test Program efficiency is the probability that the STP
returns a correct fault indication, once a permanent (or leaky transient)
fault has been detected. This is a fundamental parameter for (residual)
duplex systems since it gives the probability of choosing the good computer
for adaptation to simplex, once a fault has been detected through comparison
and not corrected by the rollback. The STP efficiency comprises not only the
proportion of faults detected with the diagnostic routine, but also the pro-
portion of faults detected through BITE features. Because of this, some
faults will be detected immediately, and others will be detected several milli-
seconds after the diagnostic program is initiated. If the resulting time loss
is critical, the mission could.fail. Thus we associate with the STP efficiency
its maximum execution time -- i.e. the time it takes to execute the entire
diagnostic program.
7.1.1.1 STP Requirements
For it to be effective, the STP in conjunction with BITE should
verify proper operation of the following modules.
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1. Memory - program memory tested by sum check if main
store parity not available. Data areas tested by
write/read verification with test data.
2. CPU - All instructions should be executed in a
predescribed sequence with required variations and
exhaustive data patterns to insure that all instruc-
tions are operating properly. All addressing schemes
and registers should also be tested.
3. I/0 Test - The I/0 should be tested using I/0 wrap
checks to insure all I/0 functions are operating
properly.
BITE should include features such as time-out counters, I/0 parity, power
monitoring circuits and storage protection.
7.1.1.2 Efficiency Estimation
The STP efficiency analysis procedure consists of several steps:
1) partition the computer into several independent modules as described above,
and obtain reliability data and circuit documentation for the components of
each module, 2) determine which sections have no effect on computer operation
(such as unused I/0 channels, the AGE interface or elapsed time counter),
3) determine the failure modes (such as nand gate stuck on 1) for each circuit,
and its detectability based on the STP program and BITE, 4) the STP efficiency
can then be determined as follows:
Let ij = occurrence rate of jth failure mode of ith circuit
Bij = detectability of jth failure mode of ith circuit
ni = quantity of ith component
Then the STP program efficiency is given by:
Z n. r X.. Total detectable
STP efficiency = 1 failure rate
i n j 13 Total failure
rate
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The maximum diagnosis time can be obtained from a sizing and
timing analysis of the STP program.
7.1.1.3 Typical Computers
Most computer manufacturers supply an STP program with an efficiency
of 95% (manufacturer supplied estimate) and diagnosis time of 10-30 milliseconds.
7.1.2 Program Integrity
The Program Integrity (PI) is the probability that a transient in the
memory will not result in any modification to the program. The rollahead/rollback
procedures correct any transient that doesn't destroy the program or last too
long. The program survivability parameter is used by the simulator in conjunc-
tion with the transient duration to estimate the rollahead/rollback success
probabilities, which in turn are used indirectly to estimate the transient
leakage.
7.1.2.1 CPU Faults
If the memory is not protected, then there is a small chance that a
CPU transient will result in a program modification, for it could cause indexing
errors resulting in incorrect address computations. Thus portions of critical
program segments (such as the landing module) not currently being executed could
be destroyed resulting in a lurking fault. This could cause a system failure
at a later time in the mission.
However, many contemporary aerospace computers have storage pro-
tection capability. This facility prevents the CPU from modifying the contents
of any protected storage locations.* Thus the chance that a CPU fault will
result in program modification is virtually zero, and the program survivability
to a CPU transient is essentially 100%.
The simulator currently assumes the existence of storage protection
in the candidate computer.
7.1.2.2 Memory
The program integrity for a particular computer memory is
dependent on its type and organization. A read-only memory offers the best
protection, as it provides a PI of 100%. The NDRO plated wire memory is not
Except under special conditions defined by the computer manufacturer.
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quite as good, but has a much better PI than a DRO core memory. The DRO
core memory is particularly bad since incorrect data obtained because of
a fault occurring during a read cycle is written back into memory during the
restore cycle resulting in non-intentional modification to the memory (program).
Trade off data for DRO and NDRO memories is discussed in Section 9.
7.1.2.3 PI Estimation
The program integrity is defined by
PI A Pr iThe program memory contents is not modified, given
that a transient failure has occurred in memory}
The program integrity can be estimated using a top-down procedure consisting
of the following steps: (1) partition the memory into its functional compo-
nents; (2) estimate the relative transient failure rate (Ti/T) for each
component; (3) estimate the probability (PI1) that when a transient occurs
in the ith memory component, no program word will be damaged; and (4) calculate
the program integrity using this formula
PI =. [(PIi)(Ti/T)] (Equation 1)
1
where
PIi - Pr {Program memory is not modified when a transient
occurs in the ith component in memory}
T i  Transient failure rate for the ith memory component
T = T i & Memory transient failure rate
1
The above formula is derived using the total law of probability which
states (PARZ 60)
if {Ai} is a set of mutually exclusive events
and Bc U A. Bc[AUA2U... UAn]
i
then Pr[B] =- Pr [BIA i] Pr [Ai]
7- 1
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From the above theorem, it follows that if {A } is a set of mutually
exclusive events and (BAC) CU A.
ithen Pr [BIC] = Pr [BI(CnAA)] Pr[A.|C] (Equation 2)
If we let
B = event that a program word is modified
C = event that a transient fault occurs in memory
th
and A. = event that a transient fault occurs in the i memory
component we have
PI = Pr [BIC] = Pr {Program memory is not modified given that a
transient has occurred in memoryl
PI. = Pr [BI(CnAi)] = Pr {Program memory is not modified given
that a transient has occurred in
the ith component}
i/T = Pr [AiC] = Pr {Transient occurs in the it h component
given that a transient has occurred in
memory}*
Equation 1 can be obtained from equation 2, by substitution, as is shown
below:
Pr [BIC] =Z Pr [BI(CnAi)] Pr [AilC]
PI = [( Pli) x ( T i/T)]
i
The program integrity can be determined systematically to whatever
level of detail is required. This is;because the PI determination procedure
is recursive, that is, the ith element can be partitioned into its components
or failure modes and an analogous procedure used for determining PIi from the
PI. .'s.
To obtain this result, we assumed that the transient inter-arrival times for
the memory and its components are exponentially-distributed random variables
with means of l/T and l/T i , respectively.
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PI i =- (PIij)( T ij/Ti)
where PI..ij = Pr {Memory word damaged given that a transient has
occurred in the jth subcomponent of the ith component}
ij = Transient failure rate of the jth subcomponent of the
ith component.
The PIij can be determined by further partitioning, or by using
engineering judgment to estimate the effect of the transient. In the latter
case, we taken into account any masking effects. For example, only a small
portion of the memory is used during a read/restore cycle, so transients
occurring in certain components (such as address drivers) will only cause
damage to a program word when the component is used during the duration of
the transient. In this case, PIij is one minus the probability that the faulty
component will be used during the transient duration and its use will result
in damage to a program word.
7.1.3 BITE Efficiency
The BITE efficiency is the probability that the built-in-test
equipment will detect the occurrence of a transient or permanent fault without
the aid of a diagnostic program. This parameter is used by the simulator to
determine the effect of rollback in simplex, and uncovered transients in duplex.
It has only a negligible effect on configurations of 3 or more operating compu-
ters. This parameter is needed separately for both the CPU and the memory.
7.1.3.1 CPU BITE Efficiency
The CPU BITE efficiency is about 5% for most typical aerospace
computers (excluding the power supply). In order to obtain a more accurate
figure, a detailed analysis of the organization and data flow of the CPU is
necessary. This parameter only has a third order effect on RCS survivability,
thus a detailed estimate is unnecessary.
7.1.3.2 Memory BITE Efficiency
The memory BITE efficiency can be estimated by a procedure similar
to the STP estimation procedure. Briefly, the following steps are necessary:
1. Partition the memory into components and obtain the
failure rate (.i) and quantity (n i) of each.
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2. Determine the important failure modes of each
component and its probability of occurrence (..ij).
3. Determine which failure modes can give a BITE
indication (such as parity). Let 8ij = 1 if the jth
failure mode of the ith component gives a BITE indication
and 0 if it doesn't.
4. The memory BITE efficiency is then given by the following
formula:
ni a 8ij Xij
Efficiency =
Zn. x.i 1
7.2 ANALYTIC MODEL
An iterative relationship developed from the mathematical model
is used to evaluate reconfigurable computer systems employing transient recovery.
It requires values for the following parameters:
1. The effective computer failure rate.
2. The recoverability for 2, 3 and more operating computers.
3. The transient leakage for 1, 2, 3 and more operating
computers.
7.2.1 Computer Effective Failure Rate
The computer effective permanent failure rate is the value of x used
in the analytic model for system evaluation purposes. This failure rate may
be different from that solely attributable to the computer. This comes about
because some HASW systems involve the use of computer-dedicated EEMs such that
an EEM failure prevents the proper operation of its associated computer.
Obtaining the computer effective permanent failure rate is accomplished
using these steps. First, an estimate is obtained of the computer failure rate.
This may be obtained from the manufacturer or may be estimated independently by
the evaluator. Second, a rough design of the EEM is prepared.* Next, the EEM
Assuming an actual design is not available.
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failure rate is estimated.. Then, the EEM design is analyzed and the portions
identified that, when failed, impair the computer's operation. The failure
rates of these portions are then added to the failure rate of the computer to
yield the effective failure rate. If, as is the case for some configurations,
other EEM failure impair bus operation, these failures are added to obtain a
bus effective failure rate.
7.22 Recoverability
This parameter is a measure of a redundant (N) computer system's
ability to recover to a less redundant (N-1) computer system from permanent
or leaky transient faults. The recoverability for 3 or more operating computers
is very close to 1.0 for a well designed system since a faulty computer is
immediately updated during the comparison. For a (residual) duplex system, a
self test program must be invoked to isolate the faulty computer, so the re-
coverability for duplex is dependent upon the STP efficiency.
The duplex recoverability is obtained as one of the outputs from the
simulator, which determines it by forming the ratio of the number of residual
simplex systems to the number of permanents and leaky transients in duplex.
7.2.3 Transient Leakage
The transient leakage represents the probability that a computer
will not completely recover from a transient, i.e. the system will mistake the
transient for a permanent fault and adapt from N to N-1 operating computers.
The simulator estimates the transient leakage for 1, 2 and 3 operating compu-
ters by determining the ratio of uncovered to covered transients in each case.
The transient leakage is dependent on the memory type, the transient duration,
and the transient recovery algorithms used.
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8.0 COMPLEMENTARY ANALYTIC-SIMULATIVE TECHNIQUE
8.1 OVERALL STRUCTURE
The analytic modeling approach described in Section 5 and the
simulation technique described in Section 6 each has its strengths and limi-
tations. However when these two system evaluation approaches are combined,
and supplemented by some engineering analysis, a very powerful technique re-
sults. The combination is illustrated in Figure 8.1-1.
This Complementary Analytic-Simulative Technique (CAST) evolved as
it became evident that neither analysis nor simulation alone could satisfy
all the RCS evaluation requirements. Analytic modeling provides flexibility
and rapid, economical data-generation. However.the solutions for some configu-
rations are very cumbersome and in certain cases the mathematical model formu-
lated is intractable. Simulation permits computer system details to be included
easily, but data generation is slow and expensive. CAST permits the user to
obtain the best features of both analytic modeling and simulation.
8.2 RCS ENGINEERING ANALYSIS
The RCS engineering analysis is performed to provide six categories
of information to the analytic modeling and the simulation. These information
categories are:
1. Configuration Particulars
2. Fault Environment
3. System Failure Criteria
4. Software Structure
5. Recovery Features
6. Test Features
The configuration particulars are: the computer system type, e.g.
adaptive or non-adaptive, etc.; the maximum number of machines; and the external
hardware utilized.
The items provided under the fault-environment category are: the
permanent-fault occurrence rate; the transient-fault occurrence rate; transient
duration; and occurrence rate for bursts of faults.
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ANALYSIS MEASURE
SIMULATION
FIGURE 8. 1-1 FAULT-TOLERANCE MEASURES CAN BE PRODUCED THROUGH
A COMBINATION OF ENGINEERING ANALYSIS, SIMULATION,
AND ANALYTIC MODELING
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There are three system failure criteria that may be applied. These
are: missed iterations; output not delivered in time; and/or a critical
computation missed.
The software structure information that is provided as a result
of the RCS engineering analysis includes the type of scheduling mechanism
employed in the executive, e.g. synchronous or asynchronous; and the general
sequence of the applications program segments.
Recovery features deal principally with the specification of which
recovery algorithms should be used and in what sequence. The six basic possi-
bilities are: rollahead; memory copy; rollback; system restart; system
adaptation; and spare introduction.
The final category of information produced by the RCS engineering
analysis is that of test features. This category includes information about:
self-test programs (e.g. effectiveness and maximum diagnosis time); the use of
error detecting, error-correcting codes; the use and effectiveness of built-in
test equipment; output results comparison; voting of output results; and
finally reasonableness tests.
8.3 SIMULATION
The results produced by the simulator developed have been described
in detail in Section 6.3. The reader is merely reminded here that the following
items are available as simulator outputs:
1. Permanent-fault coverage
2. Transient-fault coverage
3. Detectability
4. Diagnostability
5. Recoverability
8.4 ANALYTIC MODELING
The analytic modeling provides the following measures of fault-
tolerance:
1. Computer system survivability (or failure probability)
2. Computer system reliability
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Figure 8.4-1 is a summary diagram of CAST showing what is produced
by each of the three aspects of the technique.
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CONFIGURATION PARTICULARS
*COMPUTER SYSTEM TYPE
• MAXIMUM COMPLEXITY
* MODULARIZATION
*EXTERNAL HARDWARE
FAULT-TOLERANCE MEASURES
FAULT ENVIRONMENT * SURVIVABILITY
* PERMANENT OCCURRENCE * RELIABILITY
* TRANSIENT OCCURRENCE
* TRANSIENT DURATION
FAULTARCS ENVIRONMENT ANALYTIC FAULT-
ENGINEERING MODELINGMODELINGTIO TOLERANCE
FART ATIO MEASURES
SYSTEM FAILURE
CRITERIA
" MISSED ITERATIONS YSTEMS-
* TIME LOST FA I LURE
CRITERIA
.SOFTWARE
STRUCTURE
SOFTWARE STRUCTURE RECOVERY
* SYNCHRONOUS FEATURES
* ASYNCHRONOUS
EXECUTIVE TEST
FEATURES
MODELING.
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
TEST FEATURES
* SELF- TEST PROGRAMS MODELING PARAMETERS
* ERROR DETECTION/ * PERMANENT COVERAGE
CORRECTION CODES * TRANSIENT LEAKAGE
* HARDWARE BUILT-INTEST * DETECTABILITY
* COMPARISON OF RESULTS * DIAGNOSTABILITY
" VOTING RECOVERY FEATURES RECOVERABILITY
* REASONABLENESS TESTS *ROLLAHEAD
*ROLLBACK
*MEMORY COPY
*RESTART
FIGURE 8.4-1 CAST SUMMARY DIAGRAM
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9.0 CONFIGURATION ANALYSES AND TRADE-OFF STUDIES
9.1 GENERAL
The analyses and trade-off studies described below are presented
to show the merits of the various reconfigurable computer system organization
concepts and the effects of using the various reliability enhancement tech-
niques. Before presenting these analyses and trade-offs it is appropriate
to discuss the ground rules governing these studies.
The general application class for the RCS studied is that of a
machine that provides at least the capability sufficient to handle an all-
digital, fly-by-wire control system for a passenger-carrying airplane. The
decision was made to consider a machine that has a memory capacity of 16K,
32-bit words.* The general class of aerospace computers appropriate for this
application all supply at least that capability in one ATR enclosure. It is
also possible to satisfy the requirements of the four function classes of
attitude and flight-path control, area nagivation, communications, and air-
traffic control (with the exception of display) defined in RATN 73, in just
over 12K words, thus leaving 4K for the executive. Hence, we are not faced
with the problem of excessive memory requirements.
The configurations presented are not oriented toward particular
individual aerospace computers, but rather toward classes of machines. Thus
the results should not be construed as favoring a particular design.
One difficulty encountered in evaluating a computer configuration is
the treatment of sensor and/or actuator failures. This difficulty arises be-
cause of the diversity of devices, the particular devices employed, the total
number of devices, and the individual device redundancies. Because of these
complexities, it was decided to include a seminal capability in CAST (princi-
pally in the simulator portion) to model I/O devices, and to set I/O device
failure rates to zero for these studies.
* Appendix B contains descriptions of four representative machines.
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9.2 PARAMETERS USED FOR EVALUATION
Evaluation studies have been made for three classes of configurations:
a mostly-software configuration, a hardware-aided-software configuration and
a mostly-hardware configuration. The first set of configurations uses a 16K
memory and a computer with developed I/0 capabilities. The second and third
ones use only a 16K memory, but the computer has less I/0 capabilities.
When studying the influence of some parameters, we specify the con-
figuration and the varying parameters. Non-varying parameters are those indi-
cated in the table corresponding to the configuration.
Table 9.2-I is for mostly-software configurations. Table 9.2-II is
for hardware-aided-software configurations.
9.2.1 Mostly-Software Configurations (Table 9.2-I)
9.2.1.1 Physical Parameters
9.2.1.1.1 Design Decisions
The number of computers will always be specified. A software con-
figuration has no EEM. Each bus is supposed to be dedicated to a computer,
except otherwise specified.
Sensor redundancy is studied in Section 9.3.5.4. Otherwise, we
always separate them from our study.
9.2.1.1.2 Failure Characteristics
The failure rate (per million hours) comes from our evaluation of
a typical computer with high I/O capabilities*. The intercommunications module
failure rate is included into the CPU failure rate. This is due to the fact
that the results of such faults are bad outputs, as for CPU faults. The bus
has a typical failure rate of 6 per million hours.
Transient rates are supposed equal to permanent rates and the
transient duration is set to 1 ps. There is little data confirming these
assumptions. Section 9.3.6 shows a great sensitivity of the failure probabil-
ity to the transient rate and duration. This demonstrates the important need
of a better knowledge of the transient environment.
* A detailed failure-rate determination for one of the four representative
machines is presented in Appendix C.
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TABLE 9.2-1 LIST OF INPUT PARAMETERS FOR MOSTLY SOFTWARE CONFIGURATIONS
1) PHYSICAL PAROAMETRS 3) PARAMIETERS AFFECTIG FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION I THE COMPUTERS 5) TRANSIENT FAULT RECOVERY PARAMETERS
a) esign Decislfons a) Oetection Efficiency
Efficiency for Efficiency for l x ae Number
lsber of Cnoouters Nube. of Computers 3 or more 2 1 CPU Fault naory Fault Duration of Trials Time Limit In Use
Cedicated/Non Dedicated EM - Cparion 10 100% 0 (1) 30 .1 A 3000 s es(10)
be o EE BITE 51 5 51 Rollback 5 A4) Yes(
edlcat3e/on Dedicated Buses 0 Memory Copy 149999
mmber of EsCes Nemory BITE 451 45 45 .9999 2000 s3000 es9
ulner of External levices Per Bus 0 System Restart 1000 10 (10) 1000 s NA(14) (14) (0)
er of Spre Computers 0 b) Isolton Efflcency (g)  uration
b) Failure Characteristics ) PERMANENT FAULT RECOVERY ARAMETERS
Comparisons) (0) 0(10) Always done by switching off or ignoring the faulty computer
(3) p(3) (3) 1/(3) CPU BITE 51 5% once sthe p nent has been rcognized. If a spare Is available
CP (I) 450 NA(4) 40 1UMemory BITE 451 451
C (1) 450 ) 0 lsaNnossB ber of Computers 3 or more 2 1
*4mar (II) z2 9 ' 2O los (ETP)Memory () 200 A 200 s P) 98 Efficiency -1007 l  9 810 -OZ
EEd() (11) - NA(4) - Duration 0) 0 )  I  )
Buand External 4) PARLAMETES AFFECTING FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION I  THE EXTERIAL HARDREO 30
tevlces (IV) 6 1 A(4) O (
Impact of EE Fallure on Bus ) 11)
KINer of Faults in the Bus NImber of EIs 3 or more 2 1
'Iv Detection Efficiency 1001'1
0  
I.(A l 01 1 )
INaber of Faults in Each Isolation Efficiency 100
O
-A. FOOTROTE
External Device
Y b) Bus and External Devices (1) Implicit paremeter when each EE/bus is dedicated to (B) This parameter Is valid only for permnent faults. Olagosis Is
one computer. no help with transient faults.
- Bus (2) The bus by Itself Is considered as an external device. (5) Isolation efficiency Is 100,. once the fault has been detected in seple.2) ST E CHARACTERISTICS Number of Buses 3 or more 2 (3) A: permanent fault rate; : domannt fault rate. (10) Implicit parameters.n: transient fault rate; I/y: mon transient duratoa. (11) These parameters ae not appllcable with dedicated EN: In this case. faults
Sytection Efficiency 15001 
l )  
1000 0
( 0 )  (4) Non applicable when there is no spare. In th e EM re considered as eqol lent to CPU faults.SyihnoS/A i ync hronoos S
Scheduling Mehans Isolation Efficiency 100% N-A.1 (5) In this example. It Is ass that the four external (12) These parameters are 0 with a softwre TR since thiere Is no O.devices ave the sne fault rate. (13) Rolloheod Is used for 3 or mre corpters.Iteration Period 30 .s (6) Non applicable when synchronous schedllng. Rollack Is used for 2 or 1 couters.
inor Cycle urion E terl (7) These parameters re Implicit. Io ener, the 1001 (14) Ron apllicable.
or Cycle rat ber of Redundant Devices 3 or more 2 1 efficency s reached only after the whole ory (15) Rollhed is preceded by n imposed delay to allow the transen t to disstpate.major Ccle Our ohasf been ee mrced. i.e. aiter . ful mjor cycle.(In ters of iterations) 100 Detection Efficiency 1001l IO10 ) 0t1 Thus BITE fature ay speed up detecton. (16) Irrelent ohn EEN re dedicated.
Tine Beteen Co.risons S m Isolation Efficiency 100my
10  
- LA.
Noaxi S Down Tim 30 s
Relative Size of Mi no
Cycle Progr .2
Interrupt Rate
9.2.1.2 Software Characteristics
Except in Section 9.3.7, these parameters are constand and valid
for all configurations.
We have a synchronous scheduling mechanism. The sample period is
typical of a fly-by-wire and is 30 ms long. The minor cycle duration which
represents the duration of the computation repeated every period is 5 milli-
seconds long. A major cycle is a hundred periods long, i.e., 3 seconds long.
Comparisons take place every 5 ms. We suppose that the maximum down time is
30 milliseconds long. This means that two consecutive iteration misses cause
a system failure.
9.2.1.3 Parameters Affecting Fault Tolerance in the Computers
Ways of evaluating these parameters are explained in Section 7.
Diagnosis efficiency is given by the manufacturer. The values listed here
are typical of a computer with high I/0 capabilities.
9.2.1.4 Parameters Affecting Fault Tolerance in the External Hardware
As stated in 9.2.1.1.1, there are no EEM and no external devices in
this configuration.
We suppose that the system needs two busses to perform satisfactorily.
This corresponds to an isolation efficiency of 0% when only two busses are
left.
9.2.1.5 Transient Fault Recovery Parameters
We suppose that 70% of a DRO memory transient fault affects the
content of a memory word, thus impairing rollahead and rollback efficiency.
A rollahead lasts .1 ms and a rollback 5 ms (time between comparison).
The memory copy has an efficacy of .9999. This corresponds to the
very low probability that the little routine bootstrapping the memory copy
recovery be itself destroyed. A memory copy lasts 2 seconds which roughly
corresponds to copying one word every 100 microseconds.
We allow for only 1 rollback. This means that if the rollback is
unsuccessful, adaptation to simplex is attempted. This is reasonable since
we supposed a transient duration of 1 microsecond.
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The recurrence intervals are 3 seconds long, or one major cycle.
We suppose that during one major cycle the whole program memory is exercised.
Thus, it is unlikely to mistake a permanent for a transient. This would
happen if the permanent was redetected after more than 3 seconds, following
an unsuccessful recovery attempt.
9.2.1.6 Permanent Fault Recovery Parameters
The manufacturer gives the efficiency and duration of the diagnostic
routine.
9.2.1.7 Modeling Parameters
Simulation of the mostly-software configurations results in the
following modeling parameter values:
Parameter Value
91 0.87
X2 0.37
-4
z3,k4'"5 10
4
v2  0.94
w2  0.8
w3 ,w4 ,w5  1
A total of more than ten million missions were simulated during the simula-
tion runs performed on this contract. When the state of the configuration
consisted of three or more working computers there were no faults that
directly resulted in system failure.
9.2.2 Hardware-Aided-Software Configurations (Table 9.2-II)
Most of the considerations of Section 9.2.1 are still valid except
that now we consider a computer with minimum I/O capabilities.
9.2.2.1 Physical Parameters
9.2.2.1.1 Design Decisions
The EEM's and the busses in a HASW system may or may not be
dedicated.
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9.2.2.1.2 Failure Characteristics
The computer has a lower failure rate than for a mostly-software
configuration. The failure rate of the EEMs partially makes the difference.
The complexity of an EEM should be less than the complexity of the inter-
communication module of the computer used in Section 9.2.1.
We suppose that in 60% of the cases, the loss of the EEM will cause
the loss of the bus since the EEM outputs wrong data.
9.2.2.2 Software Characteristics
See Section 9.2.1.2.
9.2.2.3 Parameters Affecting Fault Tolerance in the Computers
The main difference from the software case is that we assume a
machine with memory parity which raises the memory BITE efficiency to 80
percent.
9.2.2.4 Parameters Affecting Fault Tolerance in the External Hardware
In the case of non-dedicated EEMs, we assume that hardware config-
urations require two EEMs to be fault free before system failure. This
corresponds to an isolation efficiency of 0% when two EEMs are left.
9.2.2.5 Fault Recovery Parameters
The same remarks as in 9.2.1.5 and 9.2.1.6 are still valid.
9.2.2.6 Modeling Parameters
Simulation of the hardware-aided software configurations results
in the following modeling parameter values:
Parameter Value
1 0.87
R2 0.45
P32 4'"5 10- 4
v2  0.90
w2  0.90
w3 ,w4 ,w 5  1
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TABLE 9.2-11 LIST OF INPUT PARAMETERS FOR HARDWARECONFIGURATIONS
1) PHYSICAL PAUOrNTES 3) PARAMETERS AFFECTING FAULT DITECTION AND ISLAT1IOM IN THE COMPUTERS 5) TRANSIENT FAULT RECOVERY PARAMETERS
a) It Decision a) Detection Effcncy Efficiency fr Efficiency fr lber
CPU Fault Memory Fault Durtion of Trials Tim Limit In Use
nmber of Couter N~b.er of Computers 3 or more 2 1 NA(14) 0Roboh o f Comoute's a ad 1 .Is I 1000 as Yes{I O)
ticatditedj1o 8 EDOs Ca parisons )  1001 100 0% Rollback - 0(10) .305 0)
Rollback 501 e nO
.berr of EONs CPU BITE 5y 5 5opy 
__
1
_ _ 2000 .s 14) 3001) ms .1
Dedicated/% Dedicated Buse Mry BITE S 80 1 .9999
1Uaber of r TseEo O B0
0.aer of Et.rrl devices Per Bus R Syten Restart 100(10) 100(10) 1000 s P(14) L(14)
Iander of SpOe Comauters b) Isolation Efficiency (9)
Humber of Computers 3 or more 2 6) PERMANENT FAULT RECOVERY PARAETERS
) Failure Characteristics C aro n  100(10) (10) Always done by switching off or ignoring the faulty computer,
once the pemanent hs been recognized. If a spare Is &vailabit,
1(3) ) (3 ) C PU BITE S -t 5S 1t Is slitched n.
I~ery BITE BO 80s
CPU (I) 200 NA 200 ls ii hmber of Computers 3 or oare 2
MeNory (11) 250 I 250 l Tn I 97.5 11 Efficiency I 10- 0 S
)
E 97.51
E I(12) (II) 100 NA' 100 los Oraton 00 d1 as ()
U 4o () ) 0 4) PARAMETERS AFFECTING FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION IN THE EXTERNAL HARD 3IBE
CvIces (IV) (4) EDI
lmpact of EEM Failure on But 6
nnber of FauOts in the Bus I I nber of ENs 3 or more 2 1
'IV Detection Efficiency 100%
( 10 ) 100(10) 00 I
Fat in Ec FOOTOTES
u er of faults in ch. Isolation Efficency 1001"0 0 -T
xteral Device
IV b) (1) Implicit paemeter when each EEN/bus Is dedicated to (8) This prarmeter s valid omly for permanent faults. Diagnosis Is
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A total of more than ten million missions were simulated during the simula-
tion runs performed on this contract. When the state of the configuration
consisted of three or more working computers, there were no faults that
directly resulted in system failure.
9.2.3 Mostly-Hardware Configurations
These configurations use the same computers as those described in
Section 9.2.2. Thus, most of the parameters are the same. However, the
complexity of the EEM increases and the failure rate of the EEMs has been
estimated in this case to be 200 per million hours.
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9.3 GENERATION OF RESULTS
9.3.1 Assessed Configurations
The configurations assessed are mostly-software, hardware-aided-
software and mostly-hardware with 3, 4, and 5 computers plus a duplex
configuration.
The computers are all adaptive in that whenever two computers are
remaining, the system enters a residual duplex mode as described in Section
2.2.2.
Hardware configurations require two EEMs to be fault free before
system failure.
Two busses are required to be fault free for hardware and software
configurations. The case of adaptation of busses from duplex to simplex when
detection coding and I/0 wrap is used is also considered.
9.3.1.1 quintuplex Configurations
Table 9.3-I is a summary of quintuplex configuration assessments.
The entries are ordered in increasing 10-hour failure probability. Under
"configuration type," HASW represents hardware-aided-software, MSW represents
mostly-software, and MHW represents mostly-hardware. The number under
"computers," "EEMs," and "busses" indicate the redundancy of that device.
The two dedication columns indicate whether members of the neighboring
columns are dedicated or not (DED is dedicated while N/D is non-dedicated).
The table represents 14 different configurations.
Figures 9.3-1 and 9.3-2 are plots of the failure probabilities
versus mission time and extended mission time, respectively, for the con-
figurations in Table 9.3-I. The curves are identified by numbers correspond-
ing to the "number" column of Table 9.3-I.
Figure 9.3-1 shows failure probability as the ordinate on a
logarithmic scale between 10-12 and 10-5. The abscissa is an equal increment
scale of mission time from 1 to 25 hours. Figure 9.3-2 is on log-log scale
with failure probability shown from 10-10 to 10-2 and mission time from 1
to 1000 hours.
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TABLE 9.3-I SUMMARY OF QUINTUPLEX CONFIGURATION ASSESSMENTS
10 HOURCONFIGURATION FAILURENUMBER TYPE COMPUTERS DEDICATION EEMs DEDICATION BUSSES PROBABILITY
1 HASW 5 N/D 5 N/D 5 6.65(10) -10
2 HASW 5 N/D 5 DED 5 6.71(10) -10
3 HASW 5 N/D 5 N/D 4 1.37(10)-9
4 HASW : 5 DED 5 N/D 5 1.50(10)-9
5 MHW 5 N/D 5 N/D 4 1.59(10) -9
6 HASW 5 DED 5 DED 4 2.20(10)-9
7 MHW 5 DED 5 DED or N/D 5 2.90(10)-9
8 MHW 5 DED 5 N/D 4 3.60(10)-9
9 MSW 5 N/D - - 5 4.90(10) -9
10 MSW 5 DED - - 5 5.06(10)-9
11 HASW 5 N/D 4 N/D 5 2.02(10)-8
12 HASW 5 N/D 4 N/D 4 2.09(10) -8
13 HASW 5 N/D 4 DED 4 2.23(10)-8
14 HASW 5 N/D 4 N/D 3 9.60(10)-7
Mission Time (Hours)
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Figure 9.3-3 shows the effect of adaptive busses in quintuplex con-
figurations. Adaptive busses are achieved by error-detecting coding on the
busses and the use of I/O wrap. When down to duplex busses, codes on I/O
wrap can identify a faulty bus. All curves are HASW. Curves 1 and 2 repre-
sent dedicated EEMs with either 3 or 4 busses. Curve 3 represents a dedi-
cated EEM with 5 busses. Curves 4, 5, and 6 represent 5 non-dedicated EEMs
with 3 busses, 4 busses, and 5 busses, respectively.
9.3.1.2 Quadruplex Configurations
Table 9.3-II is a summary of the quadruplex configurations. The
entries are ordered by increasing failure probability. An explanation of
the columns of the table is given in Section 9.3.1.1 for quintuplex
configurations.
Figures 9.3-4 and 9.3-5 are plots of the failure probabilities
versus mission time and extended mission time, respectively, for the con-
figurations in Table 9.3-II. The curves are identified by the numbers in
the "number" column of Table 9.3-II.
Figure 9.3-6 shows the effect of adaptive busses in quadruplex
configurations. All curves are HASW. Curves 1 and 3 represent dedicated
EEMs with 3 and 4 busses, respectively. Curves 2 and 4 represent non-dedicated
EEMs with 3 and 4 busses, respectively.
9.3.1.3 Triplex Configurations
Table 9.3-III is a summary of the triplex configurations. Duplex
and TMR configurations are shown as well. The entries are ordered in in-
creasing failure probability. An explanation of the columns of the table
is given in Section 9.3.1.1. The failure probability for configuration
number 6, the MSW with dedicated busses, is verified by simulation. Some
entries represent more than one configuration with the same failure
probability.
Figures 9.3-7 and 9.3-8 are plots of the failure probabilities
versus mission time and extended mission time, respectively, for the config-
urations listed in Table 9.3-III with the exception of TMR and duplex. TMR
and duplex curves will be shown in Section 9.3.2. The curves are identified
by the number in the "number" column of Table 9.3-III.
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TABLE 9.3-II SUMMARY OF QUADRUPLEX CONFIGURATION ASSESSMENTS
10 HOUR
CONFIGURATION FAILURE
NUMBER TYPE COMPUTERS DEDICATION EEMs DEDICATION BUSSES PROBABILITY
1 HASW 4 N/D 5 N/D 4 9.67(10) -8
2 HASW 4 N/D 4 DED or N/D 4 1.08(10) -7
3 MHW 4 N/D 4 DED or N/D 4 1.45(10) -7
4 HASW 4 DED 4 DED or N/D 4 1.71(10) -7
5 MHW 4 DED 4 DED or N/D 4 2.75(10)-7
6 MSW 4 N/D - - 4 4.56(10) -7
c-7 MSW 4 DED - 4 4.68(10) -7
8 HASW 4 N/D 5 N/D 4 8.76(10)-7
9 HASW 4 N/D 4 N/D 4 8.87(10) -7
10 HASW 4 DED 4 N/D 3 9.49(10) -7
11 HASW 4 N/D 3 DED 3 6.48(10)-6
12 HASW 4 N/D 3 N/D 3 6.74(10)-6
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TABLE 9.3-III .SUMMARY OF TRIPLEX CONFIGURATION ASSESSMENTS
10 HOUR
CONFIGURATION FAILURE
NUMBER TYPE COMPUTERS DEDICATION EEMs DEDICATION BUSSES PROBABILITY
1 HASW 3 N/D 4 N/D or DED 3 or 4 1.48(10) -5
2 HASW 3 N/D 3 N/D or DED 3 1.86(10)-5
3 HASW 3 DED 3 N/D or DED 3 2.05(10)-5
4 MHW 3 N/D 3 N/D or DED 3 2.71(10) - 5
-5
5 MHW 3 DED 3 N/D or DED 3 2.84(10)
6 MSW 3 N/D - 3 or 4 4.4(10) -5
7 MSW 3 DED 3 4.5(10) - 5
8 HASW 3 N/D 3 N/D 3 1.3(10) - 4
Non/Adaptive"
9 Duplex 2 6(10) - 4
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FOR NON-ADAPTIVE BUSSES
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In the triplex case, adding adaptive busses does not significantly
decrease the failure probability, since most system failures are in the
computers and EEMs.
9.3.2 Effect of Redundancy
Figure 9.3-9 shows that added redundancy yields a large improve-
ment in failure probability. Here failure probability is shown versus
extended mission time. The curves represent configurations as shown below:
1. Quintuplex with five EEMs and four busses.
2. Quintuplex with four EEMs and four busses.
3. Quadruplex with five EEMs and four busses.
4. Quadruplex with four EEMs and four busses.
5. Triplex with four EEMs and three busses.
6. Triplex with three EEMs and three busses.
7. TMR with three EEMs and three busses.
8. Duplex
Computers, EEMs, and busses are non-dedicated.
The results are summarized as shown below:
10 Hour
Failure Probability
Improvement Ratio
Configuration Over Simplex
Duplex 4.3
TMR 24
Triplex 160
Quadruplex 2.4(10)4
Quintuplex (4EEM) 1.2(10)5
Quintuplex (5EEM) 1.7(10)6
It is interesting that each increment of redundancy gives about
two orders of magnitude improvement in failure probability.
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9.3.3 Effect of Non-Unity Recoverability
A recoverability (wi) of 1 has been assumed in the generated
results. Errors in recovery algorithms or single point failures could cause
a recoverability of less than 1.
Figure 9.3-10 shows how recoverability can affect failure proba-
bility in a plot over an extended mission time. The curves are identified
by numbers on the figure as follows:
1. Triplex with wi = .99
2. Quadruplex with wi = .99
3. Quintuplex with w. = .99
4. Triplex with wi = .999
5. Quadruplex with wi = .999
6. Quintuplex with wi = .999
7. Triplex with wi = .9999
8. Quadruplex with wi = .9999
9. Quintuplex with wi = .9999
10. Triplex with wi = 1
11. Quadruplex with wi = .99999
12. Quintuplex with wi = .99999
13. Quadruplex with wi = .999999
14. Quintuplex with w. = .999999
15. Quadruplex with w i = .9999999
16. Quintuplex with wi = .9999999
where i = 3, 4, 5. Here we exclude busses and dedicate the EEMs.
The figure shows that short mission times are affected more by non-
unity recoverability. Also the survivability gained by added redundancy can
be overshadowed by recoverability. When recoverability is the greatest contrib-
utor to failure, then redundancy becomes a disadvantage as can be seen from
the initial mission hours of curves 1, 2 and 3.
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9.3.4 Effects of Adaptivity
Adaptive configurations can adjust to a new fault tolerant scheme
when units have been recorded as faulty. More adaptable systems admit more
faults than less adaptable systems, increasing their discrete fault tolerance.
(Discrete fault tolerance also depends on the level of redundancy.) Adapta-
bility allows an improvement in failure probability while non-adaptability
causes a degradation at the same level of redundancy.
Table 9 .3-IV summarizes the effects of adaptabi+ lity Quintuplx,
quadruplex, and triplex imply adaptive cases where voting in the prime method
of fault detection and diagnosis with three or more fault free computers.
A residual duplex mode is entered when two computers remain. Two out of N
and TMR configurations have no residual duplex, while QMR is a non-adaptive
3 out of 5 vote.
It is interesting that QMR has five computers and a greater failure
probability than the four computer configurations. This is because it has
a discrete fault tolerance no greater than quadruplex and more computers to
have faults.
Figure 9.3-11 shows the effects of adaptivity on failure probability
over extended mission times.
9.3.5 Effects of RETs
The method to study the RETs consists in identifying the input
parameters which are affected by the introduction of each RET. Then simula-
tion runs are made with parameters representing the presence and the absence
of these RETs. When possible, an alternative method consists in computing
the impact of modifying one parameter in one run, thus avoiding one simulation
run. From these runs, we get different sets of parameters which are used for
analytical modeling.
9.3.5.1 DRO Versus NDRO
Three cases of hardware aided software NMR have been studied. The
three systems are identical except for the memory and one recovery algorithm.
The first one has DRO memory and no memory copy. This is why many transients
in multiplex cannot be corrected. The second one does include a memory copy.
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TABLE 9.3-IV SUMMARY OF THE EFFECTS OF ADAPTABILITY
Failure Probability
10 Hour Degradation Ratio
Failure (With Respect Discrete
Configuration Probability To The Adaptive Case) Fault Tolerance
Quintuplex 1(10) - 9  1 4
5 2 out of 5 6(10)lO 9  6 3
Computers 6
o QMR (3 out of 5) 1.5(10) 6  1500 2
r,
-4
4 Quadruplex 1,4(10) - 7  1 3
Computers 2 out of 4 7(10) - 7  5 2
3 Triplex 2(10) - 5  1 2
Computers TMR 1.3(1 )-4 6.5 1
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Most transients are corrected and the leakage is very low. Finally the third
system has a NDRO memory, and of course, no memory copy. We assume that the
technology involved in NDRO memories implies slightly higher failure rate and
that transients changing a memory content accounts for 1% of all memory tran-
sient. Furthermore runs are made with 2 different values for the transient
duration: 1 microsecond and 1 mill-isecond. Results of the simulation are
indicated in Table 9.3-V.
Fault DRO. (A=250 10-6) DRO (x=250 10-6) NDRO (x=300 10-6)
Duration No Memory Copy Memory Copy No Memory Copy
1 12 13=14= 5 1 13=14 5 11 2 345
11s .87 .33 .33 .87 .33 10-4  .51 10-2 10-2
Ims .87 .45 .45 .87 .45 10-4  .51 .20 .20
TABLE 9.3-V LEAKAGE COEFFICIENTS
It appears that using a NDRO improves dramatically the leakages
in duplex. and simplex. However it decreases.slightly the leakage in multi-
plex (due to the absence of memory copy) and also increases the failure rate
of the memory. Thus, we need using the analytical model to draw more precise
conclusions.
Figures 9.3-12 - 9.3-14 illustrate the results obtained for duplex,.
triplex, quadruplex and quintuplex. These curves plot the 10-hour failure
probability versus the transient fault rate for different types of memory
and various recovery algorithms and fault durations. In this section we are
interested only in the influence of the type of memory. We examine the curves
whose last digits are either 6 or 7. It appears that an NDRO memory improves
the system survivability in most of the cases. It does not if the transient
rate is very low. This may also be verified by comparing curves 2 and 4. This
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is due to the fact that the main advantage of NDRO is to enhance the proba-
fility of recovery from a transient fault in duplex. It can also be noted that
the improvement is more dramatic in triplex than in quintuplex because a
triplex system has a higher probability todegrade to duplex. The other
curves are described in Section 9.3.6.
9.3.5.2 Effects of BITE
Built-in-test equipments permit detection and isolation of a
fault in a computer without using such devices as voters and comparators nor
a diagnosis routine.
Even though it may decrease slightly the time between occurrence of
a fault and its detection, it has no measurable effect in a multiplex system.
In duplex BITE are essential. They make possible to isolate many
transient faults which could not be isolated through diagnosis, since the
transient would have disappeared when the diagnosis is run (improvement of
diagnostibility 
v2)'
In simplex BITE are also essential, since they provide the only way
to detect transients (improvement of leakage 11).
Effects of BITE are given for two software adaptive TMR configura-
tions. We see that improving duplex and simplex does improve an adaptive TMR.
This improvement would be less significant with quadruplex and especially
quintuplex since it is unlikely that such configurations degrades down to a
simplex. Table 9.3-VI shows the improvements due to BITE for a software
adaptive TMR. Similar results could be obtained with a hardware configuration.
v 1-11 Failure Probability2 1 After 100 Hours
BITE 90% 8% 19x10 -4
No BITE 71% 0% 55x10-4
TABLE 9.3-VI EFFECTS OF BITE
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9.3.5.3 Effects of Diagnostics
Diagnostics are not useful in multiplex since voting provides isola-
tion of a fault. In duplex, they are essential since they provide isolation
of a fault, once it has been detected through comparison. In simplex, they can
be used if they are run periodically. However they will catch very few tran-
sients. Their only usefulness is that they can provide a warning that the
system has failed.
Effects of diagnostics are assessed by simulating a configuration
with diagnostics. Counting the number of times a diagnostic routine is called
and dividing by 2 provides the number of failures due to the absence of
diagnostics. Table 9.3-VII gives the results for two adaptive softwareN-plex
configurations.
Quadruplex Triplex
Diagnostibility
F(100) F(10) F(100) v2
Diagnostics 18x10-5  15x10-6  19x10 -4  90%
No Diagnostics 56x10-5  58x10-6  44x10-4  61%(But BITE are
present)
TABLE 9.3-VII FAILURE PROBABILITIES AFTER 10 AND 100 HOURS FORQUADRUPLEX AND TRIPLEX WITH AND WITHOUT DIAGNOSTICS
9.3.5.4 Codes and I/O Wraparound
In order to include error correcting/detecting codes in the candi-
date computers, extensive hardware modification is required. This is not
within the realm of "off-the-shelf computers" and will not be considered here.
Single error detecting codes in memory (parity) are built into some of the
candidate computers and are considered as a part of BITE. Codes and I/O wrap-
around checks are useful for error detection and fault masking in the I/O
system.
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Single error correcting/double error detecting codes allows one
fault to occur before the hardware becomes inoperative. The reliability
model to be used for the area covered by the code is
R = e-AT (l+cXT)
where X= failure rate of the bus and the code generating and decoding
circuitry.
In the configurations we have assessed three or more redundant
serial busses were postulated. Section 9.3.1 showed the effect of adding
detecting codes and I/0 wrap to the bus (allows adaptability). Error
correcting codes on serial busses are not practical because bus faults will
probably affect more than one bit.
To show the effect of error correcting codes on busses, we use a
four-bit, byte-serial bus as a strawman. We compare a simplex error-
correcting bus with a duplex error-detecting bus. The simplex bus requires
7 wires plus coding/decoding circuitry which yields a failure rate of 7 x 6
failures per 106 hours = 42. The duplex bus requires 4 wires per bus plus
detection/diagnosis circuitry for a failure rate of 4 x 6 failures per 106
hours = 24 per bus.
Figure 9.3-15 shows coded simplex versus duplex for various values
of coverage. Coded simplex is slightly better with non-unity coverage because
of the lower total failure rate, A TMR bus is included with duplex coverage
values of 0 and .9 with X= 56.
9.3.5.5 Reasonableness Tests and Sensor Redundancy Management
Sensors may be either self-checking error-indicating or non self-
checking. Multiple non-checking sensors require at least three to resolve a
faulty sensor when comparison is used for error detection. Selection of the
median sensor value is a good method of generating a common input for all
computers. Median selection masks the effect of a sensor that has deviated
by a large amount from the true value while averaging weighs the effect of all
sensors equally. Any sensor that deviates more than a fixed amount from the
median is indicated as faulty. Deferring final judgment on whether a sensor
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has permanently failed until fault indications appear two or more times in
a row reduces the number of sensor transients recorded as permanent.
Reasonableness tests can provide a method of isolating a faulty
sensor when one or two copies are in use. The tests check if the difference
in successive sensor values do not exceed a specified limit. In some cases,
a total system analysis is required to resolve a faulty sensor.
Truncation of least significant bits is not a good method of resolv-
ing sensor values. It is possible for two binary values to differ by one
arithmetically and to have no bit positions that are equal.
In order to provide a feeling of the usefulness of the reasonable-
ness tests, the following simulation runs have been made. The system is a
software TMR (Table 9.2-I) where we include a sensor whose failure rate is
650 faults per mission hours (equal to the computer failure rate). In the
first run we suppose there is no way of deciding which sensor is good if there
are only two of them working and they disagree. In the second run, in 80% of
the cases, the system is able to decide which sensor is good. Finally, we
also compare with results obtained when sensors are supposed to be perfect.
The results are listed in Table 9.3-VIII.
TABLE 9.3-VIII EFFECTS OF REASONABLENESS TESTS
Failure Probability
After 10 Hours
Sensor No Reasonableness Test 100x10 -6
Sensor Reasonableness Test 42x10-6
Perfect Sensors 15xlO-6
A sensor may be dedicated to one input bus or be available to all
busses. If sensors are dedicated to busses and busses to computers, then the
loss of one computer causes the loss of all sensors on the bus associated
with the computer. The less dedication there is, the better it is, as can
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be seen from Table 9.3-IX. We have made two simulation runs. In the first
run, sensors are dedicated to busses and busses to computers. In the second
run, sensors are non dedicated. In both cases, reasonableness are present.
TABLE 9.3-IX EFFECTS OF NON-DEDICATED SENSORS
Failure Probability
After 10 Hours
Dedicated Sensors 94x10-6
Non-Dedicated Sensors 42x10-6
Perfect Sensors 15x10-6
9.3.5.6 Voters, Adaptive Voters, and Comparators
Voters have the capability of polling the output of N elements
and "voting" a consensus output when M elements agree (N M). Adaptive
voters differ from voters in that N and M may vary during a mission.
Adaptive voters give rise to adaptive configurations while voters are used
for "NMR" configurations. One type of voter is required for configurations
of three or more computers in either a hardware or software implementation.
A variation in the type of voter used implies a change of configuration.
Voting is evaluated in Section 9.3.4.
Comparators are used in duplex configurations and may have either
a hardware or software implementation. Hardware comparators may or may not
have a self-checking feature. The self-checking feature signals the computers
when the comparator fails and allows a switch to simplex.
If self-checking comparators fail, the duplex system will recognize
this failure and degrade to simplex since error detection by comparison is
no longer possible.
If non-self-checking comparators fail, an erroneous disgareement
signal will be generated. A rollback will be attempted and will apparently
fail. Diagnosis will be inconclusive, since no computer is faulty. The
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monitor will select a computer for simplex by a coin flip, and of course,
will select a fault free one. Therefore, self-checking comparators only allow
the system to recognize a comparator failure without going through the trauma
of an inconclusive diagnosis.
9.3.5.7 Dedicated/Non-Dedicated I/0 Units
The impact of dedicating the not dedicating I/0 units is shown in
Section 9.3.1. Several configurations where computers, EEM's, and I/0 busses
are and are not dedicated are evaluated. The results show that it is best
to not dedicate computers to EEM's, but failure probability improvement is
achieved by dedicating EEM's to busses.
9.3.5.8 Independent Hardware Monitor
The independent hardware monitor (IHM) may have one of three
purposes:
1. As a laboratory tool to test system performance,
2. As a fault recorder to aid in ground maintenance, and
3. As an error checking device to signal a system error.
The first two purposes, although useful, are not in the realm of fault
tolerance. It is important, however, that the system has no faults prior
to a mission.
In fault-tolerant computer design, the designer identifies all the
possible faults that can occur in the system and labels it the fault set.
A fault-tolerant design then protects the system from faults within the fault
set. Overlooked faults and hardware and software design errors that have not
been uncovered during checkout can cause a system failure. These causes of
system failure cannot be exactly quantified because they would be corrected
if they are identified. For modeling purposes, the probability of such an
event is taken to be much smaller than the overall failure probability during
the mission.
The IHM can detect some system faults by reasonableness tests. The
tests would verify that the difference between the present outputs and the
previous outputs does not exceed a specified limit. The effectiveness of the
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tests depends on the application, and we estimate them to be between 25 and
75 percent effective. The IHM can also serve as a limit detector on the
actuators.
If the failure is due to a software error, redundant algorithms
could be used for critical programs. The only recourse from a failure of the
alternate computations is a system restart.
9.3.6 Effects of Transients
In order to enhance the reliability of the system, transient
recovery should be provided. If not, transient faults would have the same
effect as permanent and would cause the loss of a computer. Furthermore,
transients are very difficult to diagnose and thus lack of provision for
transient recovery in duplex would decrease the diagnostibility.
Once transient recovery has been decided, the algorithms have still
to be chosen. Here, it will be seen that the distribution and the duration
of transients are important and should be known if best results are to
be obtained.
9.3.6.1 Introduction of Transient Recovery
In Figures 9.3-12 - 9.3-14, curves whose last digit is a 1 repre-
sent the survivability of HASW system without any kind of transient recovery
(except adaptability). It can readily be seen that introducing a transient
recovery algorithm (even a bad one) always improves dramatically the surviv-
ability. This improvement is even more than it appears on these plots since
the curves without transient recovery do not take into account the decrease
in duplex diagnostibility.
9.3.6.2 Transient Recovery Algorithms
9.3.6.2.1 Duplex
The recovery procedure in duplex is the rollback. On Figure 9.3-14
curves 2.2 (interrupted by the crash of the system where the plotting was
done), 2.3 and 2.7 illustrate improvement due to rollback. Curve 2.7
corresponds to a NDRO memory where rollback is very efficient since transients
causing program memory damage are very rare.
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9.3.6.2.2 Multiplex
For the cases with 3 or more computers, rollback is repJaced by
rollahead. Thus computation is not interrupted. Comparing, for example,
curves 3.1 and 3.2 or 3.3 of Figure 9.3-14 shows the improvement due to
introduction of recovery algorithm in an adaptive TMR. However, rollahead
does not correct those transients which damage the memory. That is why the
memory copy is introduced (curves 3.5 and 3.6). Another solution consists
in replacing the DRO memory by a NDRO memory (curve 3.7).
9.3.6.3 Influence of Transient Duration
The plots of Figures 9.3-12 - 9.3-14 illustrate what happens
when the average transient duration is 1 micro- and 1 millisecond. Results
are always worse in the case of a long transient. This is due to the fact
that the recovery begins when the transient is still active, thus causing the
recovery not to be successful. In order to avoid that, a delay can be intro-
duced between detection and start of recovery (see Section 5.4.7).
9.3.6.4 Influence of Bursts of Transients
Up to now, it was always assumed that transients arrived isolated
in time, according to the transient fault rate. When transient faults arrive
in bursts, it is supposed that during a short period (of the order of a
second) many transients hit the same unit. This corresponds to a component
who.would work for a while at the limits of its tolerance specifications.
We have made one simulation run supposing that the memory of the
computers could be hit by bursts. We suppose that there are 80 bursts per
million hours. A burst in average lasts half a second and during a burst the
transient fault rate is 5 per second. Thus, on the average, there are 200
transients per million hours in the memory. It can be seen that this is a
mild burst environment. Other inputs were the same as for the software TMR
of Table 9.2-I. No other transients hit the memories.
Results are intriguing: the system degrades to duplex 5 percent
more often than without burst. This is due to the fact that many bursts are
mistaken as permanents. The number of times a diagnostic is called is in-
creased by 8 percent. Thus a non-adaptive TMR system in a burst environment
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would have an 8 percent larger system failure probability than the same
system without bursts. However, the diagnostibility is improved by the bursts.
This is due to the fact that a diagnostic routine is likely to return a fault
indication. This increase in diagnostibility makes the adaptive TMR in a
burst environment more reliable than in a Poisson environment.
A way to decrease the probability of mistaking a transient for
a permanent would be to decrease the "Recurrence Interval." The recurrence
interval (3s) is used in the following way: if a fault is redetected less
than 3 seconds after its recovery attempt, it is assumed that the fault is
permanent. Decreasing the recurrence interval would obviously help for
burst. Decreasing the recurrence interval too much would cause the system to
continue to attempt transient recovery on a permanent fault.
The wide variations in the results of this section show that a
better knowledge of the transient environment is necessary in -order to
optimize transient recovery. A second conclusion is that NDRO is an
excellent protection against transient damage.
9.3.7 Scheduling Effects
Fault recovery is not an instantaneous action. Thus, a fault
recovery may cause the system to miss some iteration(s). If it is not
catastrophic to miss a few consecutive iterations, then all properly designed
systems will tolerate fault recovery without problems. However, if for the
safety of the flight, it is dangerous to miss more than one iteration, then
the scheduling may be an important factor in the survivability.
We have studied 3 cases of software TMR: 2 synchronous schedulings
and one asynchronous. In all cases, we suppose that the basic iteration period
is 30 ms and that the major cycle lasts 100 periods.
The first synchronous case corresponds to a light load and a fast
comparison: the minor cycle lasts 5 ms and comparisons also take place every
5 ms.
The second case corresponds to a heavy load and a slow comparison:
the minor cycle lasts 15 ms and comparison also takes place every 15 ms.
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The third case is an asynchronous scheduling: major cycle tasks can
be interrupted by minor cycle tasks which last an average of 5 ms. Comparisons
also occur every 5 ms. The major difference between asynchronous and synchronous
scheduling is that since a minor cycle task can interrupt a major cycle task,
a fault may cause damage in more than one program and thus be detected more
than once.
In all cases, it is assumed that a system failure occurs when 2
or more iterations are successively missed. Results are given in Table 9.3-X.
Triplex Duplex Failure
Leakage Leakage Diagnostibility Probability
e3 2 v2 After 100 Hours
Synchronous 4 -4
Light Load 10 21.5% 90% 19x10
Synchronous -4
Heavy Load 10-4  21.5% 73% 41x10
AsynchrOnous 10-3  21.5% 87% 21x10 -4
TABLE 9.3-X EFFECTS OF SCHEDULING
A heavy load is not a problem in triplex (or 4-plex and 5-plex)
since recovery does not interrupt significantly the normal flow of computation.
However, in duplex the situation is quite different. Since comparisons take
place every 15 ms, rollback duration is 15 ms long. If the rollback is suc-
cessful, the mission is not endangered. Thus the leakage 12 does not vary.
But if the rollback is unsuccessful, diagnostics have to be run to allow
simplex operation. It happens rather often that there is not enough time
to run these diagnostics. The diagnostibility decreases and the failure
probability increases significantly.
Asynchronous scheduling may cause a few transients to be mistaken
as permanents since they damage a few programs and are detected more than
once. However, the increase of the leakage 13 is not having any significant
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consequences: it is as if the permanent fault rate was increased by one
thousandth. The diagnostibility is slightly less than with the synchronous
case because the asynchronous organization makes it slightly more likely to
miss more than one iteration during the sequence rollback-diagnostics.
In conclusion, it appears that a heavy computational load is to be
avoided. If it cannot be avoided, 5 plex and 4 plex are better than triplex
since it is less likely to degrade to duplex with these systems. Asynchronous
scheduling makes little difference from synchronous scheduling. This does not
take into account the higher complexity of an asynchronous system which may
cause some extra failures not taken into account by the simulation.
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9.4 CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions reported below were obtained by use of CAST.
They are based on a ten-hour flight and failure rates thought to be applicable
to the off-the-shelf avionics computers studied. The reconfigurable computer
systems were assumed to be composed of as many as five machines.
As shown in Figure 9.3-11, the greatest improvement in system
survivability is obtained by increased redundancy. Each increment of redun-
dancy decreases the 10-hour failure probability by approximately two orders
of magnitude. The greatest failure probability decrease occurs when changing
from triplex to quadruplex, e.g., a 200-fold improvement. Increasing redun-
dancy also increases cost in terms of power, weight, and volume not only due
to the added units but due also to the increased complexity of intercommunica-
tions modules, external electronics modules, and bus switches.
Increasing redundancy has diminishing returns if there are errors
in permanent-recovery algorithm design. This error penalty becomes more
severe with added redundancy as was shown in Section 9.3.3. Using simpler
recovery algorithms, i.e., those involving less RCS adaptivity, is a possible
way of ensuring error-free recovery. However, the increase in failure prob-
ability for air-transport-type missions due to decreased adaptivity (e.g., not
adapting the system down to one computer is less than that caused by decreased
redundancy or recoverability.
Since redundancy has such a large effect on failure probability,
external hardware should have an equivalent redundancy to prevent external
failures from depressing the overall survivability.
The techniques reported here devote much attention to the modeling
of transient faults. The results show that a knowledge of the transient envi-
ronment results in effective transient recovery features. Underestimating
transient duration results in many transients being recorded as permanent,
while overestimating transient duration leaves the system unduly vulnerable
to further faults.
Finally, subject to the qualifications and assumptions described in
the first paragraph of this subsection, configuration assessment has shown that
hardware-aided software configurations provide a lower probability of failure
than mostly-hardware or mostly-software configurations.
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